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Abstract 
   Built on an investigation of a large number of archival sources in three different 
countries, this study analyses free, non-white communities in the circum-Caribbean. 
Using the comparative method, I assess how the Maroons and Creeks negotiated a role 
for themselves in an inter-war context, exploring their interactions with four main 
groups. 
   First, I consider the Maroon and Creek relationship with the enslaved population of 
Jamaica and the United States, respectively. This allows me to demonstrate that the 
signing of the peace treaties with white society had little impact on interactions with 
slaves. Maroon and Creek attitudes towards slaves continued in much the same manner 
as before peace, it was the contexts in which these interactions that took place which 
changed.  
   Second, I scrutinise how the two communities navigated the potentially inflammatory 
situation of peace with their former white enemies. I argue that the Maroons enjoyed a 
more amicable relationship than the Creeks did with the local white settlers. This was 
largely a result of the fact that the Maroons and local whites shared a mutual usefulness 
whereas the Creeks and local whites did not.  
   Third, I compare the Maroon alliance with the colonial government of Jamaica with 
that of the Creek and federal government. I show that, initially, both governments 
appreciated the usefulness of such an allegiance but, as time passed and the Maroons 
and Creeks showed no indication of submissiveness, both soon moved to restrict, and 
ultimately reduce, the independence of the societies. This attitude was exacerbated 
following the Haitian Revolution when the perceived threat to white stability from the 
Maroons was at its height and the white desire for Creek lands was increased with the 
Louisiana Purchase.  
   Finally, I examine the degree of Maroon and Creek interactions outside the borders of 
Jamaica and the United States. I show that both were fully incorporated into the circum-
Caribbean region both before and after the peace treaties. Whilst the Maroons 
encountered European powers prior to the treaties, this ceased with the coming of peace 
and their alliance was focused on the British. However, the fears of the colonial 
government, particularly after the Haitian Revolution, ensured that the Maroons would 
be plagued by rumours of foreign collusion throughout the eighteenth century. In 
ii 
contrast, the Creeks continued their numerous communications with European powers 
after the ending of hostilities. American fears were based on very real events.  
   As a whole, my PhD thesis challenges the current strict hierarchical conception of 
race in the circum-Caribbean. The similarities between the Maroons and Creeks 
highlight the fact that non-white experiences were often determined by free status and 
the cause of many of the differences was the different ‘frontier’ context of the two 
rather than their divergent racial backgrounds. 
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Introduction 
   In March 1736, as the First Maroon War raged in Jamaica, a proposal intending to 
bring about the defeat of “those rebellious negroes” was put forward to the Jamaican 
House of Assembly.  White Jamaicans had been fighting the Maroons for decades and 
every attempt to resolve conflict had so far failed. The colonial government of Jamaica 
knew that it was unable to establish the type of colony that it desired while still at war 
with the Maroons. Moreover, the vast expense of such warfare was crippling the 
Jamaican economy. The proposal itself stated that previous efforts had been “ineffectual 
and attended with very considerable expense.” The colonial government needed a 
solution or the potential goldmine of Jamaica would be lost to the British Empire. 
Therefore, it was recommended that two hundred Creek Indians who “inhabit a country 
as rocky and mountainous as any part of Jamaica” be deployed against the Maroons. 
The proposal justified the choice of the Creeks by drawing similarities between them 
and the Maroons, saying, “They are a hardy warlike people, exceedingly good 
marksmen, nimble and expert in finding out and following tracts, accustomed to 
mountains, bush fighting, and ambushing. They are also inured to hardships and the 
extremities of weather.”1 This proposal outlined the physical similarities between the 
Maroons and Creeks; however, as this thesis shows, parallels between the two 
communities extended beyond physical characteristics to similarities in political 
interactions with governments, social relationships with slaves and whites, and 
participation in the circum-Caribbean. The Act did not end up being passed by the 
Assembly but it serves to show how, even in 1736, the Maroons and Creeks were 
considered similar by Jamaican whites. 
   The above quotation raises questions that have yet to be answered about non-white 
communities who signed peace treaties with white governments. Despite the similarities 
being so obvious to contemporary whites, no study has brought the Maroons and Creeks 
together to assess their roles in the societies that surrounded them. This thesis argues 
that both of these communities contributed to the expansion and consolidation of white 
domination across the circum-Caribbean region. At the same time, their actions 
provided examples of both resistance and subordination to the establishment. Finally, 
the archival evidence analysed in the following chapters demonstrates how these 
                                                          
1
 Journals of the House of Assembly (JHA), 24
th
 March 1736, Vol. III, National Archives of Jamaica 
(NAJ). 
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communities were connected to events beyond their territories and engaged with the 
wider circum-Caribbean.
2
 This is highlighted by the impact of the Seven Years´ War, 
the conclusion of the American Revolution, the conflict with the Western Confederacy 
and, in particular, the Haitian Revolution on these communities and their relations with 
foreign nationals. No other event in the time period under study here had the same 
ramifications as that ground-breaking revolution.  
   The Jamaican Maroons are descended from escaped slaves who established free 
communities in the mountainous interior of Jamaica. Many gained liberty when the 
British attacked the island and took it from Spain in 1655.
3
 The Maroons participated in 
prolonged warfare with the British from 1655 until the first peace treaties were signed 
in 1738. The Creeks, also known as the Muscogee, are a Native American people from 
the south-eastern United States. They are descendants of the Mississippian culture 
peoples who built earthwork mounds at their regional chiefdoms located throughout the 
Mississippi River valley and its tributaries, eventually settling in what is present day 
Georgia and Alabama.
4
 Much like the Maroons, the Creeks signed treaties with white 
Americans that established peace between them and white society. 
   This thesis investigates the cultural, social and political role of the Maroons and Creeks 
in the circum-Caribbean region during roughly the century that saw the consolidation, and 
for Jamaica at least, the beginnings of the decline of slavery, that is, from 1739 until 1813. 
Both communities are analysed in an inter-war period to assess how they negotiated a 
new role with former enemies. I examine the Maroons from the end of the First Maroon 
War in 1739 until the outbreak of the Second Maroon War in 1795. I analyse the Creeks 
in a slightly later period - from the end of the American Revolution in 1783 until the 
Creek War of 1813.  The central question I explore is: how did the Maroons and Creeks 
negotiate new positions in the circum-Caribbean once peace had been established 
between them and white society? I argue that, while concurrently consolidating and 
undermining slavery through a variety of means, both of these communities aided the 
consolidation of white society in Jamaica and the United States. The very presence of 
                                                          
2
 The term “circum-Caribbean” refers to a sub-region in the Western Hemisphere. It consists of the 
Caribbean Sea, its islands, and the surrounding coasts. A more detailed background to the Maroons and 
Creeks is found later in this section. 
3 Werner Zips, Black Rebels: African Caribbean Freedom Fighters in Jamaica (Princeton: Markus 
Weiner, 1999), vii. 
4 For more on the archaeology of the Creeks, see Max E. White, The Archaeology and History of the 
Native Georgia Tribes (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2002); Matthew Jennings, New Worlds 
of Violence: Cultures and Conquests in the Early American Southeast (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 2011). 
3 
these communities stabilised the regions they lived in, and thus strengthened Jamaican 
and American society. This ultimately led to the downfall of the Maroons and Creeks.  
   The periods under investigation follow a time when, out of necessity, whites had to 
depend on non-whites to stabilise regions and enable an expansion of European power 
across the Americas. Up until these periods, white people in both Jamaica and in the 
newly-formed United States were unable to create, and therefore consolidate, the type 
of society that was desired by colonists. However, after the conclusion of the First 
Maroon War and the American Revolution, opportunities arose for European-descended 
peoples to force the expansion of slavery across Jamaica and the south-eastern United 
States; for example, following the Seven Years´ War and the conflict with the Western 
Confederacy. The Seven Years´ War, fought primarily between Britain and France in 
the years 1574 to 1763, was a war borne from European rivalries which had lasting 
repercussions for the Americas. Britain was ultimately successful and the outcome 
established the country as the foremost colonial power. The years following the war 
allowed Jamaican whites the opportunity to consolidate their strength and begin the 
process of limiting the influence of the Maroons. This was particularly important in the 
years following the American Revolution when the British were determined not to lose 
any more colonies. Similarly, the successful neutralisation, in the eyes of the 
Americans, of the threat represented by the Western Confederacy enabled the United 
States to interact with foreign powers and Native Americans from a much stronger 
position. The Western Confederacy was a confederation of Native American 
communities in the Great Lakes region and was formed to resist the expansion of the 
United States. Following several successful battles with the American army, the 
Western Confederacy resistance culminated in the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1795. 
The Western Confederacy was defeated and the growing military might of the United 
States was confirmed. The Seven Years´ War and the war with the Western 
Confederacy consolidated the foundations of British and American determination to 
reduce the Maroons and Creeks; however, it was the Haitian Revolution which 
ultimately convinced both countries of the necessity of doing so. 
   In order to investigate how the Maroons and Creeks eventually succumbed in the face 
of white society, I analyse their relationships with several external sectors: enslaved 
peoples, local whites, government officials and foreign citizens. In exploring 
interactions with the enslaved population I ask: how did peace with the Maroons and 
Creeks contribute to the expansion of slave society in Jamaica and the south-eastern 
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region of the United States? I argue that, without the support of the Maroons and 
Creeks, slavery in both Jamaica and the United States would have struggled to expand 
to the extent it did. By hunting runaways, and even owning slaves on occasion, both 
communities contributed to the consolidation of the system. However, that is not to say 
that the Maroons and Creeks wholeheartedly supported the system of slavery. In fact, 
numerous examples show how the presence of Maroons and Creeks could actually 
hinder the expansion of slavery. For example, through harbouring runaways and 
forming personal relationships. Maroons and Creeks were forbidden by law to own 
slaves and, thus, the act of slave ownership also represents an act of resistance. 
Ultimately, peace had little impact on relationships between free communities and the 
enslaved population – the context of the interactions changed, engaging in combat 
against enslaved individuals now became suppressing slave rebellions, but the acts 
themselves remained relatively similar. 
   Conclusions regarding the impact of peace with the Maroons and Creeks on the 
institution of slavery inevitably lead to questions of how this affected the Maroon and 
Creek relationship with local white settlers. How did the Maroons and Creeks forge new 
relationships with their former enemies following the end of a bloody war? In general, I 
argue that, through forms of social interactions and mutual respect, Maroons and white 
settlers negotiated mainly amicable relationships. In contrast, the white settlers of 
Georgia rarely had a comfortable relationship with the Creeks and were increasingly 
hostile towards them as the years following the American Revolution passed. This 
difference was a result of the fact that the presence of Maroons aided the expansion of 
white society as desired by white Jamaicans whereas Creeks prevented, through their 
“wasteful” use of fertile lands, the enlargement of white territory as sought by white 
Americans. 
   White settlers interacted with these communities in more informal settings so it is 
imperative to ask questions regarding the formal context too. Was the difference 
between the Maroon interaction with the white settlers and the Creek interaction with 
white settlers replicated in their respective interactions with the colonial government 
and the federal government? The evidence presented in this thesis shows that the 
attitude of the colonial government towards the Maroons and the attitude of the federal 
government towards the Creeks often followed a similar pattern. Early on, the colonial 
government saw the usefulness of the Maroons, endeavoured to accommodate them and 
appreciated that their presence helped the expansion of slave society. As the expansion 
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of slavery contributed to the consolidation of white power, especially in the years 
following the conclusion of the Seven Years´ War, the colonial government 
increasingly felt it was capable of reducing the influence of the Maroons whose 
continuing presence it perceived to be a threat to the stability of the island. This was 
particularly so following the American and Haitian Revolutions.  
   Similarly, the federal government of the United States initially saw the necessity of 
securing and continuing an alliance with the Creeks. The federal government was aware 
that, because of the weaknesses of the new union, it could not afford a war with the 
Creeks politically, economically or socially. Fears of Creek collaboration with 
European forces in the region exacerbated this situation. Therefore, in the early years of 
the republic, the federal government courted the support of the Creeks. As the years 
passed, particularly following the conclusion of fighting with the Western Confederacy 
and the end of the Haitian Revolution and the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory, the 
federal government, like the colonial government of Jamaica, moved to reduce the 
influence of the Creeks in order to make it easier to unite the new western territories 
with those of the east. 
   The final question asks: how involved in the circum-Caribbean were the Maroons and 
Creeks? I argue that the Creeks were heavily involved in the region, as the Maroons 
were initially, but that it was only after the Haitian Revolution that both groups’ 
perceived potential involvement in the wider circum-Caribbean became critical to white 
society. Neither the Maroons nor the Creeks could be tolerated, because of the 
perceived risk they posed to white society. The Maroons were suspected of foreign 
interactions, especially following the American and Haitian Revolutions, but this was 
largely a result of the fears of white society and was not based on actual evidence. 
Conversely, the Creeks continued foreign communications so white Americans´ fear 
was founded on very real circumstances.  Regardless of whether the alliances actually 
occurred or not, indirect methods, such as restrictions on movement, and subsequently 
more direct approaches, such as outright warfare, were implemented to reduce the 
Maroon and Creek influence in the regions. Ultimately, however, the role of the 
Maroons and Creeks was determined by their geographic location. Many of the 
differences between the Maroons and Creeks discovered in this thesis seem to have 
been as a result of the Maroon presence on an island colony surrounded by one imperial 
power – the British – in contrast to the borderlands context of the Creeks, where they 
lived at the meeting point of several white powers. This had far more of an influence on 
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their interactions than the race of either community. 
   Therefore, my thesis shows how free communities negotiated their positions in a new 
world and faced decisions dictated by geography rather than the colour of their skins. It 
explains how the Maroons and Creeks were influential in the shaping of these regions 
and reveals a tale of mutual dependence in several different, and sometimes unexpected, 
contexts. 
       In this thesis, the term “circum-Caribbean” applies to a geographic region in the 
Americas. Coming from the Latin word “circum,” meaning around, the term has 
typically referred to the Caribbean Sea, its islands, and the surroundings coasts.
5
 
However, this thesis extends that definition to include parts of Georgia and Alabama 
that are situated further away from the coast. The “circum-Caribbean” region refers to 
an area in which ideas, people and products were exchanged in many directions. It was 
a fluid world in a similar manner to that of the Atlantic World. I argue that large areas 
of Georgia and Alabama, if not the entire states, had more in common with the 
Caribbean islands than they did with the northern states of the United States which 
bordered Canada. The societies in Georgia and Alabama, plantation-driven, slave-based 
and peopled by African slaves, free communities and Euro-descended colonists, had 
clear similarities with islands such as Jamaica and Barbados. Therefore, I have 
broadened the definition of the “circum-Caribbean” to include them.  
   In contrast, a borderland, in its loosest definition, is a place where two entities 
(usually nations or societies) border each other. As a methodology, borderlands studies 
question what happens when distinct societies rub against each other or contest lands in 
between.
6
 What do these situations tell us about both the core societies and the spaces in 
between? For early American history, the historiographic concept of borderlands 
derives from Herbert Bolton’s school of historiography on the Spanish borderlands, the 
Spanish colonies north of central Mexico, where imperial power was weak and the 
                                                          
5 See, for example, Roberta Delson, Readings in Caribbean History and Economics: An Introduction to 
the Region (London: Taylor & Francis, 1981), xvi: Bonham C. Richardson, The Caribbean in the Wider 
World, 1492-1992: A Regional Geography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6; Kenneth 
R. Andrews, The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder, 1530-1630 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1978), 2, 253.  
6
 For example, Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen (eds.), Borderlines and Borderlands: Political 
Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-State (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013); Oscar J. 
Martinez, US-Mexico Borderlands: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Wilmington: Scholarly 
Resources, 1996); Brian DeLay, North American Borderlands (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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French and English held neighbouring colonies.
7
 David J. Weber expanded the 
borderlands concept by focusing on the history of the south-western United States and 
its transition from Spanish and Mexican control to becoming part of the United States.
8
 
Traditional, at least at the time, historians ignored this area believing it to fall under the 
Latin American history sphere whereas Weber recognised how entwined Mexico and 
the United States were. More recently, scholars have explored the notion of borderlands 
further. In 1999, Adelman and Aron proposed much-needed limits on the definition of 
borderlands, which they defined as “the contested boundaries between colonial 
domains.”9 This definition is problematic because it ignores boundaries defined by 
communities other than European-descended ones. Samuel Truett continues to widen 
the definition of borderlands further. In his work, he explores how ethnic, racial and 
gender relations shifted as a former frontier became the borderlands.
10
 In more recent 
work, Truett investigates how the people of a mining region straddling the US-Mexico 
border resisted the attempts of empires, nations and corporations to define borders.
11
         
   The borderlands concept in this thesis is reminiscent of that given in Cayton and 
Teute´s Contact Points, which explores cross-cultural contacts across several borders. 
12
 
It builds upon Nancy Shoemaker´s notion that Native Americans and Europeans were 
more alike than they came to believe.
13
 This thesis is a study of the different type of 
borderlands existing within the circum-Caribbean. It examines communities which 
rubbed against each other and highlights the similarities, and differences, of living in an 
internal borderland, such as the Maroons of Jamaica, or within a more traditional 
borderland, such as the Creeks of the United States. It argues that, far from being 
distinct entities on a frontier, the situation in both examples was more fluid with several 
                                                          
7
 For example, Herbert Eugene Bolton, The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the 
Southwest (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996). 
8
 David J. Weber (ed.), Foreigners in their Native Land: Historical Roots of the Mexican Americans 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973); Weber, The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Weber, Barbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of 
Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). 
9
 Jeremy Adelman, and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the 
Peoples in Between in North American History.” American Historical Review 104 (1999), 815. See also 
Robert H. Jackson, New Views of Borderlands History. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1998. 
10
 Samuel Truett and Elliott Young (eds.), Continental Crossroads: Re-mapping US-Mexico Borderlands 
History (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004). 
11
 Samuel Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the US- Mexico Borderlands (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
12
 Andrew R. L. Cayton, and Fredrika J. Teute, eds. Contact Points: American Frontiers from the 
Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750–1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
13
 Nancy Shoemaker. A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North 
America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
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communities interacting and engaging in cultural exchange. It shows that, on occasion, 
communities in a borderlands context could have more in common with each other, 
despite the difference in race, than with other groups from the same race. 
   The Creeks´ borderlands interactions with Georgians were similar to those of the more 
traditional narrative: violence and, on occasion, hospitality. However, in the Jamaican 
example, I highlight how communities in a borderlands context could, at times, work 
against each other, but at others move in tandem. In other words, there were occasions 
when the desires of, for example, white settlers and Maroons were in opposition to each 
other but at different times, were in tandem. As a result, settlers could feel an affinity 
with government representatives because they were of the same race, whilst actually 
having more in common with Maroons. Jamaican whites and Maroons desired similar 
things: stability, security, the chance to consolidate their communities. Therefore, they 
moved in similar ways and the result was less friction than in the Creek borderlands. 
   Less friction was, of course, possible in the Creek example but did not occur. The 
primary difference was that Jamaican whites realised that they shared desires with 
Maroons and, thus, had a fairly amicable relationship with them whereas the American 
whites did not recognise common interests with Creeks, or chose not to. They thus, had 
a relatively fraught relationship with Creeks. The result was two communities moving 
against each other, not in tandem, which resulted in increased friction. 
Why the Maroons and Creeks? 
   Focusing on an indigenous community and an African-descended community, usually 
considered in the context of their own races, allows for a more original, and long 
overdue, discussion of the effects of transnational influences than a comparison between 
two indigenous societies. It enables us to see beyond cultural determinism and establish 
that interactions between free communities and external groups could depend upon 
status and geography rather than skin colour. However, the two groups do share 
important similarities which give the basis for a sustained comparison. For example, 
both Maroons and Creeks share a history of movement and continuity. The Creeks have 
a more mobile history than is often acknowledged: following European contact, they 
moved across what is now the south of the United States, incorporating other Native 
American tribes into their confederation through war and for protection from European 
9 
incursions.14 Meanwhile, the Maroons preceded the British presence on the island of 
Jamaica, being descended from runaway African slaves when the Spanish ruled the 
island from 1509 to 1655. Moreover, both of these communities were affected by the 
theories of the day – theories such as Enlightenment thought, anti-slavery beliefs, the 
evolution of racial ideology and revolutionary ideals. Comparing two communities that 
held a similar status, that is, free and non-white, but were separated by race and 
historical background, contributes original research and arguments to several key 
historical debates; such as the significant effect of the Haitian Revolution throughout 
the circum-Caribbean and the impact of race on social and political interactions in the 
region. 
   The Maroons of Jamaica are a unique society in the British Caribbean – a semi-
autonomous free community who signed peace treaties with the British and were 
afforded their liberty, their own territory, and almost total political freedom.15 No other 
group in the British Caribbean had a comparable experience. Parliamentary policies on 
slavery and almost all other aspects of the Caribbean colonies drew heavily on data 
obtained from Jamaica providing a rich source of evidence to aid the establishment of 
the context and overall arguments of this thesis. Therefore, not only was the Jamaican 
Maroon case unique, but so too was the Jamaican experience itself. Comparing the 
Maroons to a community that was also bordered by a plantation-driven, slave-based 
society is necessary to better understand the impact communities such as these had on 
the expansion of those societies and the institution of slavery. The Creeks, who were 
based in Georgia and Alabama, were bordered by white planters who unanimously 
supported the institution of slavery. These white planters were of a similar background 
to those in Jamaica, although, as will be discussed further in Chapter Two, their 
experiences diverged once they crossed the Atlantic and, certainly by the period under 
consideration in this thesis, the characteristics of the Jamaican and American planters 
could be very different.16 The Creeks are a more appropriate nation to use as a 
comparative community than any of the Native Americans in the Northern states where 
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 Albert James Pickett, History of Alabama, and Incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi, from the 
Earliest Period (Charleston: Walker & James, 1851), 76-79; Louis LeClerc Milfort, Memoirs or a Quick 
Glance at my Various Travels and My Sojourn in the Creek Nation (New York: Beehive Press, 1972), 24; 
James Adair, History of the American Indians (New York: Promontory Press, 1973), 194-220. Jon 
Muller, Mississippian Political Economy (New York: Plenum Press, 1997), 178. 
15
 The Maroons were semi-autonomous because they were largely left to dictate the internal side of their 
society, but several, key external issues were the responsibility of the colonial government; for example, 
the punishment of criminals convicted of a capital crime. 
16
 Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: The Loss of America and the Remaking of the British Empire (New 
York: Alread A. Knopf, 2011). 
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the free black to enslaved ratio was much higher than in Jamaica, the abolition 
movement more prevalent and the empirical threat from other European nations smaller. 
Likewise, a comparison with the African-descended Seminoles in the Florida region 
would not have enabled an exploration of free communities from a different racial 
background. However, the primary reason for selecting the Maroons and Creeks was the 
remarkable similarity of the treaties that they signed with white governments.  
   The circumstances of the United States and Jamaica differed as Jamaica was a colony 
of the British Empire whereas the United States was independent. To mitigate this, I 
have selected the state of Georgia as a case study of the way local white settlers 
interacted with the Creeks because the sheer amount of sources on the Creeks prevents a 
sufficiently in-depth analysis of Creek interactions with all southern states. Therefore, 
with this in mind, this study deals with the tension between whites local to Maroon and 
Creek territory and a government situated far from their lands: the colonial government 
of Jamaica and the federal government of the United States, respectively. It is important 
to bear these differences in mind because they caused conflict in white attitudes towards 
the Maroons and Creeks.  
Previous scholarship    
   This study of race, free communities, the circum-Caribbean region and, of course, the 
Maroons and Creeks themselves would not be possible without the scholarly work that 
has gone before. Early works focused on white society and their political machinations 
when dealing with enslaved populations, free communities and other empires. 
Subsequently, there has been a move away from this focus to concentrate on the internal 
politics of non-white societies in the Americas.
17
 My work builds on both of these 
approaches to history. The overall focus is on the Maroons and Creeks, both non-white 
communities, but includes extensive examination of their interaction with white and 
black society. In some ways, it is an attempt to weave together all of these stories that 
have been told individually, to build a picture of the complex, frequently changing 
interactions between the different sectors of society.  
   Previous scholarship has focused on, among other things, the expansion of the United 
States, the development of the plantation economy, and the relationship between colony 
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and metropolis.
18
 Following this, there was a larger focus on individual white societies, 
scrutinising the internal societies of indigenous and Maroon communities and their 
contact with Europeans.
19
 This work brings together all of these issues to show that the 
earlier focus on white society was not misplaced, but needs to be considered in 
conjunction with all of the other aspects of society as well.  
   The previous scholarship on the Creeks has laid valuable foundations on which this 
thesis is built, beginning with a biography of the notable Creek leader, Alexander 
McGillivray.
20
 This work, while useful, failed to examine some questions relevant to 
Creek history, choosing to focus on the role of ‘important’ men rather than Creek 
society as a whole. The Road to Disappearance by Angie Debo in 1941 aimed to move 
the scholarship forward.
21
 This book was fairly typical of the era, with other works 
chronicling the history of the Creeks appearing at a similar time, such as R. S. 
Cotterill’s The Southern Indians: The Story of the Five Civilised Tribes.22 These works 
adopted a narrative approach to the history of the Creeks, culminating in the story of 
how they were removed to Oklahoma in the mid-nineteenth century. 
   The more analytical publications that centre on all aspects of Creek society tend to 
investigate the events leading up to the Creek War of 1813, also known as the Redstick 
War. This began as a civil war within the Creek nation and developed into full-scale 
hostilities with the United States. It culminated in the Creek nation ceding more than 21 
million acres of land to the United States. Theron A. Nunez was one of the first scholars 
to write on this subject with his article ‘Creek Nativism and the Creek War of 1813-
1814.’23 In this article, Nunez explored the nativist movement that preceded the Creek 
War and argued that the primary cause for the outbreak of war was the call for a return 
to traditional Creek values. This work was one of the first in fully highlighting the 
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increasing tensions between traditional Creek and European values. Several other 
scholars agree with Nunez and link Tecumseh’s nativist movement to the Redstick 
War.
24
 Whilst I do not attempt to ascertain the main reason why the Creek War broke 
out, the various causes of the war that previous scholars have addressed enriches my 
discussion of the Creek relationship with local white settlers and government 
representatives.  
   The role of land acquisition in causing tensions between the Creeks and Americans, 
an area which attracted plenty of scholarly attention over recent years, is particularly 
relevant to this thesis. Creeks ceded millions of acres to the United States as a result of 
the federal government’s “civilisation” plan, as well as in payment for debts run up at 
federal trading posts across the region. The civilisation plan was a federal development 
program created in the 1790s to open up Native American lands to Euro-American 
settlement. The aim was to train indigenous people in ranching, farming, and cottage 
industries such as cloth making. Publically, the plan claimed that Native Americans 
would become self-sufficient farmers, selling small surpluses on the market. However, 
scholars such as James Leitch Wright, Kathryn Braund and Angela Pulley Hudson have 
shown that the underlying goal of the plan was to settle Indians on small farms and thus 
force them to give up hunting on their vast territories without resorting to costly 
warfare.
25
 Claudio Saunt explored the effect of Creek land cession, contending that the 
loss of land led to a change in the social structure of the Creeks and, therefore, a change 
in the distribution of power throughout Creek society.
26
 Robbie Franklyn Ethridge in 
Creek Country: The Creek Indians and their World argued that every Creek man and 
woman understood that the underlying motivation of the civilisation plan was land 
acquisition, and this fostered tensions between those who viewed the plan as necessary 
to their cultural survival and those who viewed it as heralding its destruction.
27
 Other 
scholars have widened the investigation of the land issue to include the effects of the 
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U.S. roads built through Creek territory in the early nineteenth century.
28
 The 
groundwork laid by these previous scholars allows this thesis to have a deeper analytical 
discussion of the relationship between Creeks and Americans - an area that I address in 
Chapters Two and Three. These scholars, as well as myself, argue that land cession was 
one of the major causes of discontent between Creeks and Georgians, although I widen 
the scope of the impact by showing how the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory 
following the Haitian Revolution sped up American efforts to acquire Creek lands.  
   In the 1960s, the influence of the Civil Rights Movement, and the growing interest in 
black history, resulted in a shift of focus towards the relationship between blacks and 
Creeks, as well as debating the extent to which Creeks owned black slaves. William S. 
Willis argued that whites feared the potential collusion between Indians and blacks so 
strove to segregate the two groups, resulting in mutual antagonism.
29
 William G. 
McLoughlin broadened the scope to show that interactions between enslaved people and 
indigenous communities varied between different indigenous groups. He further 
established that slavery had been practiced by American Indians for centuries but 
argued that the racist element of the institution was introduced by Europeans.
30
  Daniel 
F. Littlefield built upon this work by suggesting that it was not until the American 
Revolution that the Creeks developed the concept of blacks as property nor did they 
view them as slaves and individual property until the nineteenth century agricultural 
revolution.
31
 Kathryn E. Holland Braund continued this investigation into Creek slave 
ownership by suggesting that Creeks did not automatically equate blacks with slavery 
and that Creek social structure allowed them to incorporate black people into their 
communities.
32
 Finally, Claudio Saunt agreed that the Creek view of slavery was 
complex and asserts that many Creeks were horrified by European plantation culture 
and its spreading influence across the region.
33
 This scholarship forms the basis of my 
argument in Chapter One that the relationship between Creeks and blacks was complex, 
dynamic and multi-layered. I agree with the arguments that blacks were not always 
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equated with slavery by the Creeks but show that the end of the American Revolution 
was not the turning point that scholars such as Littlefield have alleged it to be. Creek 
attitudes towards slaves remained much the same after the American Revolution as they 
had before.      
   Current scholarship continues to widen the scope of Creek history and incorporate it 
into the history of the United States. The most recent publication of note is Angela 
Pulley Hudson’s Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers and Slaves and the 
Making of the American South.
34
 For a long time, Native American history in general, 
and Creek history in particular, has been segregated into “indigenous” history and kept 
apart from American history. Hudson is one of a growing number of scholars trying to 
reverse this trend.
35
 This thesis follows that approach; however, I do not stop at 
demonstrating the importance of Creeks, and subsequently other Native Americans, to 
the development of the United States. My work highlights how communities such as the 
Maroons and Creeks contributed to the development of the circum-Caribbean, a world 
that was both bordered and borderless, a world that developed strict racial barriers yet 
also blurred the lines between the races, and a world that deserves to have its many 
different communities collected into one study.
36
 
   The published literature on Creek history has several strengths. The wide variety of 
issues the scholarship addresses from nativism and land cession to relations with black 
people and the Creeks’ place in the expansion of the United States is one of them. 
However, the literature surrounding the relationship between Creeks and the whites is 
heavily focused on government officials such as Benjamin Hawkins, the U.S. Indian 
agent, and dealings with the United States government as a whole. Little distinction is 
made between whites who influenced Creek society from an external position and 
whites who influenced Creek society from within: those whites who lived among the 
Creeks, married Creek women and had Creek children. Whilst this thesis does not offer 
in-depth biographies of more “anonymous” men, it does include archival evidence from 
such people. Clearly, there are issues with these sources but I believe they give a multi-
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layered insight into Creek society and, therefore, into the Creek role in the region.
37
  
   In contrast to the scholarship on Creeks, there has been relatively little written on the 
Jamaican Maroons. The first noteworthy publication was in 1938, an article called ‘The 
Maroons of Jamaica’ by Joseph J. Williams, a Catholic missionary.38 The first book-
length work on the Jamaican Maroons, The Fighting Maroons of Jamaica by Carey 
Robinson, was not released until 1969.
39
 However, like much of the scholarship on the 
Maroons, Robinson’s book was aimed towards a more popular audience and, while 
making numerous interesting points, suffers from a lack of footnotes. Following the 
publication of these works, the literature tended to focus on the “folkloric” heroes of the 
Maroons. Examples include Nanny of the Maroons in Nanny, Sam Sharpe, and the 
struggle for people’s liberation by Kamau Brathwaite, which was written specifically as 
part of the campaign to make Nanny a “National Hero” of Jamaica, and Cudjoe in 
Cudjoe, the Maroon by Milton McFarlane.
40
 
   A publication in the same popular vein as the above, Bev Carey’s Maroon Story, is 
used throughout this thesis.
41
 Carey’s exhaustive study of the Maroons is unparalleled. I 
have found several of the examples included in Carey’s work, which are not found in 
other published manuscripts, in the archival records. Unfortunately, her work does not 
utilise footnotes but is quite clearly based on archival research because many of the 
events discussed can be found in the scholarship which does have footnotes. Therefore, 
Carey’s work cannot be ignored and I have assumed empirical foundation of incidents 
in Carey’s work not found anywhere else because of her obvious use of sources. 
   Perhaps the major academic work of Jamaican Maroon history is Mavis Campbell’s 
The Maroons of Jamaica.
42
 This is a comprehensive study of the Maroons from the 
British arrival in Jamaica in 1655 until the second set of peace treaties in 1796. 
Campbell’s work is the starting point for any scholar looking at Maroon history because 
it uses excellent archival sources. She traces the development of Maroon society from 
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its inception and emphasises the initial mutual dependence between Maroons and the 
whites. Campbell’s work concludes that the colonists’ ever-tightening control of the 
Maroons resulted in the Second Maroon War. This thesis broadens Campbell’s 
approach and emphasises the central role the Maroons played in Jamaican, and circum-
Caribbean, history by highlighting the role of the Haitian Revolution in the demise of 
the Trelawny Town Maroons. I argue that the Haitian Revolution was the primary cause 
for the increasingly restrictive acts Campbell discusses. 
   Richard Hart’s Slaves Who Abolished Slavery is another manuscript that utilises 
archival sources to investigate the development of Maroon societies.
43
 Hart covers a 
similar time period to Campbell, and includes many of the same sources, but fails to 
reach the analytical heights of Campbell’s work. The detailed quotations certainly aid 
the understanding of how the Maroons evolved from runaways under Spanish 
colonisation to communities with their own corporate identities, but they stop short of 
answering exactly how this transformation occurred. 
   The first scholar to focus the majority of their work on analytically surveying the 
Jamaican Maroons was Barbara Klamon Kopytoff.
44
 Kopytoff continued Campbell’s 
approach of critically analysing events in Maroon history. For example, she compared 
the development of the Leeward Maroons in the west of the island to that of the 
Windward Maroons in the east, arguing that the centralised authority of Cudjoe made 
the Leewards into a more organised unit than the Windwards.
45
 Among other things, 
Kopytoff surveyed events such as the signing of the peace treaties with the British in the 
1730s. She was also one of the first scholars to integrate Maroon history into the wider 
context of Jamaican history rather than segregating the community into its own field, in 
much the same way Native American history had been segregated from the history of 
the United States.
46
 Kopytoff’s work forms the basis of the discussion of the treaties and 
the interaction between Maroons and colonial government officials found in this thesis.  
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   A critical moment in the exploration of Maroon history was the use of oral traditions. 
Richard Price pioneered this method to investigate Maroon communities in Suriname.
47
 
Following Price’s approach, the anthropologist Kenneth Bilby began to use oral 
traditions to unearth the Jamaican Maroon perspective on events in their history.
48
 In 
addition, Bilby utilised other aspects of Maroon culture to investigate the history of the 
Maroons. For example, he examined the Kromanti dance of the Windward Maroons, as 
well as Maroon spirit possession, to try to comprehend Maroon culture.
49
 Before Bilby 
advocated this method, the majority of scholars relied on archival sources. The 
fragmentary nature of Maroon archival evidence means that Bilby’s research is an 
invaluable contribution to our understanding of Maroon history. There are several vital 
differences between his methodology and that of historians. Most significantly 
anthropologists, such as Bilby, take their starting point as the present and engage in 
extensive participant observation, often learning their subjects’ language and 
interviewing people, before using their findings to draw conclusions on a community’s 
present state, as well as their history. Historians, on the other hand, primarily use 
archival work created during the time under study to draw their conclusions. Bilby’s 
work combined these two approaches and was a welcome addition to the Maroon 
scholarship following a rather large gap between his work and Campbell’s.  
   The literature on Maroons in Jamaica has, so far, tended to place them in the wider 
context of Jamaican slave society only. There have been some comparisons between the 
Jamaican Maroons and the Guianese or Surinamese Maroons, for example, Kenneth 
Bilby’s ‘Swearing by the Past’, but little work has considered the Jamaican Maroons 
outside of the “expected” area. That is, the Maroons have very much been studied in the 
wider context of Maroon history with very few scholars attempting to view them in the 
context of anything else. A notable exception was Michael Craton’s book Testing the 
Chains which places the Maroons amongst other studies of slave rebellion.
50
 However, 
even this views the Maroons in an African-based context rather than crossing the racial 
divide. Any attempt to contextualise Maroon history into a wider Caribbean framework 
has only resulted in comparisons between Maroon warfare and slave rebellions. An 
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example is Monica Schuler’s ‘Ethnic Slave Rebellions in the Caribbean and the 
Guianas.’51 There has been limited effort to draw wider comparisons to groups other 
than slaves or Maroons from different colonies. This thesis fills this gap. I move beyond 
the common framework of assessing Maroons as ex-slaves and examine their role as a 
free, non-white community in the circum-Caribbean by drawing comparisons with 
another free, non-white, but indigenous, community – the Creek nation.  
   The previous scholarship on the Creeks has also largely viewed them in their 
“expected” context. The usual comparisons made in the Creek literature involve Creeks 
and other Native American communities.
52
 However, a few scholars have attempted to 
go beyond this and draw attention to the similarities between Native Americans and 
other communities, such as Rebecca B. Bateman’s ‘Africans and Indians: A 
Comparative Study of the Black Carib and Black Seminole.’53 By considering the 
Seminoles in a new context, Bateman reveals previously unknown aspects of the 
community, particularly their relationship with the white people who lived in the 
surrounding areas. Such comparisons are almost completely lacking in the Maroon 
scholarship and very limited in the Creek scholarship. There has been no significant 
comparison of Creeks to any other community outside the Native American world. My 
research is similar to that of Bateman’s in drawing comparisons between an African-
descended community and an indigenous community. However, the Seminoles were an 
amalgamation of Native Americans, usually former Creeks, and Africans, usually slave 
runaways, whereas the Native American community in this thesis was largely made up 
of indigenous Native Americans.   
   Overall, the literature on the Creeks has explored more topics than the Maroon 
scholarship and has started to consider the Creeks as part of the context of expansionism 
in the United States and as free people in the Atlantic World. However, both sets of 
literature would benefit from considering the groups in a far wider context. This sums 
up neatly the reason why I explore both the Maroons and Creeks, and their respective 
roles in the circum-Caribbean. To date, no one has attempted to draw the individual, the 
regional and the transnational into one study and create a more multi-layered study of 
these free communities. The only way to truly understand the processes occurring at the 
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local level is to take into account the political, cultural and social changes that were 
taking place in the region at the time. Doing so also reveals the networks of interaction 
and ideas that stretched beyond borders, contracting this vast geographic area, in which 
remarkably similar experiences were being enacted. It is imperative to move back and 
forth between local and transnational frameworks, demonstrating how one influenced 
the other and vice versa, to build a richer analysis of life in the circum-Caribbean for 
these free communities.   
Comparative History 
   Each chapter within this thesis has a section which is an exposition of each group 
followed by a section which directly compares the Maroons and Creeks. It is, therefore, 
worth a brief consideration of the comparative method.  
   Traditionally, social scientists, not historians, have dominated the use of the 
comparative method. By comparing two or more cases, scholars sought to isolate 
“variables” to determine the decisive causes of events. By multiplying examples of 
similar events, social scientists hope to refine their casual explanations and generate 
descriptions of human behaviour that have a more general validity.
54
 However, some 
scholars, such as George Fredrickson, have rejected this tradition and written as 
orthodox historians. For example, Fredrickson eschews the search for general laws and 
concerns himself with explaining individual cases.
55
 
   The comparative method appears to pursue two goals alternately. On the one hand, it 
seeks to accentuate the distinctive features of each individual case, and on the other, 
attempts to derive evidence on general developments from case studies. While 
historians tend toward the first approach, the second one is more prevalent among social 
scientists. However, comparative historical studies do also deal with the question of 
commonalities. In terms of this thesis, the comparative method enables the 
establishment of characteristics unique to the Maroons and Creeks while also 
identifying general trends in the attitudes towards these non-white communities in the 
circum-Caribbean. In other words, the archival evidence displayed in this thesis shows 
that both communities were altered by the Haitian Revolution but the ways that the 
impact manifested itself differed. 
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   There are some disadvantages to employing the comparative method. One of the 
foremost criticisms of the comparative approach is that it can be seen to be at odds with 
the principles of historical research - such as proximity to the sources.
56
 A further 
problem is its perceived reliance on the secondary literature over the evaluation of a 
consistent body of sources. To decrease the impact of this problem, it is necessary to 
limit the number of cases under comparison so one can move away from reliance on 
secondary works.
57
 Thus, this thesis is limited to a comparison of two communities. 
   Another major criticism of the comparative method is that the differences and 
similarities that projects of these types demonstrate are of great interest, but they are far 
more likely to add to what we know about the similarities and differences of each case 
than to tell us why those similarities and differences occurred. In other words, it helps 
with description far more than with analysis.
58
 As Carl Degler has pointed out, it is only 
when the job of explaining differences is undertaken that comparative history begins.
59
 
Therefore, this work is not focused on a description of the similarities and differences of 
the Maroons and Creeks – a sustained analysis throughout the thesis provides 
explanations for why each situation occurred. The story that comes from comparing the 
Maroons and Creeks has not been previously captured. Earlier scholarship has 
highlighted the role of free communities in the Atlantic World but has not straddled the 
racial divide between Africans and indigenous people
60
 Likewise, no study has 
compared the effects of the Haitian Revolution on an African-descended community 
and an indigenous community. The focus of Haitian Revolution scholarship has been on 
its effect on enslaved people rather than established free communities in the circum-
Caribbean. The scholarship has also spoken of the flow of ideas around the Atlantic 
World but has not traced these to show how events in other areas directly affected free 
communities across the region.
61
 The comparative method allows my research to do all 
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of these things. Overall, the comparative method shows that these communities were 
not on the fringes of society, simply used by white people then thrown aside when no 
longer required.
62
 Rather, the archival research in this thesis demonstrates how these 
communities influenced their own history and the policies formed towards them, which, 
in turn, influenced the wider circum-Caribbean. 
Historical Background to the Maroons 
   The story begins in 1739 when both the Windward and Leeward Maroons signed 
treaties with the colonial government of Jamaica. To understand the context in which 
these communities came to ally with the white government it is necessary to briefly 
review this difficult chapter in Jamaica’s history. Prior to 1739 plantation rebels and 
Maroons worked together on several occasions to confront the institution and culture of 
slavery.
63
 In most of the work created by Mavis Campbell, Barbara Klamon Kopytoff, 
Kenneth Bilby and others, the relationship between Maroons and plantation slaves is 
described as one of mutual dependence, at least prior to the signing of the first peace 
treaties in 1739.
64
  
   The Maroons were typically escapees from the plantations prior to 1739. There was 
some internal population growth but the Maroons were generally reliant on the influx of 
runaways from the plantations to bolster their number.
65
 Once escaped, Maroons often 
maintained close ties with rebels and other enslaved persons on the plantations. This 
was necessary because, as Orlando Patterson argues, those on the plantations were 
needed as spies.
66
 Apart from depending on plantation rebels to feed them information, 
the Maroons were also indebted to them for supplying arms, ammunition and certain 
food provisions.
67
 In turn, the Maroons were instrumental in physically instigating and 
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psychologically inspiring uprisings on the plantations, such as the slave revolt in St. 
Ann’s parish in 1673.68 Thus, what became manifest before 1739 was an island-wide 
revolutionary network of Maroons and slaves; cooperation between enslaved rebels and 
Maroons steeped in an inherent desire for freedom. As long as the relationship between 
rebels in the hills and the plantations remained intact, it worked to the advantage of 
black people on the island and kept the plantation system, and therefore the slave 
system and stability of the island, in a state of limbo.  
   In the years preceding the treaties, the Maroons amassed control over a substantial 
amount of territory. Most of the land that they acquired was situated along the slopes of 
the mountain chain that runs through the central part of the island. Apart from this 
location, Barbara Kopytoff stresses that the “western central part of the island” was also 
an important region in which the Maroons settled.
 69
 These natural enclaves worked as 
protective fortresses that white colonists found difficult to penetrate.
70
 Such topography 
was central to the Maroon offensive campaigns against the whites and their war strategy 
successfully curtailed the rise of white civilisation in Jamaica. Only three major colonial 
towns were built during this period, all in close proximity to each other: Kingston, Port 
Royal and Spanish Town.
71
 Along with these towns, there was limited development of 
pens, small farms and sugar plantations in the areas primarily adjoining the coast.
72
  
   The rapid pace at which the Maroons advanced in the pre-treaty years towards 
cementing their rule over a sizable proportion of the Jamaican landscape exasperated the 
British colonists.
73
 Without firm control of the island, there was a strong possibility that 
the colonists’ worst fear would materialise: relinquishing Jamaica to the blacks.74 Whites 
were in a precarious position during this entire time and the situation was a pressing 
concern. Not only was the pride of white colonists at stake, but the future of establishing 
Jamaica as a valuable and profitable colony in the British Empire was being jeopardised. 
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The colonists invested enormous sums of money in the early eighteenth century to 
counter black attempts to gain freedom in Jamaica. Edward Long, the eighteenth century 
Jamaican planter-historian, estimated that at least £240,000 was spent over the eighty 
years in efforts to suppress the resistance of the Maroons.
75
 Over two centuries later, 
Kopytoff suggested the figure exceeded Long’s estimate and stated the expense dealt a 
serious blow to colonial coffers.
76
 The military campaigns that the British government 
funded were not only costly but also largely unsuccessful. To stem the tide of a rising debt 
and to offset further embarrassment the colonists had to find another solution that 
minimised the use of force. 
   What confronted the colonists was far more complex than the Maroons as individuals 
or, indeed, as a community. For the colonists, the real threat was the act of marronage 
itself and its implications for the development of the island’s economy. With the 
increase in the number of runaways in the years leading up to 1739, the colonists were 
aware that, even if they managed to wipe out the existing Maroons, there would be new 
groups ready to replace them. The colonists faced established networks between 
plantation rebels and Maroons, an increase in the number of African runaways and the 
large acreage of “idle” land in the interior.77 The war of this period was thus against a 
much larger enemy than the Maroons. In the opinion of the colonists, it would be more 
sensible to win over some of the Maroons by entering into treaties with them, rather 
than to persist with the impossible task of exterminating them. With this in mind, the 
colonists began overtures to bring the Maroons to peace. In the west, the Maroon leader 
Cudjoe was known to have a firmer control over his people than the Maroons in the east 
of the island so the colonists aimed to open talks with him. Following peace between 
Cudjoe’s Maroons and the colonial government, the Windwards took longer to agree 
terms and, there are claims, they only did so because they feared Cudjoe would ally the 
Leeward Maroons with the colonists to defeat the Windwards.
78
 The five major Maroon 
towns after the peace treaties were Trelawny Town, Accompong, Scotts Hall, Moore 
Town and Charles Town (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Map of Jamaica showing Parish boundaries and locations of the major Maroon settlements
79
 
   Jamaica, in this period, was still an under-developed colony. Some areas had large 
numbers of white people living in them, particularly around Kingston, Spanish Town 
and Port Royal, and mass African importation had begun, but there were large areas of 
the island that lay untouched by development, predominantly in the northeast in 
parishes such as Portland, largely because of the hostile Maroon presence. A British-
appointed governor led the colonial government in Jamaica, the most prominent part of 
which was the House of Assembly, full of white planters from around the island. 
Absentee owners possessed significant amounts of land and this situation would worsen 
in the years to come.
80
 
   With the signing of the peace treaties with the Maroons, a great deal changed, and yet 
much remained on the same path since the 1730s. Tracts of land were opened up to 
cultivation but it was for cultivation that would consolidate the trade in Africans and 
their use as slave labour, rather than as an antithesis to slavery. Planters continued to 
dominate the political and economic arenas and seemed more in control than ever but 
they were still troubled by frequent slave rebellions, the threat of invasion from other 
European powers and, of course, were always wary of the intentions of the Maroons 
themselves. Despite this, the period under study is concurrent with the “golden age” of 
Jamaican slavery, at least for the slaveholders, where planter power was at its highest. 
This was particularly true following the end of the Seven Years´ War from which 
Britain emerged as the world´s leading colonial power. The situation was to last until 
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the eve of the nineteenth century. Abolitionist voices were rising and economically the 
Jamaican planters were beginning to be hurt by the competition of colonies such as 
Cuba. However, any attempt to view these processes as linear and one-dimensional 
obscures the complexity of both Jamaican history and the history of the circum-
Caribbean.  
Historical Background to the Creeks  
   Whilst the Maroons were descended from runaway slaves, and to some extent from 
the indigenous population of Jamaica, the Creeks were almost exclusively an 
indigenous people native to what is now the United States.
81
 Hernando de Soto, the 
Spanish explorer, led the first expedition into the interior of North America in the 
sixteenth century. As a result of this expedition, infection spread leading to, according 
to some scholars, the collapse of the Mississippian culture and the rise of the Creek 
confederacy.
82
 The Creeks, located in present-day Georgia and Alabama, were actually 
a confederation of tribes such as the Hitichi, the Alabama and the Coosa, who had been 
incorporated into the wider umbrella term of “Creek” as generations passed, see Figure 
2. The term “Creek” referred to the fork of a trading path from Charleston and was first 
used by the British to describe the Native Americans who lived in the area around this 
creek.
83
 Tribes were brought into the confederation either through negotiation or as a 
result of incorporation after being defeated by the larger confederation in wars. The 
basic Creek social unit was the town, or talwa. Abihka, Coosa, Cusseta and Coweta 
formed the four “mother” towns of the confederacy. The Creeks were also often split 
into the “Lower Creeks” and the “Upper Creeks” with each side often showing 
allegiance to differing European powers. The Lower Towns were located along the 
Chattahoochee, Flint and Apalachicola rivers, as well as the Ocmulgee and Oconee 
rivers; some of the major towns being Coweta, Cusseta, Hitichi and Oconee. The Upper 
Towns were located on the Coosa, Tallapoosa, and Alabama rivers; major towns 
included Tuckabatchee, Coosa and Hilibi.
84
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Figure 2: Map of Native American territories in the Southeastern United States
85
  
   As most Creeks felt a stronger allegiance to their town than to the confederacy as a 
whole, the most important leader in Creek society was the village chief, or micco. These 
men represented their villages at meetings with other villages but were not dictators and 
could only attempt to persuade others to go along with their plans rather than force the 
town into action by threat of violence. Miccos ruled with the assistance of lesser chiefs, 
or micalgi, who held posts such as medicine men, warriors and village elders. However, 
what outranked even a Creek’s allegiance to their town was their allegiance to their 
clan. The authority of the miccos was limited by a Creek’s reverence to their clan 
leader, who was often a woman, as Creek society was matrilineal. The Wind clan is 
considered the most influential with numerous powerful Creeks, such as Alexander 
McGillivray, belonging to that clan. Other clans include the Bear, the Potato and the 
Beaver. 
   As the Creek confederacy grew, so too did the European presence in the south-eastern 
United States. Britain, France and Spain all established colonies in the region following 
de Soto’s initial exploration. All of the nations traded with the Creeks and went to war 
with them throughout the eighteenth century. With the end of the Seven Years’ War in 
1763, France lost its North American empire and British settlers moved inland toward 
Creek territory. Many of these settlers began to feel that the British government 
favoured the Native American deerskin trade over the settlers’ needs and many began to 
join the Sons of Liberty.
86
 Fears of these land-hungry settlers, and the Creek need for 
European manufactured goods, such as guns, led many of the Creeks to side with the 
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British once the American Revolution broke out.
87
 However, different Creeks sided 
with different armies as a result of the complex social structure of the talwa, the clan 
and personal situation. The Upper Creeks tended to side with the British and the Lower 
Creeks attempted to remain neutral but many towns eventually joined the Loyalist 
cause. Despite this support, when the war ended in 1783, the Creek confederacy learned 
that Britain had ceded their lands to the new United States. 
   The south-eastern United States in the early 1780s was not an entirely different place 
from 1730s Jamaica. A bloody war had ravaged the country, killing thousands and 
sending the cost of the war spiralling, much like the First Maroon War did with 
Jamaica. There were developed parts of the region that were under plantation 
cultivation, but there were also vast amounts of lands open for development, both 
indigenous owned and not. Much like in Jamaica, there were large concentrations of 
white people living in the region, centred on the coastal regions such as Charleston, 
South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia. A newly-formed federal government, held first 
in New York City and then subsequently Philadelphia and Washington DC, included 
representatives from the states, and each state itself had its own government. However, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Two, absentee ownership of plantations in Georgia was 
almost non-existent, in contrast to the situation in Jamaica. 
   When signing the first of many peace treaties with the Creeks, the Americans had to 
come to terms with the fact that many of Creeks had actually fought alongside the 
Loyalists and were, in the eyes of some Americans, the defeated enemy. Talks were 
held almost immediately after the end of the American Revolution when federal 
commissioners visited the Creek territory and peace was established between the Creeks 
and the new United States. These talks heralded a new era for the Creeks. The 
confederation was now dealing with a young country rather than an empire: a country 
that wanted land to pay off the war costs and to grow into a more powerful force to 
protect itself from the European empires that surrounded it. Despite this, as with 
Jamaica, continuities occurred both internal and external to the Creeks. For example, 
despite the trading company of Panton, Leslie & Co. being Loyalist and moving to be 
based in Spanish Florida, it was allowed to continue trading with the Creeks. In a more 
national context, there was no sudden change to the path that the United States was on. 
The same crops were cultivated and the emphasis was on growth of wealth, it was 
simply now in the context of a new country rather than as colonies of the British 
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Empire. In contrast to the period under consideration in Jamaica, this was not the 
“golden age” for the United States. There were good times, for the contemporary white 
population at least, of mass expansion and escape from metropolitan control: but it was 
also a young nation, torn between how to best move forward and bring the thirteen 
colonies together into one nation. It was a time of political turmoil and uncertainty, yet 
eventually, and especially following the defeat of the Western Confederacy, it seemed 
that nothing could stop the expansion of the United States.  
Sources 
   This investigation into the Maroons and Creeks is based on archival work in three 
different countries. However, Maroon history suffers from a lack of sources from both 
the Maroons themselves and those whites and slaves who lived near them. Therefore, 
the majority of research can only be based on official government records such as those 
in the U. K. National Archives and the Jamaican National Archives. Where possible, I 
have utilised sources such as the diaries of Thomas Thistlewood, a planter living near 
the Maroons, and accounts from men, such as John Merody, who lived amongst the 
Maroons. Further, wider commentary provided by planter-historians like Bryan 
Edwards, Edward Long and R. C. Dallas ensure that personal attitudes and views of 
contemporaries inform the discussion. Also included are events mentioned in Bev 
Carey’s Maroon Story which, whilst problematic because of the lack of footnotes, is 
clearly based on archival research and benefits from stories passed down to Carey 
through her Maroon heritage. 
   The Creek investigation profits from a far larger body of archival documents. It 
combines government records with personal letters from Europeans and Americans 
involved with the Creek Nation. Accounts written by Creeks themselves are also 
incorporated to allow their voice to be heard where possible. To ensure that the 
documents of powerful men are not limited to Americans, the published letters of 
Alexander McGillivray, the Creek leader, form a balance to the diaries of Benjamin 
Hawkins. Unfortunately, as with the Maroon sources, the voices of enslaved people are 
regrettably rare. The few mentions attributed to slaves are quoted within the letters of 
white men; however, it is imperative to include them. 
   There are clearly limitations to the use of the above sources. Despite being a study of 
the Maroons and Creeks, the evidence is largely drawn from the writings of white men. 
However, there often is no other option. The vast majority of people never left a 
29 
historical account and, for those that were written, much is lost over time. The solution 
is to utilise the few sources available that represent the voices of the Maroons and 
Creeks then to read between the lines of other records to enrich the analysis after 
assessing the possible biases of the author. This thesis has been written with the 
acceptance of the shortcomings of the archival manuscripts and endeavours to 
understand the context of the available sources to ensure as accurate an assessment as 
possible of the Maroons and Creeks.   
Treaties 
   The starting points for assessing these two communities are the treaties they signed 
with representatives of the governments in Jamaica and the United States. The Leeward 
Maroons in western Jamaica signed their treaty first in 1738/9, followed shortly by the 
Windward Maroons of the east.
88
 The first treaty that the Creeks signed after the 
American Revolution was the Treaty of Augusta, signed in November 1783 with 
representatives of Georgia. The first treaty agreed with the federal government was the 
Treaty of New York, signed in 1790.  
   The obvious problem with comparing these treaties is that the Maroons only signed 
treaties with the colonial government whereas the Creeks signed treaties on both a state 
and a federal level. Several issues arose from this, including the fact that many federal 
representatives, and Creeks, deemed the state treaties invalid because they were signed 
with only a few Creeks present rather than representatives from the majority of towns. 
However, the treaties did have an effect on Creek society because the state of Georgia 
sought to enforce them. Therefore this brief introduction primarily addresses the Treaty 
of New York as the principal treaty for the Creeks, but also includes a short discussion 
of the Treaty of Augusta. 
   It has been claimed elsewhere that the Maroons and British representatives actually 
signed a blood oath – a traditional ceremony which involved drinking each other’s 
blood mixed together with rum.
89
 Whether this is true or not, the evidence undoubtedly 
points to the Maroons taking their treaty obligations seriously. The treaty signed by the 
Leeward Maroons differed in several ways to that signed by the Windward Maroons. 
However, in both treaties there were similar, significant clauses. In return for ending all 
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hostilities, the Maroons were obliged to aid the colonial government in times of internal 
or external threat. White superintendents were also sent to live in each of the major 
towns. Perhaps the most infamous of the clauses required the Maroons to hunt and 
return slave runaways. The Maroons also had to agree to reserve the death penalty to the 
Crown, even for Maroon citizens who had committed crimes towards other Maroons on 
Maroon land. The colonial government was charged with deciding upon the line of 
succession once the current chiefs had died. Finally, the Maroons were granted a certain 
amount of land, although Kopytoff has likened this to confinement to reservations.
90
 
Both treaties allowed Maroons to grow and sell crops but Quao’s explicitly outlawed 
the production of sugar cane. 
   There is some debate over which side initiated the treaty negotiations in Jamaica. Zips 
claims that the whites offered gifts and hostages, and the governor himself undertook 
the arduous journey to the vicinity of the Maroon villages to ratify the treaty without 
delay.
91
 Ultimately, though, both sides were committed to ending the fighting. On 19 
April 1739 the Assembly passed an Act confirming the terms of the treaty and 
authorising the payment of rewards to those Maroons who in future should take up, and 
restore to their owners, runaway slaves.
92
 The Governor reported the agreement of the 
majority of the Windward Maroons in his address to the Assembly on 18 March 1740, 
“some sulkers excepted.”93 
   Wilson argues that the treaties constituted a pivotal moment in British-Maroon 
relations, the differing interpretations of which had lasting repercussions for both 
sides.
94
 This is a view supported by Robinson who stated that the treaties changed “the 
entire character of the Maroons and reverse their way of life.”95 However, the Maroons 
had been fighting the British since 1655 and had still not established themselves as a 
formal community. The treaties gave them the opportunity to do so without committing 
themselves and their children to further warfare. There is no doubt that, on paper, the 
British gained more: peace, an internal police force, and a psychological blow to the 
enslaved people left on the plantations. But the Maroons gained what they had been 
fighting for and, as the rest of this thesis will show, the treaties led them into their most 
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powerful phase yet.  
   The Creek treaties share much with those signed by the Maroons. In May 1783, a 
group of Creek warriors and headmen travelled to St. Augustine to ascertain the validity 
of rumours that Great Britain intended to evacuate the south-east. The result was the 
Treaty of Augusta.  The treaty awarded Georgia approximately 1,000 square miles of 
Creek lands between the Tugaloo and Oconee rivers; land which, to a large degree, was 
already being settled by American squatters.
96
 Georgia also promised to forget the 
depredations committed by pro-British Creek warriors during the war and to renew the 
old system of trade.
97
 However, Alexander McGillivray declared the treaty invalid 
because he claimed it had been signed under duress and only by two minor chiefs. 
Creek tradition required "unanimous" consent for the cession of Creek lands and, 
therefore, in McGillivray’s eyes, the treaty was void. The Georgians repeated this 
process of treaty signing at Galphinton in 1785 and Shoulderbone Creek in 1786.
98
 This 
is the primary reason for comparing the Treaty of New York with the Maroon treaties 
because the Treaty of New York was signed by Alexander McGillivray and numerous 
other notable chiefs, making it the treaty which most represented the agreement of the 
Creek nation (although, it is important to note that it still caused dissension within the 
confederacy).
 99
 
   The federal government had spent several years trying to sign a treaty with the 
Creeks. After a failed attempt at Rock Landing, Georgia, in 1789, Alexander 
McGillivray was invited to New York by George Washington to conduct a treaty. 
Twenty-seven Creek leaders travelled to New York for the occasion. The Creeks agreed 
to cede a significant portion of their hunting grounds to the United States and to return 
runaway slaves to the official authorities. In return, the United States granted the Creeks 
the right to punish non-Indian trespassers in their territory but refused to allow the 
Creeks to punish non-Indians who committed crimes on Creek lands. The Creeks agreed 
to turn over Creek people accused of crimes against Americans to the U. S. courts. The 
nation was also to receive twelve hundred dollars a year for the lands, ten times as much 
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as the value of all the game the Creeks could kill on it in one year.
100
 In a secret article, 
Alexander McGillivray received a commission as a brigadier in the U. S. Army and was 
granted permission to import up to sixty thousand dollars of trade foods, in any one 
year, through the Spanish port of Pensacola without paying American duties.
101
 The 
treaty legally prohibited individual states from concluding treaties with the Indians. 
Following the signing of the peace treaty, the President presented “a string of beads as a 
token of perpetual peace, and a paper of tobacco to smoke in remembrance of it.”102   
   Kappler claims that one of the most significant provisions of the 1790 treaty 
represented the desire of leading Americans to end Creek dependence on the deerskin 
trade and recast the Native American socially, politically, and culturally. In Article 12, 
the United States agreed to “furnish gratuitously … domestic animals and implements 
of husbandry” so that the Creeks might “be led to a greater degree of civilisation, and to 
become herdsmen and cultivators, instead of remaining in a state of hunters.”103 
Provisions were also made for interpreters and federal agents to reside among the 
Creeks in order to supervise and direct the transformation. The so-called “civilisation 
plan” held great ramifications for the Creeks, which will be explored in more detail in 
later chapters. 
   The importance of the Treaty of New York cannot be overstated. Indeed, Holmes 
argues that the most important diplomatic triumph of the United States took place when 
President George Washington ratified the Treaty of New York with Alexander 
McGillivray and the Creeks on 13 August 1790.
104
 This was a type of treaty that had 
never been signed before and not just because, as Hudson claims, it marked a change to 
tradition; treaties with the Creeks were now negotiated in board rooms hundreds of 
miles away from the disputed territory.
105
 This treaty marked a new attitude towards 
treaties in the United States. Ethridge has argued that in the first years after the 
American Revolution, no monetary compensation was offered to the Indians. Modelled 
after the British system, these early treaties were ostensibly peace treaties, although they 
were inevitably accompanied by requests for land, and the Indians were guaranteed U.S. 
protection. However, as the years passed, treaties became a way of acquiring land and 
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not of making trade alliances.
106
 The Treaty of New York represents the beginning of 
this change. 
   The Treaty of New York was also notable because it changed the way that monetary 
compensation was distributed. In previous years, annuities guaranteed a yearly stipend 
to be paid to the Native American group. Initially, the annual payments were guaranteed 
“in perpetuity.” However, in the Treaty of New York the U.S. Senate insisted that the 
number of years be fixed and a lump sum be paid upon signing.
107
 This enabled the 
federal government to have more freedom when it came to treaties. It could sign treaties 
and not be bound to pay hefty sums for numerous years. It meant indigenous 
communities could be tempted with seemingly large amounts of money which were 
actually relatively low.  
   At first glance, the treaty gave the Americans what they wanted with few major 
concessions to the Creeks. The treaty settled the disputed Creek-Georgia boundary by a 
cession of some three million acres lying between the Ogeechee and Oconee rivers. 
However, the land in question had been granted to Georgia by the three treaties 
negotiated during the 1780s and was already heavily settled, thereby losing its value as 
a hunting range. This led to Braund claiming that, regardless of political implications, 
the treaty actually served the Creeks well economically.
108
   
   How has this treaty been viewed by other scholars? Watson claims that although it 
ostensibly placed the Creeks under American control, in fact, it only aroused opposition 
by the expansion-minded people of Georgia, their Spanish neighbours, and the Creeks 
themselves.
109
 Therefore, Watson suggests that the treaty actually hindered Creek 
society. On the other hand, Randolph Downes has claimed that "few Indian treaties to 
which the United States was a party have been so favourable to the red man."
110
 These 
two views represent the different sides taken by scholars. I argue that the treaty itself 
had a limited impact upon the Creeks, in most areas at least; it was other events like the 
Louisiana Purchase that eventually weakened the power of the Creeks.  
   Overall, there were many similarities between the treaties signed with the Maroons 
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and the treaties signed with the Creeks. Other scholars, such as Wilson, have noted the 
Maroon treaties and British officials' “similarly ambivalent deals” with Native 
Americans elsewhere in the Caribbean and on the North American continent.
111
 
However, no one has used the similarities of these treaties as a basis to explore these 
two communities further.    
Chronology 
   This study begins in the early eighteenth century, just after the signing of the initial 
peace treaties with the Jamaican Maroons in 1739. It ends almost one hundred years 
later with the commencement of the Creek War of 1813, which grew out of the War of 
1812 between the United States and Britain. However, there are two different time 
frames that overlap here; the Maroon timeline begins in 1739 and ends with the Second 
Maroon War in 1796 while the Creek timeline commences at the end of the American 
Revolution in 1783 and ends in 1813.
112
 I have chosen these timeframes for several 
reasons. The Maroons are dealt with over a longer period of time because they only 
signed two significant sets of peace treaties with the British and it is that time between 
the treaties that is under consideration. In addition to this, the archival evidence for the 
Maroons is much more limited than that regarding the Creeks and, therefore, the 
timeframe had to be extended in order to provide more access to archival evidence and a 
more viable comparison. The reverse is true for the Creeks; the archival evidence can 
be, at times, overwhelming and one way to limit the sheer volume of documents is to 
examine a shorter time period. Additionally, beginning with the end of the American 
Revolution enables this study to focus on how the newly-formed United States dealt 
with the Creeks, avoiding over-complicating the situation by bringing British policies 
into the study which, while fascinating, would simply not be possible for a study of this 
length. Taking the Creek War of 1813 as the end-point also allows the study a suitable 
end in terms of another significant treaty, the Treaty of Fort Jackson, being signed. This 
permits an analysis of how both the communities, and their negotiations of new 
relationships outside of their own societies, changed in an inter-war period. Using an 
inter-war period allows an assessment of change and continuity brought about by peace. 
   These periods saw massive changes beyond Jamaica and the United States. Scholars 
have used different terms to describe this but among them are the “Age of Revolution” 
                                                          
111
 Wilson, ‘Performance of Freedom,’ 62. 
112
 There is some debate over what year the American Revolution finally ended; I have taken the end as 
1783 because that was the year that the peace treaty, the Treaty of Paris, between Britain and the United 
States was signed. 
35 
and the “Age of Enlightenment.” Political power in the Americas was changing, as it 
was in Europe, a fact which must be kept in mind as the power politics between 
European empires had huge effects on both policy and day-to-day life in the 
Americas.
113
 The relevant debates, which will be discussed in the appropriate chapters, 
include the development of racial ideology; power in the eighteenth century circum-
Caribbean; and the meaning of “freedom” in the eighteenth century British Atlantic 
World. The role that the Maroons and Creeks played in the circum-Caribbean must be 
viewed in this wider context, once again showing how the best historical research 
moves between the local, the national and the transnational. Throughout the period 
covered by this study, the treatment of free communities in Jamaica and the United 
States contributed to the construction, and de-construction, of race as a dividing factor 
in the circum-Caribbean by providing examples of the Maroons and Creeks crossing the 
racial divide between African and indigenous American, as well as examples of 
crossing the potentially greater divide of “white” and “non-white.” The Maroon and 
Creek experience consolidated racism, for example, by emphasising the divide-and-rule 
strategy of whites in the Atlantic World, but also demonstrated that the often-heralded 
binary of “white” and “non-white” could be a fallacy. There is evidence that both 
Maroons and Creeks were entertained in the homes of white people; whites were not 
simply military allies but social acquaintances as well. Yet, on the other hand, Maroons 
and Creeks contributed to racist acts and were victims of racism themselves. The 
Maroons were simultaneously considered faithful allies by the whites of Jamaica but 
also blamed for the “indiscriminate massacre and destruction by the hands of 
savages.”114 By examining all of these different facets of interaction, a clearer, although 
more layered, picture of race relations in the eighteenth century circum-Caribbean 
region will emerge.   
Limitations and Possibilities for Future Research 
   Whilst outlining what this thesis does address, it is also important to take a moment to 
highlight the areas that it does not address and the reasons for that. A sustained 
discussion of the Maroon and Creek interactions with free black communities in 
Jamaica and the United States is not included. This is a result of space restraints but also 
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because the free black population was, like the Maroons and Creeks, a free, non-white 
community and this thesis aims to discuss the differences between such a society and 
other groups such as non-free, non-white communities or free, white communities. 
However, a comparison between a free, non-white community with a corporate identity 
and one without would be a very worthwhile piece of scholarship, building on the work 
presented in this thesis. 
   While, clearly, I am not arguing that all free communities in the circum-Caribbean 
region had a uniform experience in the period under study, there is enough evidence to 
suggest that similar attitudes towards them could be found in others, certainly those in 
other plantation-based slave societies. The Creek experience can certainly be related to 
the other four “civilised” tribes of the Cherokee, the Chickasaw, the Choctaw and the 
Seminoles, as well as other Native American tribes in the United States. There seems to 
be some difference in the treatment of the Northern tribes, the most famous of which is 
the Iroquois, but this study can certainly contribute to the knowledge and methods of 
studying tribes such as these. Likewise, the Maroons of Jamaica were unique in signing 
peace treaties with the British government whereas the other well-known Maroon 
groups in Suriname signed their treaties with the Dutch. The local issues that have been 
uncovered in this study can be comparable, but not identical, to the other communities 
mentioned above, but the transnational influences uncovered, such as the Loyalist 
diaspora following the American Revolution, the reduction of the freedom of movement 
on non-white people and the effects of the Haitian, French and American Revolutions 
are issues that can be brought into the study of many free, non-white communities in the 
Atlantic World.   
   The terms used throughout this thesis can sometimes be problematic. For example, in 
the comparative sections of the chapters, I refer to the Maroons or Creeks interacting 
with “other sectors of society.” In these instances, I mean other sectors of Jamaican 
society for the Maroons and other sectors of American society for the Creeks. Whilst 
the Maroons and Creeks were accepted into these two societies to a certain extent, they 
were separate entities in themselves, even after the signing of the peace treaties. 
However, the phrase identifies Jamaican and American society as the context in which 
the Maroons and Creeks most interacted. It also serves as shorthand to allow the 
argument to be presented more clearly. 
Structure 
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   There has been no comprehensive overview of the Maroon or Creek role with the 
many different sectors of Jamaican or American society; therefore, this thesis has four 
main chapters, moving out in metaphorical concentric circles from the local to the 
transnational to build a multi-layered analysis of these roles. 
   Chapter One addresses Maroon and Creek interactions with the slaves who lived 
either within or near their territory. This chapter opens up wider debates about how 
peace with free communities in the circum-Caribbean contributed to the institution of 
slavery, but it also shows how, on an individual level, resistance to the slave system 
could be commonplace. This section identifies three main spheres of interaction 
between the Maroons and Creeks and the enslaved populations of Jamaica and the 
south-eastern United States: slave ownership, hunting runaways, and familial 
relationships. The archival evidence shows that, with regard to slaves at least, little 
changed with the bringing of peace.  
   Chapter Two examines Maroon and Creek interaction with local white settlers, that is, 
those men and women who lived either amongst them, such as the superintendents and 
traders, or the men who lived near them and owned plantations that bordered on Maroon 
and Creek territory. This chapter discusses how the communities were involved on a 
more regional level, interacting across the racial divide and outside of their territory. It 
also provides a view on how the official relationship laid out in the treaties actually 
played out in real life. The three areas of interaction analysed in this chapter are: land, 
violence, and personal relationships. The main argument of this chapter is that the 
Maroons largely had a more amicable relationship with white settlers than the Creeks 
did, primarily because white settlers in Jamaica valued stability over further land 
acquisition whereas white settlers in the south-eastern States desired Creek land. 
   Chapter Three discusses the Maroon and Creek relationship with the respective 
governments – the colonial Jamaican government and the federal government for the 
Creeks. This chapter reviews the role the Maroons and Creeks played on a more 
national/imperial level and how they influenced policies which applied to themselves, 
as well as to the slaves. The three main fields of discussion are: land, economy (or 
trade), and personal relationships. The chapter shows that, in contrast to the previous 
chapter, the Maroons often had a worse relationship with representatives of the colonial 
government than the Creeks did with representatives of the federal government. This 
was a result of the fact that the colonial government did not rely on the Maroons for 
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trade or land acquisition whereas the federal government did with the Creeks. Both 
governments began the inter-war period with an accommodationist stance towards the 
free communities but this changed after the Haitian Revolution. To the colonial 
government, the Maroons now represented a threat to the continuing success of the 
island while the Creeks stood in the way of the federal government being able to unite 
its new western territory with its eastern lands. 
   Finally, Chapter Four is an analysis of the interactions of the Maroons and Creeks 
beyond the borders of Jamaica and the United States. This chapter demonstrates to the 
fullest extent how these communities were, or were perceived to be, connected to the 
circum-Caribbean. From the Creeks being considered as a force to fight the Jamaican 
Maroons in the 1730s, to the Maroons petitioning the Governor of Spanish Caracas for 
aid if they rose up against the British; this chapter is perhaps the most original and 
noteworthy of all because few scholars even address the possibility of the Maroon and 
Creek influence reaching beyond their “national” borders. This chapter shows how the 
inter-war period was characterised by a continuation of many practices by the Maroons 
and Creeks when it came to interacting with foreign nationals. However, it also 
emphasises how that changed when the Haitian Revolution broke out. In Jamaica, this 
revolution resulted in rumours that the Maroons and French were in collusion, 
convincing the Governor of Jamaica to move to eradicate the Maroons. The end of the 
Haitian Revolution also caused the sale of the Louisiana Territory to the United States 
by France which led to the United States aggressively pursuing a policy of Creek land 
acquisition. Therefore, events that occurred neither in the United States or Jamaica 
ended in the loss of vast amounts of Maroon and Creek land. 
   Overall, this thesis presents new arguments about the role of free communities in the 
circum-Caribbean in the eighteenth and early nineteen centuries. The effect of the peace 
treaties on the Maroons and Creeks has often been overstated and, I argue, the focus 
needs to be on the larger context of the circum-Caribbean to understand how events 
unfolded and eventually resulted in total war. These communities enabled the expansion 
of slavery while also providing inspiration for resistance; they stabilised colonies while 
representing the biggest threat to that very stability. Theirs is a story of continuity and 
change, confirmation and contradiction. By moving between individual interactions and 
vast power games between empires, a more rounded, detailed analysis of the Maroon 
and Creek role in the circum-Caribbean emerges. 
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Chapter 1. Maroons, Creeks and the Enslaved Populations of Jamaica 
and the United States 
   In August 1795, following the termination of the Second Maroon War, John Merody, 
assistant to the Trelawny Town attendant Thomas Craskell, was brought to testify in 
front of the Commander-in-chief. He was asked whether the Maroons had “tampered” 
with any “estate negroes” to induce them to join the rebellion against the whites. 
Merody replied that one night, shortly before the Proclamation declaring war on the 
Trelawny Town Maroons was issued, he overheard a conversation amongst slaves that 
about one hundred of them were “ready and willing to join.”1 
   In the United States, local whites had similar fears of a Creek alliance with the 
enslaved population. In April 1816, after the Creek War had come to an end, Edmund 
Doyle, an Indian countryman, wrote to John Forbes, of Panton’s trading house, 
discussing the matter of enslaved people within the Creek nation. Doyle wrote that, 
during that war, hundreds of blacks had been “carried away” from the nation. The 
blame for their absence was placed firmly on the Creeks by saying that every black 
person he saw claimed that they had been “seduced from their masters.”2 However, 
even Doyle himself admitted it would be hard to prove that this was the case. 
   Both of these examples demonstrate the overriding fear that many European-
descended people in Jamaica and the United States had of the enslaved population 
joining forces with these free, armed, semi-autonomous communities. This threat was 
both physical, the free communities uniting with slaves to fight against the whites, and 
psychological - the Maroons and Creeks serving as inspiration to enslaved individuals. 
In response, the governments of both Jamaica and the United States used the treaties to 
continually stipulate that the free communities hunt down and return slave runaways to 
create animosity between them and the enslaved populations. Despite this, as the two 
above examples show, whites continued to be plagued by the possibility of the enslaved 
joining with these free communities and launching an attack on white society.  
   As a result of these fears, Maroons and Creeks were under pressure to change their 
behaviour towards enslaved people in the inter-war period. There was arguably no other 
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sphere that caused the whites in Jamaica and the United States so much concern. Prior 
to the treaties, Maroons and Creeks had interacted with the enslaved populations for 
years, at times working together and at others fighting against each other.
3
 This chapter 
shows how little changed in this regard during the inter-war periods. Maroons and 
Creeks continued to engage in hostilities with slaves, in the context of suppressing slave 
rebellions, and carried on forming personal friendships. In addition, many of the 
behaviours which suggest a change in attitude towards the enslaved population actually 
demonstrate a continuation of previous practices and resistance to change. The way in 
which these attitudes were expressed altered but the belief behind those attitudes was 
the same. In this way, the peace treaties had little impact upon the social relations 
between enslaved people and the Maroons and Creeks. 
1.1 Maroons and Slaves: Runaways, Rebels and Allies 
   Scholars who speak of the Maroon relationship with the enslaved population of 
Jamaica in the inter-war period often represent it as antagonistic, or, at best, strained.
4
 
Grant goes so far as to claim that the respect and admiration that the Maroons had 
enjoyed from the enslaved population “inevitably turned to hatred and fear.”5 This 
section demonstrates the inaccuracy of these claims. Certain slaves did turn to hatred of 
the Maroons, and vice versa, but the relationship was complex and had been so even 
before the peace treaties. Grant’s view implies that the slaves’ views of the Maroons 
were only changed by the intervention of white society through signing peace treaties. 
But casting the relationship before the treaties as “good” and after as “bad” is overly 
simplistic. This section investigates the many forms in which the Maroons interacted 
with enslaved people after the peace treaties and how, overall, the peace treaties did not 
change the “entire character” of Maroon society.6   
   The pre-treaty relationship has been characterised in two main ways. Some scholars, 
such as Milton McFarlane, have claimed that certain slaves were cultivated as “reliable 
and trusted friends” but the vast majority of slaves were unable to recognise a Maroon.7 
Conversely, Michael Craton argues that Maroons were well-known in slave circles 
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because they kept in touch with enslaved family and former shipmates.
8
 Craton 
acknowledges that this did not necessarily result in a positive relationship. He shows 
that plantation slaves were often used against the Maroons during the First Maroon 
War.
9
 It was this situation, of enslaved people and Maroons fighting against each other 
prior to the treaties, which helped to foster the animosity that was present after the 
treaties.   
   Antagonism prior to the treaties was evident in other ways too. According to Carey, 
three slaves, Cuffee, Sambo and Quashey, were taken by the Maroons from their 
plantations but chose to return to estate life with their former owners because life 
among the Maroons “was not to their suit.”10 Of course, this claim could have been 
made to appease their owners but it does not explain why the slaves voluntarily left the 
Maroon territory. Maroons were known to raid plantations and take slaves with them, 
fostering more tensions, and this may have been the case with the above three slaves. 
Some would have gone willingly but others may have had families and friends that they 
did not want to leave behind. Forcibly removing these slaves from one location to 
another did not endear the Maroons to the enslaved population. Despite this, other 
slaves continued to join the Maroons in large numbers. In one ambush by the Maroons 
an entire complement of seventy Africans attached to Hobby's Barracks willingly 
deserted.
11
 These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate the complexity of the 
Maroon and enslaved relationship prior to the peace treaties.   
   Despite this ambivalence of the slaves towards the Maroons, Jamaican whites were 
constantly afraid that the slaves would join with them. In 1733, the Assembly of 
Jamaica claimed that the Maroons’ actions had “shaken the fidelity of our most trusty 
slaves.” The Assembly worried that even those who remained in “seeming subjection 
wish well” to the Maroon cause, and were only awaiting an opportunity to join with 
them.
12
 Many of the clauses in the peace treaties reflect the colonial government’s 
determination to keep the two sides apart in the inter-war period. 
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  One of the most infamous ways that the colonial government tried to do this was by 
inserting a clause which stated that the Maroons had to hunt slave runaways and return 
them to white officials. White Jamaicans benefited from this clause in several ways. 
First, it reduced the likelihood that slaves could run away successfully. Previously, 
Maroon towns were an ideal haven to run to because of their inaccessibility and lack of 
proximity to white communities. Second, it provided what Bilby has called an “internal 
police force,” full of men who knew the mountains from childhood and had honed their 
martial skills in the years previous.
13
 Finally, it stoked the tensions that had simmered 
between the slaves and the Maroons for years. As Zips highlighted, slaves had fought 
on the side of the colonial militia for payment; now Maroons could themselves serve as 
mercenaries against slaves who fought for freedom.
14
 The inclusion of this clause in the 
treaties was seemingly a masterstroke by the colonial government. However, as this 
chapter shows, what transpired was more complex, and relations continued in a similar 
manner as before the peace treaties. 
   Before examining the extent to which the Maroons adhered to this treaty obligation, it 
is worth exploring another intriguing cause of the complex relationship between slaves 
and Maroons – slave ownership. The colonial government consistently decreed that 
Maroons were not to own slaves in their towns. Whilst the rate of slave ownership 
within Maroon communities does not seem to have been significant, it did occur both 
before and after the treaties. Unfortunately, records for this area are extremely 
fragmentary so we can only infer a certain amount of information.  
   The first official reference to slaveholding was just five years after the peace treaties. 
A motion put to the Assembly stated that several merchants were found to be selling 
slaves to the Maroons. The House was against this and demanded a clause to prevent 
the Maroons from keeping slaves be inserted into a proposed bill.
15
 After this, few 
mentions of Maroon-owned slaves were found in the years following the peace treaties. 
In 1773, Robert Brereton, the superintendent-general of all the towns, wrote about the 
Maroon leaders: “I find there are about twenty slaves in all the towns, belonging to the 
Maroon officers, which they do not care to acknowledge or give me an account of.”16 It 
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is possible that even more slaves were owned by the Maroons because, as owning slaves 
was against the treaties, Maroons would have tried to keep the slaves’ identity secret.  
   Slave ownership by the Maroons seems to have continued into the 1790s. In 1791, the 
colonial government passed a second law for the better order and governing of the 
“negro towns” which explicitly prevented them from purchasing slaves.17 There would 
be little reason for the government to pass such an act if the Maroons did not own any 
slaves. Under what conditions were these slaves held? Were they treated as chattel 
slaves? Were they incorporated into Maroon society? Unfortunately, there is no archival 
evidence to directly answer these questions. Thompson believes that Maroon slaves had 
few rights in this period whereas Genovese argues that the Maroons practised a “mild, 
familial slavery” reminiscent of the kind practised in Africa.18 What is certain is that 
these slaves would have been held in different conditions to slaves in the rest of Jamaica 
for reasons outlined later in this section.   
   Mavis Campbell expands upon Genovese’s suggestion by stating that Maroon slaves 
were treated in a similar manner to slaves living in the Asante kingdom of Africa, who 
scholarly consensus understands as the ancestors of Maroons.
19
 Slavery amongst the 
Asante people arose as a social mechanism for the assimilation of “outsiders” into early 
Akan society. As the Asante were matrilineal, children born of male slaves and Asante 
women were absorbed into the Asante people through the matriclans.
20
 A slave might 
be offered by his family to go into in service to discharge a family obligation and 
thereby avoid war and bloodshed.
21
 This is a remarkably similar system to that of the 
Creek slave ownership, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The Maroons’ 
position in Jamaica would make this type of slavery feasible. The small numbers of 
slaves in Maroon towns alone shows that slaves were held in different conditions to the 
majority of estate slaves in Jamaica. This small-scale agriculture conducted in Maroon 
territory could not replicate the conditions under which slave labourers on the coastal 
plantations toiled.  
                                                          
17
 Jamaica, The Laws of Jamaica: 1760-1792, (London: A. Aikman Printer’s to the King’s Most Excellent 
Majesty, 1811), 476. 
18
 Eugene Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the making of the 
Modern World (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 57; Alvin O. Thompson, Flight to 
Freedom: African Runaways and Maroons in the Americas (Kingston: University of West Indies Press, 
2006), 216. 
19
 Campbell, Maroons of Jamaica, 21. 
20
 Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 165. 
21
 Carey, Maroon Story, 436-7. 
44 
   The few cases which do mention Maroon-owned slaves provide frustratingly little 
detail on the conditions they were held under. For example, there is a fleeting mention 
of the black man, Montezuma, said to have belonged to a Maroon called W. Kerr in a 
list of runaway slaves.
22
 Other than these names, no further details are revealed. It is 
possible Montezuma was indeed a slave. Alternatively, Kerr may have claimed 
Montezuma was his slave to protect him from ownership by white Jamaicans. Bev 
Carey argues that this was one of three ways in which Maroons could aid slaves, the 
other two being providing shelter and being selective in which individuals they 
apprehended.
23
 However, Carey’s argument is weakened because owning people was 
outlawed for the Maroons and, by claiming a person as their “property,” Maroons 
actually risked those people being confiscated and possibly punished. Harbouring a 
slave and claiming that person was free, or even a Maroon, would presumably have 
been a more effective, and therefore more likely, approach.  
   Why did the colonial government endeavour to prevent Maroons owning slaves when 
European- style ownership would exacerbate the existing tensions between the enslaved 
population and the Maroons? Campbell has suggested that preventing Maroon slave 
ownership was another way that the colonial government could prevent Maroons’ 
accumulating property.
24
 Whilst I agree that the colonial government intended to 
preclude Maroons from owning property that was valuable to white society, more 
important was the fact that outlawing slave ownership would stop the Maroons from 
acting in a manner akin to European society. Owning slaves was, in the eyes of the 
colonists, a preserve of European society and the colonial government was determined 
to keep the strict racial hierarchy in place. Other clauses of the treaty allowed Maroons 
to own property (albeit only property that the Europeans allowed them to) so it seems 
unlikely the restriction was imposed purely for the reason Campbell has suggested. 
   Once the Second Maroon War broke out, more mentions of slaves are found in the 
archival records. For example, Zell, an Ibo belonging to a colonist called Isaac 
Lascelles, said he was forced away with three other slaves and made to carry salted 
provisions and yams. Zell’s case is notable because he does not seem to have been 
allowed to fight alongside the Maroons even though it was during wartime, suggesting 
slaves were not fully incorporated into Maroon society. Another example is Jamaica, a 
slave belonging to a man named John Reid, who was employed by the Maroons for two 
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weeks catching thatch and looking for wild yams.
25
 This case is interesting because it 
implies that the Maroons would “employ” slaves for a short period and then send them 
back to the estates. As I will show in Chapter Two, the relationship between local 
planters and the Maroons was surprisingly amicable so it is entirely possible that 
planters did hire out certain slaves to the Maroons. If this was the case then it shows a 
degree of familiarity between planters and Maroons and is evidence of the fact that not 
all white Jamaicans adhered to the colonial government’s wish to ban Maroon slave-
ownership. It also hints at the Maroon treatment of slaves. It is improbable that local 
whites would hire out slaves to Maroons if those Maroons were likely to spirit them 
away to their territory and free them or treat them leniently.  
   There is the possibility that these accounts had several falsehoods. Zell’s claim that he 
was “forced” to join the Maroons could have been to avoid punishment for running 
away and joining the colonist’s enemies. Jamaica may also have underplayed the role he 
was allowed in Maroon society to avoid retribution. The cases of Zell and Jamaica show 
the difficulties of trying to determine what characteristics Maroon slavery had. Neither 
person was fully incorporated into society but neither were they treated particularly 
harshly. Zell and Jamaica seem to have been treated as non-Maroons rather than as 
enslaved individuals. Whether the claims of Zell and Jamaica are true or not, their cases 
are evidence that there was a degree of interaction with slaves, perhaps representing a 
form of slavery, which went entirely against the colonial government’s wishes. 
   Worryingly for the white authorities, interactions between the Maroons and slaves 
were not reduced to instances of potential slave ownership. Evidence in the archival 
sources shows that slaves entertained Maroons on their plantations, a continuation of 
pre-treaty practices. Shortly before the Second Maroon War, a man called Robertson 
said that fourteen or fifteen Maroons were welcomed at a place called Oliphant’s by the 
gardener of Mr. Mure.
26
 This is direct evidence that slaves and Maroons interacted 
outside of the accepted context outlined in the treaties. These social interactions with 
slaves were so pivotal to the Maroons that Carey has claimed, from a Maroon point of 
view, that the clause which banned such engagements was the most restrictive covenant 
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in the 1791 laws.
27
 Interactions with the enslaved population in social contexts are 
further evidence to contradict Grant’s claim that the relationship turned to one of 
“hatred and fear” following the treaties. 
   Personal contact between Maroons and slaves also seems to have taken the form of 
sexual interaction. Balcarres, then Governor of Jamaica, wrote in July 1795 that the 
Trelawny Town Maroons had “increased to 660, exclusive of their numerous children 
by slaves residing on the low plantations.”28 Robinson claims that planters turned a 
blind eye to this because they believed that children born from a Maroon father would 
be stronger and, therefore, more valuable.
29
 By interacting with enslaved women, but 
not attempting to aid their escape, the Maroons seemed to condone slavery. However, if 
we place too much blame for this at the feet of the Maroon men, it risks the outdated 
practice of stripping slaves of any agency or control over their lives. Perhaps the slave 
women chose to stay on their plantations rather than take the uncertain risk of flight to a 
community caught between two worlds.  
   It also may have been that Maroons did not abandon their children on the plantation. 
Genovese writes that, on occasion, Maroons married slave women.
30
 This suggestion is 
supported by Edward Long, the planter-historian, who wrote that the Maroon population 
actually diminished because of their “cohabitation” with slaves on the plantations.31 
Therefore, perhaps these Maroons did cohabit with their wives and children on the 
plantations while keeping a foothold in Maroon society as well. There were certainly 
reports that, immediately following the outbreak of the Second Maroon War, the 
Trelawny Town Maroons sent messengers to tell their brethren who lived outside of the 
town what had happened.
32
 The dynamic, often contradictory relationship which 
characterised the pre-treaty world was clearly being replicated throughout the 
eighteenth century. 
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   Having discussed examples of the more positive interactions between the Maroons 
and slaves, it is now necessary to turn to the infamous act of hunting slave runaways. 
On 19 April 1739 the Assembly passed an Act confirming the terms of the treaty and 
authorising the payment of rewards to those Maroons who in future should “take up, 
and restore to their owners, runaway slaves.”33 As early as 1741, the colonial 
government requested the assistance of Maroons in hunting runaways. The Maroons 
were so skilled in locating runaways that “they have been known to trace parties of 
runaway Negroes to a great distance by the smell of their firewood.”34 White society 
wasted no time in turning to their new allies who promptly assisted in returning the 
runaways.
35
 This practice continued throughout the eighteenth century, into the 1790s. 
An advertisement dated 22 May 1795 in the Supplement to the Royal Gazette read “TO 
THE MAROONS – Five Pounds Reward” and detailed certain slave runaways being 
sought.
36
 Clearly, some Maroons had taken to their new role with vigour.  
   At first, hunting runaways appears to mark a significant new dimension in Maroon 
relationships with slaves. However, the situation was more complex than this. The 
Maroons did not simply hunt runaways, as instructed by the treaties. They often 
returned slaves’ bodies rather than, as preferred by white Jamaicans, bringing them back 
alive.
37
 The act became so prevalent that a law had to be passed giving more reward 
money for those slaves returned alive than those returned dead.
38
 This suggests that 
Maroons were going beyond their treaty obligations and killing slaves for reasons of 
their own. However, this was not a new phenomenon. Throughout the archives there are 
several mentions of slaves being killed by Maroons prior to the treaties, even seemingly 
non-combatant slaves, such as the female slave, Queen.
39
 This, then, implies that the 
treatment of some slaves by Maroons was borne out of their shared history as enemies 
in Jamaica rather than solely as a result of the peace treaties.  
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   To further demonstrate the complexity of the situation, there is evidence to suggest 
that many Maroons policed slaves selectively. Carey has argued that the Maroons 
looked carefully at how slaves had escaped: if it was achieved quietly; if the slave 
established his cottage in the remote clearing in the woods; if such a clearing housed 
one family, or several. In other words, if the slaves had attempted to do as the Maroons 
had done and establish themselves without fanfare then those villages could remain 
undisturbed in their remote places. However, the Maroons would pursue what they 
viewed as renegades disturbing the peace.
40
  
   Evidence in the diaries of Thomas Thistlewood, the notorious slave-owner, broadens 
Carey’s assertion to show that some Maroons hunted runaways alleged to have 
committed a violent crime. In 1763, he noted that “the Wild Negroes” had captured 
eleven runaways in a hut in the mountains. The Maroons were said to have killed three 
and taken the rest to be tried at Savanna-la-Mar. Some were eventually hanged and 
others burnt alive for the murder of a Mr. Wright.
41
 In other examples, in 1764, 
Cudjoe’s men caught a “negro wench” who had cut out a sailor’s tongue and another 
who had “a vast deal of Obeah of different kinds.”42 Perhaps Carey is correct that 
Maroons considered the way in which the escape was made but Maroons also seem to 
have evaluated the character of the runaway before deciding whether to adhere to their 
obligations or not. 
   One interesting dimension to the Maroon act of hunting runaways, which has yet to be 
explored, is a claim made in the Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica. This alleged that 
a deception was conjured up between the slaves and Maroons. Apparently the “wild 
negroes” would catch runaways within the limits of plantations, or towns, “frequently 
by consent, and at the instance of such runaway, who are in connivance with the said 
wild negroes, and obtain them a part of the said reward.”43 If true, this clearly shows 
that the treaties did not herald the end of Maroon and slave collaboration. There is the 
possibility that this charge against the slaves and Maroons was not true; however, there 
must have been a certain amount of close interaction between the groups for it to have 
at least seemed plausible. At first, it seems unlikely that a slave would risk punishment 
for this plan. However, if a slave had a lenient master who accepted runaways as part of 
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the system, then perhaps the reward may have outweighed the punishment. 
Nevertheless, if true, the participation of Maroons in this act shows their recognition of 
slaves as property to be returned for money, even if the slaves were in collusion with the 
Maroons. This may have been a case of both sides feeling unable to change the system 
so trying to play the system to their mutual advantage. 
   The apparently fluid attitude of Maroons towards hunting slave runaways continued 
into the late eighteenth century. The archival records suggest that certain slaves were 
even allowed to establish their own communities in the woods. During the Second 
Maroon War, a party of British soldiers were said to have met a party of runaway 
“Congo negroes,” about 35 in number, settled “deep in the woods” towards Black River 
and, from the “appearance of the provisions,” were alleged to have been there “some 
time.”44 It is unlikely that individuals would have established settlements in the woods 
during the Second Maroon War because they might have been mistaken for Maroons 
and killed by the soldiers. The most likely explanation is that the Congo settlements 
were in the woods prior to the hostilities. The Maroons may have been unaware of their 
existence but, as this section and subsequent others show, the Maroons frequently 
travelled in the woods to hunt runaways, visit market towns, or to hunt wild boar. It is 
extremely unlikely that British soldiers would have discovered this settlement before the 
Maroons. Therefore, the Maroons, it seems, had allowed the settlement to develop.  
   While some runaway communities were apparently being allowed to flourish in the 
woods, other Maroons were hunting runaways because of the opportunities such an act 
presented. Grant sees slave catching as one of the few ways that the Maroons could use 
their unparalleled ability as woodsmen and exercise their love of combat, as well as offering 
both excitement and payment.
45
 Young Maroons may have relished the opportunity to 
prove themselves as men by hunting and catching runaways. This is why, in some ways, it 
is surprising that the colonial government advocated hunting runaways so strongly. Hunting 
runaways meant that the Maroons kept physically fit, enhanced their knowledge of the 
interior of the island, and were able to hone their martial skills – all of which could pose a 
threat to the colonial order of the island. In other words, the act presented an opportunity to 
continue many Maroon traditions and thus solidify their identity as a separate community. 
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   Related to hunting runaways was the act of suppressing rebellions of which there have 
been frequent mentions in the archives. Instances such as these are hard to separate from 
hunting runaways as many slaves ran away precisely to foment a rebellion, but it is 
important to attempt to analyse the acts separately because viewing all runaways as 
rebels is a continuation of the planters’ attitudes. Following the treaties, Maroons were 
called upon almost immediately to put down a slave rebellion. In 1742, a group of 
slaves ran away from Foster’s plantation in Trelawny, reportedly with the goal of armed 
resistance. The authorities apparently discovered that “the rebellion...was concerted 
between the Coromantee negroes of those plantations, and some of the same country in 
the woods.” The conspirators first intended, “to cut off all those there that were born in 
the woods or came from other countries” and the rest of the slaves at Foster's were to 
destroy the white people.
46
 The Leeward leader, Cudjoe, immediately attacked the 
rebels and prevented the situation from escalating. He soon discovered that some of his 
men were involved so he sent them to be tried in the colonial courts. Two were 
sentenced to death and the other two were sentenced to transportation from the island. 
However, as a gesture of goodwill, the Governor pardoned the two men sentenced to 
death and returned them to Cudjoe who promptly executed them himself. This 
demonstrates the extent to which Cudjoe took to his new role of quashing rebellions. 
However, Cudjoe seems to have been a very strict leader who did not allow any 
challenges to his authority; it is possible that he was disgruntled that these men had 
acted without his orders than the fact they were involved in a slave uprising. 
   It was not just Maroon leaders who adhered to the treaty obligations of suppressing 
rebellions. For example, forty mercenaries from Crawford Town participated in the 
suppression of a rebellion which started in Kingston in 1746.
47
 In 1752, George Currie 
of Accompong earned a reward of £100 for killing a rebel slave named Quaco Venter. 
The Committee of the House considered the action a “very extraordinary service” 
because Venter was a “dangerous rebel” who had killed many and was a “great terror in 
the area.”48 Apparently, so effective were the Maroons that Genovese has claimed that 
the British authorities had no doubt that the military prowess of the Maroons played a 
major role in discouraging slave revolts.
49
 This is supported by Edward Long’s 
statement that the Maroons had been “very serviceable” in suppressing slave 
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insurrections.
50
 The Maroons had fought a long battle with the British to establish their 
freedom and it should come as no surprise that they appeared reluctant to risk 
jeopardising this freedom to support the slaves, some of whom had fought against them 
during the First Maroon War. This seems to be more of a problem for the “first time” 
Maroons, Maroons who remembered fighting against slaves. As time passed, new 
Maroons born after the peace treaties seem to have suppressed rebellions less and less, 
as I show in the next paragraph.
51
   
   Increasingly, some Maroons were becoming ambivalent to putting down slaves´ 
rebellions because of the limited financial rewards. As a reaction, the colonial 
government held out financial incentives at every opportunity. In addition to the 
rewards for every rebel slave killed or captured, Maroons serving the establishment 
were paid seven and a half pence per day while their captains received two shillings and 
sixpence.
52
 This apparently did not prevent the Maroons from requiring further 
incentives. In 1761, the colonial government requested that Trelawny Town send a 
party of Maroons to find some slaves that were “skulking” in the woods. The Maroons 
did not respond positively enough so, to encourage them, two planters, Mr. Cope and 
Mr. Goodin, promised that they would give the Maroons twenty shillings per head for 
all the slaves that  killed, over and above what they already received.
53
 This suggests 
that, by 1761, the Maroons required additional encouragement to round up rebellious 
slaves. One hundred and fifteen pounds was eventually paid for this service so it 
appears that, whatever grievances the Maroons felt, the whites soon found some 
Maroons willing to do as the whites requested.  The economic motivations of the 
Maroons can be seen on another occasion in 1761. The Maroons were sent out against 
rebellious slaves and, initially, were said to have done a “good service” and to have 
killed “twelve or fifteen negroes” in one skirmish. Their “good service” was soon 
forgotten as they became somewhat “discontented and mutinous.”54 This discontent was 
said by Edwards to have arisen from the inability of the authorities to pay the Maroons 
what they were due. 
   This ambivalent attitude of the Maroons towards slave rebellions was seen in the 
previous year, 1760, when a large number of slaves, led by Tacky, rose in rebellion in 
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St. Mary in the north central part of the island. The rebellious slaves caused terror 
throughout colonial society by killing whites across the parishes.
55
 On 10
th
 April, the 
Lieutenant Governor wrote that he “had sent Expresses to the Commanding Officers of 
Crawford Town, Nanny Town, and Scots Hall with Orders to March Immediately a 
company from each place.”56 The Maroons were mustered and headed straight to the 
scenes of the battles.
57
 They encountered Tacky and his band apparently wandering in 
the woods and the Maroons “immediately pursued” the slaves in “full cry.” The chase 
was of “no long duration” and Tacky was shot through the head.58 Tacky’s rebellion 
represented one of the largest threats to Jamaican society and it is widely accepted that 
it was a Maroon who nullified that threat.
59
 
   Planter-historians are divided over whether the Maroons played a significant role in 
quelling other skirmishes during Tacky’s revolt. Edward Long believed that the 
Maroons were the “principal instruments” in suppressing the insurrection.60 On the 
other hand, Bryan Edwards claimed that the Maroon role in parts of the 1760 rebellion 
has been overstated.
61
 He does not dispute the fact that Tacky was killed by a Maroon 
but contends that, on other occasions, parties of Maroons arrived “two or three days” 
after an outbreak, leaving it to colonial troops to defeat the rebels in skirmishes such as 
one at Heywood Hall. The more contemporary argument of Robinson suggests that the 
Maroons provided ears of deceased slaves to prove their services but that those ears 
were from the “already dead” that the Maroons had dug up.62 The Maroons seem to 
have acted in the manner outlined by Long but then seem to have become disinterested, 
presumably because of the usual case of lack of payment. The participation in Tacky’s 
rebellion implies that the Maroons were far more likely to suppress a large-scale 
rebellion than the smaller incidents the following year. This was possibly because an 
island-wide insurrection threatened their own freedom and peace. This could have been 
the reason why the next slave to threaten the stability of the entire colony, Three 
Fingered Jack, was killed by a Maroon. Jack had been resisting capture for over two 
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years and the Maroons who eventually killed him were rewarded with £200.
63
 
   On the occasions when the Maroons were disinterested in suppressing rebellions, 
rumours swirled that they were on the brink of joining with slaves to overthrow white 
rule. In 1765, when a slave rebellion took place, a “good deal of alarm was occasioned 
by the statements of some of the prisoners that the Maroons were to have joined them 
and divided the country with them.”64 Again, in 1776, Thistlewood wrote that it was 
“strongly reported the Maroon Negroes are at the bottom of the Negro conspiracy.”65 
Despite Maroon actions in Tacky’s rebellion and the killing of Three Fingered Jack, 
white society continued to fear a Maroon and slave alliance.  
   These fears were soon to be realised. In 1795, the Second Maroon War broke out 
between the Trelawny Town Maroons and the colonial government. Even more 
worryingly, rumours abounded that slaves were joining the Trelawny Town Maroons. 
Of even more concern for Jamaican whites was the claim that some of the slaves who 
were serving with the British soldiers had joined the Maroons.
66
 Other archival evidence 
certainly supports the assertion that slaves could, and did, flee their estates to join the 
Maroons. Henry Shirley, a Jamaican planter, reported that from “the best accounts,” 
upwards of 200 slaves joined the Maroons.
67
 Shirley’s account is given credibility by 
the fact that the figure was based on General Walpole’s observances. Although fighting 
against the Maroons, Walpole railed against the way in which the colonial government 
deceived the Maroons. At the conclusion of the war, Walpole was offered five hundred 
guineas and a ceremonial sword to mark his contribution to the defeat of the Maroons 
but he was so disgusted by the colonial government’s treatment of them  that he refused 
both and sailed to England. If Walpole’s observations were correct then approximately 
the same number of able adult slaves fought as able adult Maroons. However, the 
presence of 200 slaves represents an incredibly low percentage of the entire enslaved 
population. Shirley’s account then actually suggests that the tensions between the slaves 
and the Maroons, dating back to before the First Maroon War, continued until the 
Second Maroon War and beyond. 
   According to the archival sources, Maroons had to convince slaves to join them 
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during the Second Maroon War. In an examination following the war, Thomas Sadler 
testified that, in the raids on the plantations, what the Maroons could not carry away 
they “distributed amongst the negroes belonging to the plantation.”68 In other words, the 
Maroons encouraged slaves to join them by offering incentives - a situation which 
mirrored how white society had induced Maroons to ally with the colonial government 
earlier in the century. Sadler further reported that Parkinson, a Maroon leader, told the 
slaves that they only wanted to kill “backras” and the enslaved population had nothing 
to fear from them. This actually hints at the continued distance between the Maroons 
and certain slaves – if the Maroons were particularly close to the slaves, they would not 
have had to reassure them that they only wanted to kill whites. This is further supported 
by the fact that Parkinson told the slaves that “he did not mean to force them, that he 
was fighting to make all the negroes free.”69 Perhaps the enslaved populations were 
wary after a number of the Maroons had spent decades hunting runaways. Perhaps the 
slaves were uncertain whether the war would be successful. Either way, the majority of 
the slaves continued to reside on the plantations and “wait and see” – the same situation 
as during the First Maroon War. 
   Whilst the vast majority of the enslaved population appeared to await the outcome, 
some chose not to wait and see but either decided to, or were forced to, fight alongside 
the British forces. On November 19, the Westmoreland vestry presented thirty dollars to 
three armed slaves whose good behaviour entitled them "the praise and remembrance of 
the community."
70
 The colonial government did not stop at offering financial rewards to 
the slaves who fought the Maroons. Balcarres issued a statement that assured the slaves 
that he thought it “highly probable” that the House of Assembly would purchase the 
freedom of “any slave, who takes, or kills, a Trelawny Maroon in arms.”71 This at once 
shows the continued tensions between slaves and Maroons, and demonstrates the failure 
of the colonial government to attract enough slaves to fight the Maroons. The British 
were unlikely to free any slaves unless necessary and would not have deemed it so if 
slaves were volunteering in significant numbers. This continued offer of financial 
reward, and freedom, therefore, shows that the colonial government had failed in its 
attempt to create utter disharmony between the Maroons and the enslaved population of 
Jamaica. If anything, the Second Maroon War demonstrates the apathy of the slaves 
when deciding whether to join a side – presumably because of the fear that they may 
                                                          
68
 Ibid. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Robinson, Iron Thorn, 198. 
71
 Balcarres to the Duke of Portland, 3
rd
 August 1795, WO 1/92, NA. 
55 
choose the “wrong” side. 
   Of those few hundred who did join the Maroons, many were apparently welcomed 
into the ranks. The colonial government despaired that the Maroons were receiving 
runaways with “great triumph.”72 Balcarres constantly worried that “the Maroons of 
Trelawny Town could command the aid of the plantation negroes at pleasure.”73 
According to Robinson, the noted Maroon leader, Johnson, even raised two runaway 
slaves to the rank of captain, one a Coromantee named Cudjoe, belonging to a Mr. 
Fowler, the other called Casacrew, belonging to Whittakers Estate.
74
 The prospect of 
slaves joining the Maroons sent shockwaves throughout the island, particularly in light 
of the recent uprising in Haiti. The worst fears of the whites had become a reality 
   Overall, it is difficult to make sweeping generalisations about an entire community 
because each Maroon was an individual and would have acted in accordance with his own 
individual motivations. However, in order to try and make sense of the Maroon role in 
society, it is necessary to establish how, as a community, the Maroons affected Jamaican 
society and the system of slavery there. The fact that a significant number of African-
descended people had formed a free, semi-autonomous community in the mountains of 
Jamaica was striking for slaves in Jamaica. Indeed, even the notorious Tacky said that he 
and his allies “will force the whites to give them free like Cudjoe’s negroes.”75 
   These free Maroons were, by law, allowed to trade, roam freely (although this was to 
change), and even punish their own people (short of capital crimes). Their mere 
existence provided the slaves with hope that not all black people were condemned to a 
life of slavery in Jamaica. It also weakened pro-slavery arguments because the Maroon 
presence was evidence of black people living relatively peacefully alongside white 
people, rather than acting as savages who needed to be tamed. As Chapter Two will 
show, Maroons enjoyed a relatively amicable relationship with the white Jamaicans 
who lived near their territory and this would have affected the argument that Africans 
were barbaric and needed civilising. Therefore, to both black and white society, the 
Maroons represented a departure from the “norm” of expected African behaviour. 
   The colonial government needed to do something to show blacks and whites alike that 
the Maroons were under their control – which was the purpose of many of the clauses in 
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the peace treaties. In this way, the image and practice of the Maroon being ordered by 
the whites to hunt slave runaways was a strategic coup for the colonial government. 
Whether the Maroons hunted only slaves they termed rebels or not is irrelevant to the 
image that the colonial government wanted to create. By hunting a runaway on the 
orders of a white man the Maroons were actively supporting the system of slavery. The 
whites cared little for the actual motivation of the Maroons as long as the runaway was 
caught. In the whites' eyes, the act demonstrated white power over all blacks, even 
“free” blacks like the Maroons. Whites did not have to have legal ownership over a 
black man to order him to obey their wishes - or so it would have seemed to most in 
Jamaica at the time. Maroons may have been following the orders for their own reasons 
but, to the rest of Jamaica, they were simply fulfilling the white man's wishes. In 
practice, the peace treaties failed to change the Maroon relationship with the slaves – 
insofar as that there had always been animosity between some and good relations 
among others - but the contexts imposed by white society changed. However, for 
propaganda purposes, the treaties proved to be extremely effective.   
   Thus, the Maroons contributed to both the consolidation of, and resistance to, slavery. 
By returning slaves, even if policed selectively, the Maroons contributed to the 
expansion of slavery in Jamaica. Meanwhile, other acts, such as visiting slaves on 
plantations, having children with them and owning slaves, undermined the social 
hierarchy that the colonial government tried to impose. This deeply complex and multi-
faceted relationship had its origins in the pre-treaty era and continued throughout the 
eighteenth century.  
1.2 Creeks and African-Americans: From Slaves to Spouses 
   The context of the Creek relationship with the enslaved population of the south-
eastern United States differed from that of the Maroons because the Creeks were not 
descended from Africans so there was no question of the so-called “betrayal” of their 
brethren. Popular discussions of Maroon history focus on the act of hunting runaways 
because it was expected that Africans should stand together.
76
 This is not an issue in the 
Creek historiography because inter-racial solidarity was not expected.
77
 However, 
interactions with enslaved people still did have an impact upon Creek society. Indeed, 
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Eugene Genovese has suggested that some Native American communities were “utterly 
transformed by the entrance of large numbers of blacks.”78 While this was undoubtedly 
true, it does not detail when the transformation was meant to have occurred. Other 
scholars have analysed the introduction of African-Americans and identified the turning 
point as the American Revolution.
79
 Through an analysis of Creek interactions with the 
enslaved population, I contend that the ending of the American Revolution actually had 
little impact upon actual interactions between Creek society and African-American 
peoples. Whether owning slaves, hunting runaways, or intermarrying with black people, 
Creeks had participated in these events long before the American Revolution and 
continued to do so afterwards. However, what did change was the imperial and political 
context in which those interactions were taking place, insofar as the Creeks were now 
interacting with American states and the federal government rather than Britain. This 
exploration of Creek relationships with enslaved people feeds into larger questions of 
how the Creeks negotiated the new world they were confronted with in the inter-war 
period. 
   African-American people were not suddenly introduced into Creek country following 
the end of the American Revolution; they had been present throughout British 
colonisation. However, the number of African-American people bordering Creek 
country was fairly low until mid-way through the eighteenth-century. In 1751, Georgia 
permitted slavery leading to dramatic growth in the number of slaves. Then, in 1763, 
when Britain assumed control of Florida from Spain, the enslaved population in the 
region expanded significantly.
80
 Saunt has shown that, between 1760 and 1775, the 
unfree population of Georgia and Florida more than quadrupled from scarcely four 
thousand to roughly eighteen thousand, rapidly exceeding the entire number of Creeks 
in the area.
81
  
   Enslaved people were also found within Creek country itself. According to Saunt, the 
largest concentration of African-American slaves, estimated to be around three hundred, 
was on the “mixed-blood and Indian countryman plantations” on the Coosa and 
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Tallapoosa Rivers.
82
 For instance, Sophia Durant and Elizabeth, sisters of the notable 
Creek leader Alexander McGillivray, who lived in Ocheubofau, owned eighty and thirty 
slaves, respectively. Richard Bailey of Autossee owned eight as did the Upper Creek 
headman Efau Haujo, and Alexander Cornells owned nine.
83
 The Indian countryman 
Richard Grierson, who lived among the upper Tallapoosa, owned forty.
84
 
   It is evident that black people were present within Creek country in fairly significant 
numbers and, therefore, according to Braund, Euro-Americans were filled with fears of 
Indian-black conspiracies against their settlements and actively discouraged Indian-
black interaction.
85
 I argue that interactions continued despite the best efforts of 
American society and came in many forms; from slaveholding, to hunting runaways, to 
intermarriage. This section demonstrates how the relationship between Creeks and 
blacks was a complex and fast-moving one; amicable and antagonistic at the same time 
but ultimately a continuation of practices from prior to the American Revolution.  
   Several historians, including Gary Zellar, John F. Richards and Kathryn Braund, have 
pointed to the American Revolution as a turning point in Creek attitudes towards racial 
slavery.
86
 They claim that the key moment was the Creeks allying with the British 
during the American Revolution. At that point, the Creeks were told by a British general 
that whatever “plunder” they got would be their own property. The Creeks saw the 
King's army seize all the slaves they came across so they did the same with the intent to 
carry them to the Nation. In another situation, when American officials urged Creeks to 
restore slaves to them taken during the war, the residents of Coweta refused because 
they said the slaves were given to them “as a present by the white people.”87 However, 
we cannot be sure how Creeks viewed these African-American people. Did Creek 
attitudes towards African-American people change because of these instructions from 
the British? What notions of ownership did the Creeks have and did these alter 
following the American Revolution?    
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   First, I will address the questions surrounding slave ownership by the Creeks. Snyder 
has argued that, over time, Creeks moulded their own slaveholding tradition using their 
experiences with other Indian nations and, later, with Africans and Europeans.
88
 This 
section supports Snyder´s assertion, but also investigates specifically which practises of 
slave ownership were incorporated into Creek society and demonstrates that those 
practices were not incorporated solely as an effect of the American Revolution. 
   The notion of ownership in Creek society was complex. Andrew Frank has outlined 
that, throughout their pre-removal history, Creeks welcomed countless African, native, 
and European outsiders into their villages as spouses and occasionally adopted others 
into their families.
89
 Conversely, Kokomoor has argued that the Native south-east has a 
long history of enslavement for profit.
90
 These two scholars demonstrate the different 
ways in which enslaved people could be viewed by the Creeks. 
   Slave ownership was not a new concept introduced to the Creeks by the Americans. 
According to Saunt, small numbers of Creeks began keeping slaves in the 1760s.
91
 
Indeed, when William Bartram travelled around the Creek nation in the 1770s, he 
described Creek-owned slaves that were indigenous themselves. When he visited a 
Lower Creek chief who “owned” many Yamasee captives, Bartram highlighted the 
difficulty of trying to understand the capacity in which these indigenous slaves were 
held. He noted that they were “dressed better than he [the chief]” yet still waited upon 
the chief with “signs of the most abject fear.”92 The complexity of what constituted a 
slave dated from before the years of colonisation when some captives were tortured and 
killed for ceremonial and religious purposes, whilst others were adopted into native 
clans and hence, into their communities.
93
 As William Bartram observed of this second 
group, slaves, “both male and female, are permitted to marry amongst them: their 
children are free, and considered in every respect equal to themselves.”94 The treatment 
of slaves in Creek society before the American Revolution was ambiguous and could be 
harsh with slaves owned by “fear” or owned in a manner which represented the first 
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step in tribal adoption. 
   Tribal adoption of slaves continued to be practiced in Creek country in the post-
revolutionary years. The initial step to adoption was often ownership by clan rather than 
individual.
95
 This was the case in the 1780s with Sambo, who in 1788 was owned by the 
Tiger or Panther Clan in Chiaja and was referred to as “one of his family property” by 
the Chehaw Tiger King.
96
 These adopted slaves were sometimes asked to work the land 
but not in the same way that slaves were expected to in Euro-American areas. 
Kokomoor has argued that Creek owners simply asked the African-Americans among 
them to participate in the same communal style agriculture as was practiced by all 
families in their villages.
97
 This difference in treatment seemed to foster a milder form 
of slavery than that practised on the vast, cotton plantations of the Deep South.  
   Agricultural work does seem to have formed a large part of the slaves’ day in Creek 
country. George, a slave in the Creek land, said “I made fences, dug the ground, planted 
corn, and worked hard, but the people were kind to me.”98 George may have been 
treated well but these tasks imply he was still considered an outsider by Creek society. 
The tasks that George was instructed to do were usually assigned to Creek women 
rather than men.
99
 Snyder suggests that Creek masters assigned their African-American 
captives tasks inconsistent with their own gendered division of labour, to reinforce the 
notion of African-Americans as the other.
100
 Treating a black person as “the other” by 
gendering their tasks suggests an incorporation of Euro-American practices. However, 
any non-Creek male, regardless of race, could be made to do these tasks. It was not the 
colour of the skin but the length of time in Creek society that determined activities. 
Once incorporated into Creek society, or having been born to a Creek parent, a person 
could take part in the same activities as Creek men to prove themselves to the 
community in order to be accepted. For example, a white trader who brought his Euro-
American wife with him was often tolerated but not incorporated into society as a 
Creek, whereas a white trader who married a Creek woman could became part of 
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society because his marriage showed his commitment to settle in Creek country.
101
 If a 
slave did not marry a Creek person then their opportunity to show their commitment 
was by completing menial tasks and slowly being accepted.  
   This lenient attitude towards slave-ownership continued into the 1790s, suggesting that 
the American Revolution and subsequent treaties were not the turning points they have 
previously been identified as. In 1795, Spanish officials complained that ten Indian men, 
women, and children had been in the area for some time “burning forests and pastures and 
even introducing themselves into the houses of the residents.” A Spanish officer called 
Carlos Howard reported that “they have in their company two negroes stolen in past years." 
These African-Americans praised "the good life that people of their colour enjoy in the 
nation where they eat the same as their masters and work only when they wish with-out fear 
of punishment.”102 Indeed, this supports Hudson’s argument that Creek-owned slaves were 
frequently afforded considerable latitude in their daily tasks and were often known to travel 
great distances within the nation.
103
 This was in stark contrast to how the majority of Euro-
Americans treated their slaves. In fact, on some occasions, observers seemed to detect little 
difference between the Creeks and their African slaves. Braund has described the Creek 
slaves as “like their employers,” stating that they “joined in games and dancing, courted 
Creek women, drank rum, swapped tall tales with warriors.”104 According to Saunt, this 
treatment led to whites never knowingly purchasing slaves who had belonged to Indians for 
fear of their nearly certain flight back to Creek country.
105
 The archival evidence above 
certainly supports Saunt’s theory that many slaves preferred life in Creek country. The fact 
that this was the case even after the American Revolution suggests Creek attitudes towards 
black people did not undergo a significant transformation. 
   Many African-American slaves continued to flee to Creek country for a better life. 
One slave, for instance, reportedly “got with the Indians” on his own accord and later 
stated to an agent hired to secure his return “that he would not go back [to white 
society] if he could help it.”106 This sheds light on some of these African-Americans 
who the Euro-Americans termed as “captured” by the Creeks. Many of these African-
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Americans may have chosen to run away to the Creeks, only to claim that they were 
captured when subsequently detained by Euro-American authorities. It is unclear 
whether these African-Americans chose a life with the Creeks over the Euro-Americans 
because they hoped it would be better or because they had heard from others of the 
“better” life in Creek society. Given the extensive slave grapevine, it seems likely that 
many African-Americans knew they would have a better life in Creek country because 
of the stories passed around the South.
107
 
   In many instances, such as the case of George who was made to complete agricultural 
tasks, enslaved people within Creek territory were treated more like tenant farmers than 
property. Ethridge has claimed that Creek slave-owners gained little from their slaves in 
terms of labour. They lived with their owners and tended agricultural fields, and the 
crops were theirs except for a small payment to their owners.
108
 Doran argues that this 
was because the Creeks were not inclined toward the acquisition of worldly riches.
109
 
This may have been the case in some instances but there are examples that show Creeks 
were just as capable of mistreating their slaves as Euro-Americans were and were 
certainly interested in the acquisition of “worldly riches.”  John Cannard, a mestizo with 
forty bondsmen and bondswomen, was the largest slaveholder in the area.
110
 One visitor 
to his property wrote, “He is a despot, shoots his negroes when he pleases, and has cut 
off the ears of one of his favourite wives, with his own hands, in a drunken fit of 
suspicion.” 111 Interestingly, Cannard was a mestizo, meaning one of his parents was a 
Euro-American. It is too simplistic to suggest all mestizos were crueller to their slaves 
than their wholly Creek counterparts but it is possible Cannard may have been more 
influenced by Euro-American society because of his parentage. This is a point discussed 
later in the section. However, we cannot read too much into Cannard’s case because he 
allegedly attacked one of his wives so had a history of violence. Cannard is one of the 
few examples of extreme violence towards Creek slaves. The majority of the evidence 
shows that Creeks treated their slaves more mildly than their Euro-American 
counterparts. 
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   Creeks may not have been as violent towards their slaves but it seems that they did 
begin to turn to hereditary slavery, a break from the previous practices. One example is 
that of the slave, Lucy. One summer morning in 1787 a well-armed Creek war party 
crossed the Oconee River into disputed lands. The party approached the farmstead of 
John Lang and seized his twelve-year-old African-American slave, Lucy. The Creeks 
took Lucy back to the nation where she would live and labour in Creek country, bear 
children and live to see her grandchildren born, and remain enslaved under Native 
American masters.
112
 The statement that her children and grandchildren would be 
enslaved is a hallmark of Euro-American slavery rather than the adoption-type slavery 
practiced in Creek society. However, what is not clear is under what conditions Lucy 
was made to work. Was she held in the same conditions as traditional Creek slaves or 
was her enslavement more akin to that of American slavery? Perhaps we will never 
know but it seems that the hereditary method of enslavement was being utilised in 
Creek country by the 1780s showing a certain amount of Euro-American influence on 
Creek society following the American Revolution. 
   This hereditary slavery appears to have continued into the 1790s, albeit in a seemingly 
more complex way than in the Euro-American territory. In 1793, while living among 
the Creeks, a slave named Mary, stolen from Liberty County, Georgia, gave birth to 
four children whom “the Indians kept because they were born upon their hands.”113 In 
previous Creek traditions, the status of slave was not passed down through the 
generations; therefore, this example may have been an incorporation of Euro-American 
practices into Creek society. However, the interpretation of this case rests on whether 
the children were actually free. The document says that the Creeks “kept” the children 
which could mean they were kept as slaves but it could also mean they were being kept 
through adoption into Creek society. Either way, the children were removed from their 
mother which went against the traditional matrilineal structure of Creek society. This 
supports Braund’s theory that Africans were increasingly treated as the “other” in Creek 
society. 
   The differing statuses of the African-Americans in Creek country remained complex. 
In 1792 Euro-American trader John O'Riley offered African-American slaves to a Creek 
man in exchange for two Euro-American women he held captive. The Creek man 
refused, explaining that “they did not bring the prisoners there to let them go back to the 
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Virginia people [Americans], but had brought them to punish and make victuals and 
work for them, the Indians.”114 This implies that, even into the 1790s, the Creeks were 
not differentiating between Euro-Americans and African-Americans when it came to 
captives and the work they were supposed to do. This disputes Snyder’s claim that 
Euro-Americans usually faced violent death at the hands of their captors whilst the 
Creeks came to regard African-Americans as valuable producers, putting them to work 
as farmers, herders, carpenters, sawyers, and domestic servants.
115
 John O’Riley’s 
experience shows that certain Creeks captured people in accordance with their level of 
usefulness rather than the colour of their skin.  
   One way to ascertain the extent of Euro-American influence on Creek attitudes 
towards African-American enslavement is to review their practices when buying or 
selling slaves. In March 1783, Arturo O'Neill explained that “some of the Talapuche 
Indians have brought here Negros for sale, [and] I have offered to continue this 
practice.”116 The Creeks did not just sell African-Americans to the Spanish. Other Creek 
warriors chose to sell their African-American captives within the Creek Nation. 
Examples include the Chehaw warriors who took a party from John Whitehead's 
plantation in Liberty County, Georgia, and sold them to others living among the 
Chehaws. A Creek headman named Humlathluchee, or Big Eater, bought Hector and 
Daphney and later sold or gave Daphney's two children to other Creeks. Finally, “a 
negro wench named Rose” was resold more than once in the Creek Nation before 
eventually being traded to Panton, Leslie, and Company in Pensacola.
117
 The Creeks 
apparently went further afield as well. Alexander McGillivray, for example, arranged to 
purchase slaves from Jamaica, and John Cannard travelled to the slave market in 
Savannah.
118
 
   John Cannard in particular began to trade African-Americans in a similar manner to 
Euro-Americans.
119
 Cannard used this property to become a powerful rancher and trader 
in the region. More importantly, though, Cannard carried on the trade in African-
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American captives with other Lower Creeks. In a letter to Indian agent James Seagrove, 
Cannard dispassionately described his role in human trafficking, saying “when the 
Negroes came the red people wanted to buy [them].”120 Euro-American traveller Caleb 
Swan explained that Cannard’s newfound wealth “raised him to the dignity of a chief, 
and enabled him to go largely into trade, by which he supplies all the Indians around 
him.”121 This evidence supports Snyder’s suggestion that some Creeks used African-
American war captives to transform their economic fortunes.
122
 Many Euro-American 
slave-owners would also have claimed that this was the reason for their enslavement of 
blacks; therefore, using slaves to transform their economic fortunes seems to be one of 
the similarities between Euro-American and Creek slavery. However, it was not the 
ownership of African-Americans and using them for profit that made Cannard more 
akin to a Euro-American owner than to a traditionally Creek one, it was the way in 
which he employed his enslaved people. They were not just utilised to help with small 
agricultural tasks, they were instructed to work on large-scale plantations in the way 
that African-Americans were across Georgia.  
   However, it is important to note that Creeks had been trading enslaved people for 
centuries. Zellar argues that the Creek involvement in the Indian slave trade imprinted 
the practice of treating people as commodities on the Creek people.
123
 By as early as 
1703, the Creeks had become South Carolina's premier slave-trading partners. Over the 
next two years, Creek warriors targeted the Apalachees of Spanish Florida for capture 
with a view to sale. According to Allay, during that time Creeks sold some two to four 
thousand Apalachees as slaves and secured a reputation as the American South's most 
powerful native nation.
124
 Therefore, buying and selling slaves in itself is not an 
indicator of a change in behaviour following the American Revolution. The biggest 
change in attitude was that the Creeks began to focus on trading African-Americans 
rather than just any captives. During a two-year period in the Creek-Georgia border war, 
Creek warriors captured at least 140 Georgians, nearly 80 percent of whom were 
enslaved African-Americans.
125
 There could be many reasons for this – one possibility 
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is that the Creeks wanted the captives to work for them and it was the African-American 
people who would have been most useful with their knowledge and expertise of 
agriculture. Furthermore, if they wished to trade the captives on for a profit, the Creeks 
would have been aware that there was no market for Euro-American captives and white 
society was only interested in purchasing African slaves. The best the Creeks could 
have hoped for was a ransom from the families of the white people – and this carried 
many threats in itself. 
   Increasingly, there were occasions when Creeks viewed slaves in terms of economic 
value, a practice usually associated with Euro-Americans. Abner Hammond, a traveller 
through Creek country, noted the presence of African-Americans in the nation. He 
claimed that “six or eight negroes” might be recovered by paying to the holders of them 
nearly their value.
126
 This implies, then, that some Creeks viewed African-American 
captives in economic terms rather than as people to potentially adopt into their clan. By 
1801, certain Creeks were explicitly referring to African-Americans as “property.” In a 
letter to John Forbes, the Creek chief Mad Dog wrote that the traders in Creek country 
had “property enough in negroes, cattle, horses.” He reiterated that he did not mean 
Euro-American traders alone, that he included the Native American factors who had 
accumulated property.
127
 Referring to African-American people as “property” certainly 
suggests that the Creeks were changing their attitudes towards African-American 
people. However, this attitude may not be representative of the views of all Creeks. Mad 
Dog wrote this letter to John Forbes, who was a Euro-American trader with the Panton 
Company. We cannot use his words to generalise to those Creeks who did not interact 
with Euro-Americans but his letter does demonstrate that Euro-American ideas towards 
African-Americans were beginning to permeate at least some sectors of Creek society. 
Overall, however, there was not a large-scale adoption of Euro-American practices 
regarding slave ownership as scholars such as Saunt and Braund have suggested. 
Indeed, Hawkins continually complained that Creeks, for example Efau Haujo, made 
“little use” of their slaves.128 
   Slave ownership was not the only area in which Creeks and African-Americans 
interacted. As with the Maroons, Creeks also captured and harboured slave runaways. 
Braund has suggested that, since African-Americans often sought refuge from their 
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Euro-American masters among the Indian tribes, white society used slave catching as a 
way to thwart social interactions between Creeks and African-Americans.
129
 There is no 
doubt that Creeks did capture African-American runaways and returned them to their 
masters. One example is the Lower Creeks, Philatouche and Ninnywagchee, who were 
themselves of African descent. Both were traders, who led attacks against Euro-
Americans and captured African-American captives for return to their owners.
130
 Creek 
leaders also took part in these acts. In February 1786, Alexander McGillivray secured 
the return of Ciro to his master in New Orleans.
131
 In fact, McGillivray's 
correspondence is full of instances in which he oversaw the return of fugitive slaves to 
colonial settlements.
132
 These actions begin to hint at the impact of the ending of the 
American Revolution on Creek society. 
   However, as with slave ownership, hunting runaways had been practised long before 
the American Revolution. Returning slaves was enshrined in the articles of friendship 
between the Creeks and South Carolina. According to this 1732 agreement, Creeks who 
returned escapees to a British garrison would be rewarded.
133
 Then, in late spring 1767, 
in Augusta, the British Indian agent John Stuart won a promise from the Creeks to 
return fugitive slaves.
134
 In fact, in almost every treaty prior to removal, Creeks were 
requested to return runaway slaves. Therefore, the act itself was not new to the Creeks. 
The question to be asked is why were the Creeks returning runaway slaves and did the 
reasons differ before the American Revolution and after?  
   One reason was for profit. Benjamin Hawkins, following state and federal laws, 
offered a $12.50 reward for returning runaway slaves, a substantial amount of money in 
Creek country.
135
 In terms easier to understand, every captured runaway was officially 
worth a gun and three blankets – the equivalent of approximately forty pounds of 
dressed deerskins in weight.
136
 Returning an African-American runaway was far more 
profitable than spending months on the hunt for ever-decreasing deerskins and, 
therefore, this activity represented an economic opportunity. A further situation outlined 
by Hawkins shows the economic motivations of the Creeks with regard to runaways. He 
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claimed that some Creeks participated in the common practice of proclaiming a freed 
person to be a slave, taking the person into custody and then presenting the person as a 
runaway slave and claiming the reward money.
137
 Piker has even claimed that Creek 
slave catchers were willing to create business by helping slaves to escape.
138
 This shows 
that financial reasons were pivotal to the actions of some Creeks towards slaves.   
   Not all Creeks thought in economic terms when confronted with slave runaways, 
however. In 1787, the Executive Deputy of Georgia wrote to the Cheehaw King 
requesting his assistance. He said that a man in Liberty County near the Altamaha 
named Andrew Wouldhove lost a family of slaves after they crossed the Altamaha on 
their way to the Creek nation. Some Creeks “who acted very honestly,” carried them to 
Fort James on the Altamaha but the father of the family made his escape and it was “no 
doubt gone to the nation and will very probably be concealed by some negro fellowes” 
who were in the Creek territory and had run away some years ago. The Georgians 
stressed that harbouring runaways bred ill blood and, therefore, he hoped that the 
Cheehaw King would use his endeavours to catch the runaway slave and return him. He 
said that the Indians who captured him would be paid $50 for their trouble. The 
Georgian concluded that the capture would be a good deed and “tend to make both 
people whites and reds better friends.”139  
   This example reveals several things. First, some Creeks would return African-
Americans to the Euro-Americans without much encouragement. The first set of Creeks 
who encountered the runaway captured him and took him to Fort James, apparently 
without prompting. Second, it implies that African-Americans continued to believe they 
had a chance to escape and seek freedom in Creek country, even though certain Creeks 
were being paid to hunt them. Third, there were apparently bands of runaways in Creek 
country who were able to harbour new runaways with Creek assistance. Finally, the 
letter suggests the extent to which Euro-Americans had to convince other Creeks to aid 
them - they offered both monetary reward and promises of a better relationship. Further, 
the reward they offered was a significant amount of money, demonstrating the extent to 
which some Creeks needed convincing. Increasingly, though, some Creeks did not take 
any convincing. In 1787, a settler called Benjamin James wrote that he had three 
African-Americans in Cumberland but a man called Amey had gone and taken those 
slaves. James “immediately sent of twelve indians for my negroes who fetch'd them to 
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me.”140 Regardless of their reasons, hunting runaways shows that that Creeks were 
slowly being sucked into Euro-American practices, even if their motivations for those 
practices differed from the motivations of Euro-Americans. As the power of these slave 
societies grew, more groups of Native Americans were being drawn in and that 
increasingly dictated individuals’ choices.  
   Other Creeks not only refused to hunt runaways but actively harboured them as well. 
Even Creek leaders such as Alexander McGillivray hindered attempts to locate slaves. 
On one occasion, a Gerardo Bine entered Creek territory with a Spanish passport to 
catch two runaway slaves, travelling to McGillivray’s house to tell him of his reasons 
for entering Creek country. McGillivray replied that he did not understand the passport 
and that it was good only for toilet paper. He then told Bine to leave Creek country and 
refused to allow him to search for the runaways.
141
 It is unclear why certain slaves were 
harboured and others were not. McGillivray was known to authorise the return of slave 
runaways so it is not obvious why on this occasion he turned Bine away. McGillivray’s 
ambivalent stance is seen in another instance in 1789. He wrote of an African-American 
man named Luis who “was long in this country” because no one claimed him. 
Subsequently, Luis passed as free and used to go where he pleased. Despite this, 
McGillivray went on to reiterate that any African-Americans that ran away and went 
into the nation “shall always be deliverd to their owners wherever demanded.”142 
Perhaps McGillivray’s public stance on returning runaways was different to his private 
one.  
   Following McGillivray’s contradictory actions, there continued to be examples of 
Creeks shielding runaways. Benjamin Sims wrote that a young slave absconded from 
him and took with him one of Sims’ horses. Sims had been told that the slave had 
“made his way good to the Creek nation.”143  Likewise, A B. Harris claimed that the 
Creek town called Masacusa was an “assailom [asylum] for negroes.”144 It seems that 
African-Americans were found across Creek country but certain towns were more likely 
to harbor runaways than others. This could have been for several reasons, such as 
proximity to Euro-American territory, which European territory the Creek settlement 
was nearer, and number of African-Americans already present in the area. Those towns 
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on the border with Euro-American towns may have been more likely to harbor 
runaways because of the antagonism those towns had with the Euro-Americans, which 
will be discussed in Chapter Two. Conversely, towns further into Creek territory may 
have been more likely to return runaways because they were less familiar with other 
races. Towns closer to Spanish territory may have been more influenced by the Spanish 
policy of protecting runaways who entered their territory. 
   There is the possibility that Creeks were falsely accused of harbouring runaways. A 
man named David Blackshear charged the Creeks with stealing a slave worth $544.50 
but the Creeks claimed it was well-known that the slave had run away, was apprehended 
in the Creek agency, then stole a horse and made his escape only to be killed 
somewhere in east Florida.
145
 Likewise, Jesse McCall of Georgia travelled to Pensacola 
in search of some slaves apparently stolen from him “or his connexions,” and which he 
“supposed werre in this nation” but on his arrival there, he was informed that some of 
them were in West Florida.
146
 There is no telling whether the Creeks in these examples 
were telling the truth but it is possible that the Creeks were giving false information in 
order to harbour runaways. Alexander McGillivray seems to have used this tactic. In 
January 1784, McGillivray wrote to Commandant Arturo O'Neill of Pensacola, “The 
nation is now pretty well drained of Negroes what few there is, don't answer the 
description you wish.”147 As the above section shows, there were numerous African-
Americans in Creek country so for McGillivray to claim that the nation was “pretty well 
drained” of them is suspect at least.  
   Perhaps the most striking evidence to suggest that the Creeks did not comply with 
white demands to return runaways is provided by Benjamin Hawkins. As late as 1808, 
Hawkins was infuriated by the lack of Creek effort in hunting runaways. He wrote to 
the nation that if they did not “alter their conduct” then he would “shut my door against 
all of you.” He reiterated that the Creeks must “collect and restore such negroes” as 
“you are bound to do so by treaty.”148 Interestingly, Hawkins was willing to pay $25 for 
each slave returned, an increase on the $12.50 offered in the 1790s. Even into the 
nineteenth century, Creeks seemed to still be choosing which slaves they wanted to 
hunt, or even if they wanted to hunt them at all – a situation reminiscent of the pre-
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Revolution days. 
   The final area to assess Creek attitudes towards black people is in the few mentions in 
the archives which suggest the formation of personal relationships – whether positive or 
negative. For example, in 1783, five Alabama Indians murdered two black slaves and 
appropriate satisfaction for the murders was sought. The Creeks agreed to everything 
except taking the lives of two Indians in the place of the dead slaves because they 
believed these were not “equivalent” to the Indians.149 This is evidence which suggests 
Creeks were changing their attitudes towards African-Americans. Creeks had always 
given satisfaction for murders committed by their people. This usually involved killing 
the alleged murderer, or a member of the murderer’s family. In the border violence with 
white settlers, Creeks often agreed to kill one of their own people in retribution for a 
Creek murdering a white person; therefore, this refusal to give satisfaction because the 
slaves were not “equivalent” cannot simply be related to the slaves being outsiders. 
Further evidence of this attitude is seen in 1795, when a Yuchi man camped near 
Tensaw shot and killed a slave of that town. A Tensaw boy asked the Yuchi “why he 
had killed the Negro” to which the Yuchi responded “that he had killed him because he 
is the same as a dog.”150 Clearly, we cannot take these few mentions to represent the 
whole of Creek society but it does seem a dislike of African-Americans, based on their 
race, was creeping into certain areas of Creek community.  
   However, whilst some Creeks were referring to blacks as “dogs,” other African-
Americans were being incorporated into Creek society, in contrast to black people in 
Euro-American society. For example, Ninnywageechee, also known as the Little Negro 
Factor and the Black Factor, was an “Indian and negro mestizo, [a] trader among the 
Lower Creeks.”151 Another, Philatouche, was of African descent and a notable leader in 
Chiaja.
152
 Likewise, O’Brien states that the prominent Creek chief Cusseta Hadjo (also 
called Cusseta Tustunnuggee or Jim Boy) was said to be part African-American.
153
 All 
these examples show that African-American people could gain a certain status within 
Creek society, but as they all had a Creek parent, it is unclear whether they would have 
                                                          
149
 Arturo O’Neill to Henrique Grimarest, 19th March 1783, Reel 184, EFL, PKY. 
150
 Manuel de Lanzos to Enrique White, 19
th
 February 1795, Reel 418, EFL, PKY. 
151
 John Cannard to Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada, 25
th
 May 1793, Reel 43, EFL, PKY; John Cannard to 
the kings, principals, and chiefs of the Lower Creeks, 25
th
 May 1793, Reel 43, EFL, PKY; James Burges 
to Robert Leslie, 1
st
 July 1793, Reel 43, EFL, PKY. 
152
 Alexander McGillivray identified Philatouche as the leader of Chiaja in his letter to Manuel Vicente de 
Zéspedes, 3
rd
 August 1786, Reel 43, EFL, PKY. 
153
 Sean Michael O’Brien, In Bitterness and Tears: Andrew Jackson’s Destruction of the Creeks and 
Seminoles (Guilford: Lyon’s Press, 2005), 5. 
72 
risen to these statuses without Creek parentage. Nevertheless, it is evidence of Creek 
inclusiveness which is in direct contradiction to the attitudes of Euro-Americans 
towards African-Americans and perhaps one of the biggest indicators that Euro-
American influences did not permeate Creek society to the extent that has previously 
been thought.   
   The examples of Ninnywageechee and Philatouche are just some of the many 
allusions to Creek intermarriage with black people. In fact, Creeks were said to have 
intermarried with slaves more than other indigenous nations, such as the Cherokee. In a 
nineteenth century joke, a Creek says to a Cherokee, “you Cherokees are so mixed with 
whites we cannot tell you from whites.” The Cherokee replied, “You Creeks are so 
mixed with negroes we cannot tell you from negroes.”154 This intermarriage, and the 
resultant offspring, is one of the most striking differences between Creek society and 
Euro-American society when it came to attitudes towards black people. Whites often 
had relations with their slaves but it was illegal for a white person to marry a slave. In 
Creek country, it was fairly commonplace. Saunt has even argued that all captives were 
liberated upon marriage.
155
 At no point did this change before or after the Revolution 
until the Removal.  
   Slaves did not necessarily have to marry into Creek society to be accepted as part of 
the community. Three enslaved men, Isaac, Pearo, and Orange, freed themselves in 
1788 and headed for Creek country. The three of them were granted refuge and 
subsequently became warriors. This shows that, while certain African-American men 
were given the female gendered tasks of agricultural work, others could pursue the more 
masculine role of warrior once they had proved their commitment to the community. 
Seven weeks after their initial escape, they returned to their old plantation with a Creek 
war party; together, they killed three enslaved African-Americans and captured six 
more.
156
 
   It is undeniable that African-Americans formed a significant part of Creek society. 
The interactions between Creeks and enslaved people varied from slave to master, slave 
to hunter, slave to rescuer, parent to child. There was no uniform way in which African-
Americans fitted into Creek society. Much of the evidence presented here supports 
Kokomoor’s argument that African-American slaves among the Creeks were allowed 
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more freedom and were subjected to less abuse than among Euro-American slave 
owners.
157
 However, as shown above, this was not the case in all instances. Therefore, 
this section adds substance to Snyder’s belief that Creek slaveholding did not progress 
along a single trajectory leading inevitably to hereditary slavery. Rather, many different 
captive-holding practices co-existed. Older ideas about justice, status, and kinship 
mixed with newer notions of identity and race.
158
 There is little evidence that there was 
a wholesale change in attitude from the traditional Creek ones to a more Euro-American 
outlook after the American Revolution. 
   Even those Creeks who did begin to adopt a more racist attitude towards African-
Americans demonstrate a continuation of practices from before the American 
Revolution. Creeks had long adapted their ways to suit their situation whether it was by 
being confronted by other indigenous groups, the British, the Spanish, or the 
Americans. Further, whilst certain Creeks, often mestizos, undoubtedly adhered to the 
chattel slavery system, the vast majority did not, even into the nineteenth century. Many 
Creek owners required their slaves to complete small agricultural tasks without fear of 
violence, a fact supported by the continued flight of African-Americans to Creek 
country. Economic motivations drove many of the Creek attitudes towards African-
Americans, particularly when capturing runaways to return to their masters or to work 
the land. None of these actions prevented the Creeks from continuing to form 
relationships with African-Americans and to bear their children. 
   Despite this, it would be patronising to suggest that all Creeks were freedom fighters 
for African-American slaves. Many slaves were mistreated in Creek country. Others 
were bought and sold without regard to family. And, as Ethridge pointed out, the bottom 
line was that certain Creeks adopted the American view of African-American people as 
“property.”159 However, if the Euro-American aim was to influence all Creeks to 
partake in chattel slavery to break any potential for a Creek-black alliance then they 
failed. Undoubtedly, the introduction of African-Americans into Creek society had a 
considerable effect. But, the introduction of African-Americans did not start at the end 
of the American Revolution. All the practices which are used to investigate the Creek 
attitude towards African-Americans had their origins in the decades before the war. The 
war did not even have a significant impact upon the frequency of the practices. Whilst it 
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cannot be denied that the American Revolution is an important historical event, if we 
take the view of the Creeks and look eastwards towards the American territory, rather 
than the Euro-American stance of gazing westward to the Creek lands, little changed 
until much later in the nineteenth century.  
1.3 Same Actions, Different Contexts: Maroons, Creeks and Slaves 
   In the above two sections, I outlined the main ways that Maroons and Creeks 
interacted with the enslaved population of the regions they lived in to investigate 
whether these interactions, or attitudes, changed following peace with the British and 
Americans respectively. I have argued that, overall, both the Maroons and Creeks 
continued to act towards African-Americans in much the same way that they had done 
before the end of their respective wars. The contexts in which these interactions took 
place changed but the actual acts did not. This implies that the ending of hostilities with 
white society did not weaken either community - both the Maroons and Creeks 
negotiated new roles on their terms. 
   As shown above, the Maroons and Creeks interacted with the African-American 
population in a remarkably similar way following the peace treaties. The main areas of 
interaction were: slave ownership, hunting runaways or aiding in putting down slave 
rebellions, and personal relationships, usually intermarriage or shared offspring. 
However, within each of these areas, there were differences and the explanations for 
these are important. I argue that the differences occurred predominantly because of 
geography. The Jamaican Maroons lived in an island society, surrounded by the British 
and their enslaved population. In contrast, the Creeks lived at the meeting point of 
several slave societies and other indigenous communities. It was these contrasts that 
contributed to many of the differences identified. 
   In relation to the first area of comparison, I demonstrated that slaves were found in 
both Maroon and Creek communities but that neither the Maroons nor the Creeks 
owned slaves in large numbers, as found in the coastal regions of both Jamaica and the 
United States. This suggests that free communities in the circum-Caribbean practised 
small-scale, familial-type slavery where adoption, or at least incorporation, into society 
was the norm. This, in itself, is hardly surprising because Creeks had practiced this kind 
of slavery for decades whilst the “first time” Maroons were familiar with African-style 
75 
slavery before arriving in the Caribbean.
160
 What is more revealing is that this type of 
slavery does not seem to have changed significantly over the time-periods under study. 
There is no evidence that either community adopted wholesale a more European-style 
of slavery highlighting the shortcomings of white society when trying to impose their 
will on free communities. 
   Whilst it is not clear what types of jobs were given to the slaves of Maroons, it seems 
they echoed the work of Creek slaves. A male slave in Creek country was often required 
to complete agricultural tasks. Likewise, Maroons may have, at first, instructed male 
slaves to perform agricultural tasks in order to “prove” themselves to the Maroon 
leaders. Female slaves would presumably be required to perform agricultural tasks 
alongside the Maroon women. However, in both cases, as suggested in the archival 
evidence, male slaves could be raised to the status of warrior or even leader. This is 
some of the strongest evidence that hints at Maroon and Creek inclusiveness towards 
African-Americans which continued into the inter-war period and beyond. It was 
particularly so during large-scale warfare such as the Second Maroon War and the 
Creek War of 1813.
161
 It may also have been that agricultural tasks were given to these 
new male slave recruits because slaves in both America and Jamaica would not have 
been trained to hunt wild boar (in the Maroon case) or deer (in the Creek case) so would 
have been no use to the warriors who went on these hunts. Once again, then, this 
implies that the Maroons and Creeks were not influenced by whites in their treatment of 
African-Americans. They divided up tasks for their slaves based on the needs of the 
community rather than on status or race. 
   Why did these free communities not adopt a European approach to ownership of 
slaves? The evidence suggests it was because there was no need to. Both the Maroons 
and Creeks were aware of the slavery practised in Jamaica and the United States and 
chose not to adopt that style or could not because they lacked land and capital. The 
predominant economic activity for Maroons was hunting runaways, not a feasible 
activity for Maroon slaves to undertake. Likewise, the Creeks’ main source of income 
was hunting deer; however, as has been outlined elsewhere, there was a decreasing 
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amount of deer.
162
 In fact, the numbers were so low that the Creeks were under growing 
pressure to survive as a community without their main source of income. The 
decreasing deer population was not enough to support Creek society itself never mind 
additional Creek slaves. Moreover, Maroon territory was unsuited to the type of 
cultivation that required a mass slave workforce so even if there was a desire to own 
slaves, there would have been little to occupy them with. In contrast, the Creeks’ land 
was appropriate for cultivation but, much to Hawkins’ frustration, Creeks seemed to 
display little inclination to turn towards European-style agriculture. There was no 
reason for the Maroons and Creeks to own individuals for anything other than general 
agricultural or home-based tasks.  
   Interestingly, the act of slave ownership represents an act of resistance by both the 
Maroons and Creeks against the white governments. The Maroons were banned, by 
treaty, from owning slaves. However, the above evidence suggests that the Maroons did 
own slaves, albeit not in large numbers. Conversely, the federal government encouraged 
the Creeks to enslave people to increase productivity and “make use” of their lands.163 
The Creeks did not do this wholesale. Both communities did the opposite of what was 
required of them by their respective governments. This further reveals the governments’ 
lack of influence on free communities and the continuing ability of free communities to 
choose which acts to participate in. 
   White society did have more of an impact on slave ownership when it came to buying 
and selling individuals. Maroons seem to have acquired slaves through third party 
sellers, presumably local whites, so were involved in the slave economy, albeit only on 
a small scale. On the other hand, Creeks had bought and sold people for centuries and 
continued to do so. What did change is that more of an emphasis was placed on buying 
and selling black people rather than any other race. As stated earlier, this was most 
likely because of economic, rather than racist, reasons but the fact remains the same. 
These differences in trading in enslaved people reveal, firstly, that Maroons largely did 
not participate significantly in such trade because they did not own many slaves but also 
because the colonial government largely prevented them from doing so. White 
Jamaicans did not want Maroons trading in slaves and it would have been next to 
impossible to do so without white society finding out about it. White Americans wanted 
the Creeks to trade in slaves for the civilisation plan to be successful. The main cause 
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for this difference in how white governments wanted free communities to act towards 
slaves lies in the type of economy of the white society. Jamaica was a wholly slave-
based society, the entire economy of the island revolved around slavery and the colonial 
government needed to control that system. More importantly, there was a strict racial 
hierarchy and the colonial government could not allow the Maroons to participate in 
such a European activity.
164
 On the contrary, the United States did not have a strong 
enough economy, or consolidated trade links, to preclude the Creeks from buying and 
selling slaves as they had done for centuries. The south-eastern United States was also 
based on a strict racial hierarchy but allowing Creeks to trade in black people did not 
impact significantly upon this.
165
 In fact, it merely consolidated the existing hierarchy of 
whites on top, blacks on bottom and Native Americans in between. The location of the 
Creeks in borderland territory, close to the slave markets of other European empires, 
also prevented the United States from controlling these exchanges. 
   The few cases of slave ownership did not prevent personal relationships forming 
between enslaved people and Maroons and Creeks. The above sections showed that 
both communities continued to intermarry with Africans. This went completely against 
the wishes of the colonial and federal governments. That the Maroons and Creeks 
ignored their respective governments on this matter is another example of their 
resistance to white society. It was not always conscious resistance, both communities 
had formed these relationships for decades and they simply continued to do so. Taking 
into consideration the wishes of white society may not have been central to the thinking 
of free communities, it may have been that they just wanted to marry a particular 
enslaved individual. 
   Both Maroons and Creeks formed these relationships with enslaved people and had 
children with them. The main difference between the two examples seems to be that the 
Maroons left their children on the plantations with their mothers, whereas the examples 
in the Creek case demonstrate that the children were incorporated into Creek society 
and could even rise to the status of leader, as in the case of Ninnywageechee. However, 
intermarriage and subsequent children predated the peace treaties in Jamaica. This 
practice had been going on since the Maroons first ran away from their plantations in 
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1655. Therefore, intermarriage further demonstrates the lack of real power that the 
white government had over the Maroon community. Under no circumstances did the 
colonial government want the Maroons to form family relationships with the enslaved 
population, precisely because they knew it would result in harbouring runaways or 
aiding slave rebellions. The fact that the Maroons continued to do so suggests that 
Europeans had a relatively small amount of influence on the Maroons. It is unlikely that 
the Maroons left their children on the plantations purely because of a feeling of 
superiority. Maroons may have felt that the child had more chance of survival on a 
plantation than in Maroon country, especially if the master was benign. The proximity 
of Maroon settlements, as a result of the geography of Jamaica, meant that Maroons 
could, and did, visit their families on the plantations.  
   In the Creek case, it is unclear whether Creeks married plantation slaves but most of 
the evidence suggests they married slaves from within Creek society or free blacks. 
Subsequently, there is little to imply that they had children with plantation slaves and 
left those children on the plantations, as the Maroons apparently did. Once again, this 
difference seems to be linked to the geography of the regions the Maroons and Creeks 
lived in. Many of the Creek settlements were far removed from the large plantations 
found in places like low-country Georgia.
166
 The settlements near the frontier had small 
numbers of African-American slaves because the frontier communities had not been 
present long enough to expand into large-scale agriculture, and also because of white 
fears of Creek-black collaboration. Therefore, simply because of distance, it is unlikely 
the Creeks intermarried with plantation slaves. Additionally, as will be demonstrated 
further in Chapter Two, the local white population of states such as Georgia and 
Alabama were, in general, hostile towards the Creeks so travel around the region was 
difficult and opportunities to meet plantation slaves were limited. Conversely, the local 
white population of Jamaica were more amicable towards the Maroons and there are 
several examples of planters, such as Thomas Thistlewood, noting the wanderings of 
the Maroons without concern. This meant that the Maroons had far more opportunity to 
interact with slaves on plantations than the Creeks did.  
   As with the Maroons, this interwar period of peace does not seem to have yielded 
much change regarding intermarriage between Creeks and the enslaved population. 
Scholars such as Kathryn Braund have demonstrated that there were Creek-black unions 
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pre-dating the American Revolution so this represents a continuation.
167
 However, 
unlike in the other areas examined in this chapter, the intermarriage of slaves with either 
Maroons or Creeks does not seem to have occasioned much horror from the white 
population. Indeed, the whites of Jamaica noted the benefits of slave children having 
Maroon fathers. Importantly, this desire for Maroons and slave women to have children 
was a view supported by local whites, rather than the colonial government of Jamaica. 
This hints at the split in opinion between official and unofficial policy within Jamaica, a 
scenario assessed in greater detail in Chapters Two and Three. Suffice to say here that 
the local whites were perhaps more interested in increasing the value and productivity 
of their slaves than in adhering to an island-wide policy of divide-and-rule, particularly 
as the Maroons enjoyed a relatively good relationship with the local whites.  
   The seeming lack of interest from any of the whites in the United States regarding 
Creek-black unions is more difficult to understand. The American government, much like 
the colonial government in Jamaica, wanted to implement a divide-and-rule policy which 
would suggest they would discourage any unions with black people. Furthermore, once 
Benjamin Hawkins began to instigate the civilisation plan, which encouraged Creeks to 
turn to a version of slavery more associated with the whites of Georgia, it seems odd that 
little would be done to prevent marriages with slaves. The answer lies in the possibility 
that the white Americans did not have a significant influence on the day to day lives of 
Creeks. There was little the government could do if a Creek wanted to marry a black 
person if they lived deep within Creek country. This in itself is a good indicator of the 
continuing strength of the Creeks after the signing of the peace treaties but also highlights 
how geography could influence the development of a society. 
   These personal relationships were an act of resistance against the white governments 
but they also highlight that there was a whole web of interactions distinct from the 
European world occurring in these regions. Peace with the Jamaican and American 
governments did not change this and there was nothing either could do to prevent it 
from happening. These intermarriages and shared children are one of the most definitive 
examples of how free communities continued to negotiate their worlds on their terms. 
   In contrast to that most outright display of resistance, there is a complex act to assess 
which is often interpreted as an act of submissiveness – hunting runaways. On a basic 
level, both Maroons and Creeks participated in this act as dictated by the treaties they 
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signed. By doing so, both the Maroons and Creeks aided the consolidation of slavery in 
their regions. Further, it explicitly shows that both communities considered enslaved 
people as distinct and not incorporated into the free societies. This would be expected 
for the Creeks because they did not share a race and a culture with African-Americans. 
However, it is slightly more surprising for the Maroons who were ethnically African. 
This similarity implies that free communities did not determine what constituted “the 
other” by race, but by status.  
   Catching runaway slaves is more associated with Maroons than with Creeks, although this 
does not necessarily mean that white society had more of an impact on the Maroons in this 
regard. There were several other contributing factors. One was that, because Jamaica is an 
island, the places slaves could run away to were limited. Slave runaways in Jamaica did not 
have the vast expanse of lands available to slave runaways in the United States. The most 
obvious place to run to was the mountainous interior which was inhabited by the Maroons 
so, consequently, the Maroons would have been more useful in apprehending the slaves 
than the Creeks would. In addition, the relative lack of other free communities in Jamaica 
capable of hunting slaves meant that the government had to rely on the Maroons.
168
 This 
means that success was more achievable for the Maroons than the Creeks and, therefore, the 
financial rewards were more within reach. In the United States, there was more land to run 
to but there was also a larger free black population and numerous other indigenous 
communities willing to harbour the runaway slaves or, indeed, act as slave catchers 
themselves. This made the task more difficult for the Creeks to complete and, subsequently, 
resulted in slave hunting being less associated with Creeks than with Maroons.  
   Both the Maroons the Creeks seem to have been motivated to hunt runaways by 
financial incentives. This in itself is not very revealing because the vast majority of 
Europeans became involved in slavery for the same reasons. More importantly, hunting 
slaves for financial gain insinuates that the Maroons and Creeks were becoming 
dependent on external sources for survival. The reasons for this dependence differed; 
however both were related to the treaties they signed. The Maroons were increasingly 
dependent on outside forces because of the poor quality of their land – a consequence of 
the treaties. The Creeks’ economic position was a result of centuries of interaction with 
Europeans; they were completely intertwined with the market forces of European 
empires – also a consequence of various treaties. What neither Jamaica nor the United 
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States were able to achieve militarily, they were achieving economically. Economic 
dependency forced these free communities to hunt runaways which, in turn, prevented 
large-scale alliances with the enslaved population which lead to the consolidation of the 
position of the white governments. It is in this context that white society influenced free 
communities. Their ideology was not adopted by the vast majority of these communities 
but they still participated in hunting runaways because they needed to in order to 
survive economically.  
   Further evidence of the economic, rather than ideological, motivations of hunting 
runaway is seen by the fact that many Maroons and Creeks refused to do so unless they 
were paid. In their eyes they were providing a service and being rewarded for that 
service. However, perspective is everything. I argue that it mattered little to the 
governments why free communities hunted slaves – white people still got their slaves 
back and the government still had the propaganda coup of these communities hunting 
runaways. 
   This hunting of runaways undoubtedly contributed to the consolidation of slavery. 
However, there is evidence that appears to show that both Maroons and Creeks also 
harboured runaways and policed slaves selectively, which restricted the expansion of 
slavery. The Creeks seem to have been far more active in harbouring runaways than the 
Maroons, although the Maroons also did so on occasion. There are several explanations 
for why Maroons harboured few runaways. One is that each Maroon town had a 
superintendent living in it, making it hard to hide a runaway slave. There is also the 
possibility that certain Maroons simply did not want to harbour any slave runaways. 
However, the most likely explanation is again linked to the economy of Maroon society. 
Much of the income was supplied by the white government, through work such as 
slave-catching and road maintenance, therefore, the Maroons were dependent on 
satisfying certain demands of white society. Finally, it is possible that many Maroons 
did harbour runaways but just did it so well that they were never discovered. 
   In contrast, there is evidence that Creeks in all sectors of society harboured runaways; 
from “ordinary” Creeks to leaders such as Alexander McGillivray. The signing of the 
peace treaties, once again, does not seem to have resulted in the Maroons or Creeks 
feeling that they had no control over a situation. If they wanted to hunt a runaway, they 
did. If they wanted to harbour a runaway, they did. It seems that neither the government 
of Jamaica nor of the United States had much influence on their final decision. That 
82 
said, Creeks were more likely to be able to harbour a runaway successfully because of 
their geographic location. The vast majority of Creek towns had no federal government 
representative and were far away from Euro-American territory so providing refuge to a 
runaway would be easier. Furthermore, Creeks had more economic independence so 
could conceal a runaway without worrying about the effect of such an action to the 
same extent the Maroons did. Linked to this is the fact that the Maroons were 
surrounded by the British so relied on them for many of their economic opportunities 
whereas the Creeks had economic opportunities provided by other empires such as the 
Spanish or British. 
   In both the Maroon and Creek cases, aiding runaways (or not) only became an issue 
after the signing of the peace treaties so this is support for the argument that the peace 
treaties did affect Maroon and Creek life. Maroons were not going to return runaway 
slaves to their owners during the First Maroon War. On the other hand, the Creeks did 
return a few slaves to the British before the signing of the peace treaties. The British 
were not the enemy so certain Creeks were willing to assist in locating runaways. 
However, tracking runaways was not massively enforced by the British and was more 
of a request than a demand. It was after the American Revolution that hunting runaways 
became the responsibility of Creek society as a whole rather than the individual. In this 
way, the treaties did have an effect upon Maroon and Creek society. 
   A major difference between the Maroons and Creeks with regard to enslaved people 
was in the suppression of rebellions. As shown, the Maroons consistently participated in 
this act but the Creeks did not. All of the reasons for this are related to geography. The 
main reason that Maroons suppressed slave rebellions seems to have been that, 
following the peace treaties, their future was intertwined with the future of Jamaica as a 
result of their location in the heart of the island. Relations between Maroons and slaves 
could be strained; therefore, the Maroons could not be sure that a successful uprising 
would benefit them. Conversely, it was not clear that the Creeks’ fate was tied up with 
the United States. Their location at the meeting point of empires meant the Creeks had 
options that the Maroons did not. I argue that the Creeks did not suppress slave 
rebellions because they did not have to and the United States was not strong enough to 
force them. 
   Why did the colonial government trust the Maroons to suppress slave rebellions? 
After all, these were communities made up of former slaves, descendants of slaves and 
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indigenous Africans who had fought alongside parts of the enslaved population during 
the First Maroon War. There are several possibilities. One is that the Maroons were an 
incredible fighting force who had never tasted defeat - a worthy ally for any 
government. It could also have been that the colonial government had little other option 
- without the Maroons on their side, actively suppressing the rebellions, white society 
would have been at the mercy of a Maroon-slave alliance. Both of these issues 
inevitably contributed to the decision but, most important, were the actions of the 
Maroons themselves. As outlined earlier, the Maroons immediately took to their new 
duties with vigour. Without this, and Cudjoe’s strong centralised power, it is unlikely 
that the colonial government would have trusted the Maroons with suppressing 
rebellions. It was one thing sending them out against individuals but quite another to 
trust them with large numbers of rebellious slaves. 
   The Creeks were undoubtedly a fighting force to be reckoned with yet the Creeks 
were not involved with suppressing slave rebellions. The main reasons appear to have 
been that the United States had other options: there were plenty of other indigenous 
groups that could fill the role, and the Creeks did not prove their commitment to the 
stability of the region in the years immediately after peace, as had Maroons. Once again, 
this was because the Creeks’ future did not lay only with the United States, there was no 
need for them to suppress slave rebellions to safeguard their communities. The location 
of Creek territory in comparison to Maroon lands was also a factor. In Jamaica, the 
coastal plantations were easy to access for the Maroons so, if slaves rose on one of the 
plantations, the Maroons could reach the area relatively quickly. The slaves in Jamaica 
also lived in relative proximity to each other; the plantations were large and grouped 
closely together, meaning rebellion could spread quickly across the island. Conversely, 
the Creeks were further removed from the slave population. The Euro-Americans who 
lived near the border with the Creek territory generally owned only a handful of slaves, 
a situation which was not amenable to slaves launching a large-scale rebellion. In 
addition, the percentage of Jamaica’s population that was enslaved was much higher 
than the equivalent in the United States.
169
 Slave rebellion was a far more serious threat 
in Jamaica than in the land bordering the Creeks and, indeed, occurred on a much more 
frequent basis. The slave rebellions which did breakout in the U.S. during the period 
under study were far away from Creek territory; for example, Gabriel’s Rebellion in 
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1800, meaning suppression of them was not as associated with the Creeks.
170
 Once 
again, this shows the strength of the Maroons and Creeks. The Maroons chose to 
participate in the suppression of slave rebellions, to protect their future, whilst the 
Creeks chose not to, neither was forced into doing so.  
   Also worth considering is the fact that the Maroons seemed to have a more amicable 
relationship with the local whites in Jamaica than the Creeks did with the local whites in 
Georgia. This will be explained in more detail in Chapter Two but this situation meant 
the Maroons may have been more willing to come to the aid of the local whites in times 
of rebellion than the Creeks would have been. Or, viewed from a different angle, the 
local whites in Georgia would have been unlikely to turn to the Creeks for help in times 
of rebellion because they had a fractious relationship with them. There was constant 
fighting along the frontier and if slaves rebelled near Creek territory, it is unlikely that 
the whites would think that the Creeks would support them and not the slaves.   
   Overall, when assessing the impact of the end of the First Maroon War and the end of 
the American Revolution on the respective Maroon and Creek attitudes towards black 
people, the archival evidence highlights that, whilst there was an impact, that impact has 
been overstated by previous scholars. This comparative section has demonstrated that 
Euro-American society did have an influence on the Maroons and Creeks; however, that 
influence was not brought about by the signing of the peace treaties which ended both 
wars. Economic and geographic factors played a much more important role in the 
decisions that Maroons and Creeks made regarding African-Americans. At no point 
does there seem to have been a mass movement towards the view that African-
Americans were inferior. I argue that all of the ways in which Maroons and Creeks 
acted towards African-Americans were either a direct continuation of practice, or the 
same practice conducted in a different context. Furthermore, many of the contexts in 
which free communities and African-Americans interacted were actually acts of 
resistance to European demands. The ending of the wars affected both communities but 
they continued to negotiate their own relationships with African-Americans. 
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Chapter 2. Maroons, Creeks and White Settlers in Jamaica and the 
Deep South 
   In a letter of July 1807, Benjamin Hawkins described how the chiefs of the Upper 
Towns had recently made an attempt to turn William McIntosh out of office for “being 
too much attached to and in the interest of the white people.”1 This quotation 
demonstrates the type of division that could appear in Creek society — certain Creeks 
were courting an alliance with local whites whilst others were criticising anyone who 
desired such an alliance. These divides form the basis of this chapter; I demonstrate the 
different ways that the Maroons and Creeks interacted with local white settlers and how 
these two groups negotiated the distance between the races. By examining these 
relationships, I build a picture of life in the borderlands and how both sides in each 
example carved out roles for themselves with their former enemies. I argue that there 
was a more amicable relationship between the Maroons and local whites in comparison 
to the strained relationship between the Creeks and local whites in the inter-war period. 
This was largely because the whites in Jamaica needed stability on the island more than 
land, whereas the whites in the south-eastern United States desired land and seemed to 
believe the Creeks had little positive impact on the stability of the region, especially 
after the large Native American union, the Western Confederacy, had been defeated in 
1795. 
   At the beginning of the time period covered in the Creek section, the Treaty of Paris, 
signed between the new United States and Britain, turned the Creeks into allies of their 
former enemies, the Americans. As this chapter will explore, Creeks subsequently 
formed a variety of relationships with local whites.
2
 This includes examples of Creek 
interaction with Indian countrymen, white Georgians who lived near the border of the 
Creek territory, white settlers who encroached upon Creek land, and white traders who 
lived near the Creek territory in their capacity as traders at the federal trading posts. 
These interactions are noteworthy because of the different forms they took, from violent 
clashes over land encroachment, kidnapping, economic dependency, vicious retribution 
for murders, and reciprocal theft, to offers of safe passage for white travellers, mutual 
cultural exchange, Creek hospitality towards visitors, and intermarriage. 
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   In Jamaica, a different type of borderland developed between the Maroons and local 
whites but the American borderlands still bore hallmarks of the one found in Jamaica. 
The peace treaties signed in 1739 also turned former enemies into neighbours and allies; 
but, unlike the Creeks, the Maroons were surrounded on all sides. This inevitably 
affected the type of relationships formed and the course of their history. The Maroon 
relationship with whites is notable for its lack of violence following the signing of the 
peace treaties. There were no violent clashes over land (although there were peaceful 
ones), no instances of kidnapping, and retribution for crimes was seemingly non-
existent. What did occur was increased security for local whites, both for themselves 
and their property, mutual curiosity of cultures, Maroon children named after local 
whites, and local white intervention in the colonial government’s control of the 
Maroons. The main similarity between the Maroon and Creek relationships with their 
respective local whites was the economic dependency on the whites that developed.  
   Previous scholars have examined aspects of these relationships but have yet to weave 
them into the wider context of how these interactions affected other sectors of society, 
such as African-Americans and government representatives. All of these relationships 
must be examined in order to build as accurate a picture as possible of Maroon and 
Creek life in this time period. Robbie Franklyn Ethridge’s work in particular has an 
impact on this chapter. Her pioneering work, Creek Country, emphasised the 
importance of Creek land on their history, both with regard to internal and external 
relations.
3
 Ethridge is correct in underlining the significance of physical geography on 
Creek history but her point can be developed further by comparing the situation to that 
of the Maroons who inhabited a different type of physical borderland in Jamaica. Land 
was important to both the Maroons and Creeks but how it was important differed, 
leading to different notions of the borderlands. 
   Another influential scholar, Andrew Frank, correctly argues that Creeks and local 
whites were more alike than historians have portrayed them.
4
 My argument builds on 
this assertion by showing that the ends achieved by their behaviour were similar; it was 
just the means that differed and caused the tension on the borderlands. For example, 
both the whites and the Creeks believed in the punishment of alleged criminals; 
however, the whites often retaliated against any Creek in the vicinity whilst the Creeks 
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believed that only the town to which the perpetrators belonged should be punished. 
These subtle differences in how they dealt with behaviour that their society deemed 
“wrong” led to the continuous circle of violence which was present in the borderlands.  
   The scholarship on the Maroons has said little about their relationship with the local 
whites. Some historians mention peaceful border disputes and added security but there 
has been no sustained examination of the subtle nuances of the relationship.
5
 Werner 
Zips has examined the extent to which Maroons were conscious agents of their own 
fate, emphasising their resistance to colonial forces – but there has been little mention of 
the extent to which the Maroons actually forged a relationship which went beyond a 
wary truce.
6
 However, the records speak time and again of moments when Maroons 
courted white allegiances and vice versa. It is imperative to fill this notable gap in the 
Maroon historiography. 
2.1 Maroons and the White Settlers of Jamaica: An Unexpected Alliance 
   This section details the several levels of interaction between local whites and the 
Maroons to investigate the wider question of how Maroons negotiated their new role in 
society in the inter-war period. Other scholars have briefly discussed this interaction but 
have not elaborated further on it. Mullin wrote that Maroons grew to know planters and 
that, in the late eighteenth century, Maroons made an array of informal alliances with 
both black and white neighbours.
7
 However, despite views such as these, the belief that 
the Maroons were isolated from the rest of the Jamaican population has not substantially 
changed. My thesis seeks to alter this view and demonstrate the complexities of the 
relationship between whites and Maroons to outline the extent to which the Maroons 
were involved in Jamaican society. 
   The first area in which to assess the relationship is the contact between the two over 
land. Such disputes over land were usually peaceful and involved one side contacting 
the colonial government for mediation. In the mid-1750s, an internal dispute led 
Trelawny Town to split into two communities; those who supported Furry, left with him 
to establish a new settlement called Furry’s Town while the rest stayed in the original 
town. However, Furry’s Town was on the property of a white man, Dr. Hardyman, who 
demanded Furry’s Maroons vacate his property. Furry and his followers agreed to do so 
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and returned to land within the boundaries of Trelawny Town, setting up a “New Town” 
to stay distinct. In compensation, Hardyman offered Furry a rather generous sum of 
£50.
8
 This inflammatory matter was dealt with peacefully and a solution was found, 
albeit one that involved Maroon submission.   
   Maroon submission was not always required to settle disputes amicably. In 1781, 
Maroons settled on lands belonging to Charles Douglas and talks were opened to 
resolve the issue. Again, both sides acted with restraint and negotiation. Douglas said 
that he would give the lands up if, in return, the Maroons would give him an equal 
quantity to the northeast where he had another plot – to which the Maroons agreed. Two 
surveyors were appointed, one by the colonial government and, importantly, one by the 
Maroons.
9
 Both of these incidents indicate how disputes between the Maroons and local 
whites could be settled. Both sides seem to have been committed to keeping the peace 
and both were willing to be the one who gave up the land. This example shows that, on 
occasion, Maroons were even allowed to appoint their own surveyors to avoid any 
future confrontation. 
   Equally, both sides could be responsible for encroachments – evidence that the 
Maroons were not being unfairly targeted by white society. In one instance, George 
Gray “and other Maroon Negroes of Charles Town” petitioned the Assembly on the 
subject of land. They claimed that when they were first settled “about 1756,” there were 
no white settlers adjoining them, hence “they were able to raise large quantities of 
goats, hogs and other stock, so as to live very comfortably.” However, within “these 
few years past,” several sugar works and other plantations had been settled near their 
town, and upon the lands where their stock used to range. Consequently, they could not 
raise stock of any kind without encroaching on the neighbouring plantations, as the land 
allotted for them was “steep and hilly.” According to Gray, this resulted in many 
disputes between them and white settlers. Maroon stock trespassed on the cane pieces, 
while the cattle of the white settlers ruined Maroon provision grounds.
10
 The Maroons 
strove for a peaceful end to this particular dispute, saying they did not wish to put the 
country to further expense. A “run of land” on either side of the Spanish River, about 
six miles from their present town, Charles Town, was offered to them in exchange. 
Situated as it was, the Maroons felt this land would enable them to raise stock without 
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inconvenience to themselves, and there would be no trespassing on their neighbours’ 
land. They pointed out that this would remove every cause of murmurings and disputes 
“which is now too frequent between them and the white settlers in their 
neighbourhood.”11 Even decades after the peace treaties, both the local whites and the 
Maroons seemed determined to preserve the tranquillity of their relations. 
   Local whites appear to have been committed to preserving the peace in other ways 
too. On occasion, they intervened in land disputes between Maroons and other whites to 
reduce tensions. In 1770, Trelawny Town complained that a “great part of that [their 
land] which was run out for them, is rocks and cockpits.”12 Therefore, they had taken to 
encroaching on the lands of a nearby planter. Apparently, the dispute was settled by the 
intervention of another white man, the custos of St. James, John Palmer, and some other 
gentlemen, even though “there is no doubt that Maroons were encroaching.”13 In a 
further incident, when a survey of Charles Town was taken, it was discovered that the 
town was occupying 94 acres of land belonging to the Kildair property. The Maroons, 
having possessed it, were “unwilling to give [it] up, having their provisions chiefly upon 
that land; therefore,” the superintendent wrote, “in order to pacify the Maroons, I was 
under the necessity of stoping [stopping] Mr. Graham, the surveyor, from proceeding 
upon the lines, till a fair statement of their claims, should be laid before Your 
Honour.”14 The archival evidence does not reveal how this event ended but Campbell 
claims that it was likely that a local man helped settle it peacefully.
15
 What is evident in 
this example, however, is that local whites were determined to have disputes 
investigated and did not advocate stripping the Maroons of any disputed lands without a 
proper enquiry. This even extended to situations where they felt the Maroons were 
encroaching. 
   On the few occasions when the peace was threatened by land disputes – violence still 
did not break out. In 1781, John Cosens lodged a petition explaining that he wanted to 
clarify the boundaries of his land. He employed surveyors to ascertain the limits but the 
Maroons prevented them from proceeding. It seems that this was more a result of 
necessity than of belligerence. A Committee employed to review this case said it 
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appeared that Moore Town was entitled to 1000 acres but only 500 had been granted 
and laid out.
16
 Clearly, Moore Town believed this land belonged to them and they were 
willing to prevent it being taken. However, as the formation of the Committee shows, 
white society investigated the dispute and did not simply take Cosens’ word. The 
Committee ruled that the Maroons were encroaching but recommended no action 
because they had been living on those lands for forty years. 
   Even into the 1790s, when, following the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution, planters 
may have had more reason to be hostile towards the Maroons, violence did not 
characterise land disputes. In 1793, David Schaw complained that the Maroons’ stock 
was continually trespassing on his and his slaves’ provision grounds. Schaw claimed 
that, thus far, he had not been able to procure the assistance of the Maroons in making a 
dividing fence, and he was obliged to “throw up the whole of those grounds to the 
material injury of himself and slaves.”17 However, once again, this was a case which did 
not turn violent. Schaw’s response to the Maroons’ apathy regarding the fence was to do 
nothing. This in itself is rather telling about the extent of the issue. Presumably, if the 
Maroon stock was causing such a problem on his land, Schaw could have constructed a 
fence himself and then attempted to get the Maroons to pay for it. That he did not 
suggests the issue was not as pronounced as Cosens implied. This case hints at the 
differing views of property between the Maroons and the white settlers. Maroons may 
have seen no problem in allowing their stock to roam free and probably expected the 
onus to be on the land-owner to prevent stock entering his land, if he so wished. 
Crucially, however, even in times such as this when a solution that suited all parties was 
not found – still no violence broke out. It is notable that this event happened after the 
Haitian Revolution had erupted. A mass slave rebellion was underway in Haiti and local 
whites seem to have found it a better strategy to placate the Maroons rather than 
antagonise them, in contrast to the behavior of the colonial government, whose actions 
will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
   Campbell has shown that one of the primary causes of these land disputes was 
confusion over the size of the land grants in the treaties. Cudjoe’s treaty explicitly stated 
that he and his followers were to be given 1500 acres but Quao’s treaty said they were 
to be given a “certain quantity” of land to raise the same cash crops as stipulated in 
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Cudjoe’s. This ambiguity lent itself to flexible interpretations both by the Maroons and 
by the authorities.
18
 Despite this, these imprecise land grants and lack of surveys did not 
lead to the border warfare that was found in the south-eastern United States.  
   A further cause was that surveys could be delayed for decades so neither side knew 
who the land truly belonged to. For example, in 1751 a motion was passed by the 
Assembly recommending that the adjoining lands to Scotts Hall be used for the settling 
of white families. By the following month, an agreement had been made to purchase 
nearby “land called Scotts Hall,” some 500 acres, for £600. This was executed in 
November 1751, but apparently the land was not officially surveyed until 1775.
19
 For 
almost twenty-five years, no one knew who the land was allotted to and, thus, disputes 
easily occurred. This implies that land encroachment was not a pre-meditated policy 
from either side to gain more land but was more a spontaneous result of unclear land 
grants. 
   Violent clashes did not break out over land because, despite Thompson’s claim to the 
contrary, it appears that white settlers did not place a large emphasis on gaining Maroon 
lands.
20
  General Walpole did state in the 1790s that sugar plantations nearly encircled 
the Trelawny Town lands and “every where encroach upon the base of these 
mountains.”21 However, few of these lands were in use – rather the planters had bought 
them to prevent others from doing so. Parry has argued that planters disliked the 
acquisition of fresh sugar-producing territory because they feared that increased 
production would lower prices within their protected markets.
22
 If this was the case, 
then white settlers would have had little interest in Maroon lands and disputes were, 
therefore, more likely to have been resolved peacefully.  
   The idea that white settlers did not desire Maroon lands is supported by evidence provided 
by both Bryan Edwards and Edward Long. Edwards claimed that Jamaica had 4 million 
acres of land, of which 3 ¾ million was cultivable, yet only one-quarter was actually under 
cultivation.
23
 Long further stated that 80, 000 acres in St. Elizabeth and 100,000 acres in    
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St. James, both parishes bordering Maroon territory, were still not being cultivated.
24
 This 
shows that Jamaica had an abundance of land available if the planters desired it. Therefore, 
if planters did want more land, they did not need to take that belonging to the Maroons. The 
land that was desirable to the white planters was the low-lying, flat land good for sugar 
cultivation, not the mountainous interior the Maroons inhabited. 
   The lack of violence over land contradicts the theory that the Maroons were hemmed 
in.
25
 Parts of the island which were supposed to have been settled extensively following 
the peace treaties with the Maroons still had not seen significant expansion by the 1770s. 
The situation continued to be unsatisfactory to such an extent that Acts had to be passed. 
For example, one in 1776 which stated that, in return for settling in Portland, the colonial 
government would grant each person a quantity of land “not exceeding 500 acres,” in 
proportion to the number of slaves and white men they were willing to bring with them.
26
 
An Act such as this would have been redundant if the area had been settled to the extent 
that the colonial government had envisioned. The same was true in the west of the island. 
Following the American Revolution, Loyalist planters fled the thirteen former colonies, 
some arriving in Jamaica. The colonial government debated how to provide for them and 
it was suggested that they be given lands in St. Elizabeth. Rumour told of unclaimed 
crown lands stretching across twenty thousand acres or more - land which would be 
perfect for growing sugarcane.
27
 The parishes in both of these examples, Portland and St. 
Elizabeth, were close to Maroon territory which implies there was plenty of land available 
in those regions. Undoubtedly, there had been expansion of sugar plantations across 
Jamaica; prior to the peace treaties, St. George had four small sugar plantations but had 
established sixty by the 1750s.
28
 However, the evidence above suggests that this image of 
Maroons being confined to their land like “reservations” seems inaccurate.29 Local whites 
had acres of land to expand into if they so wished without encroaching on Maroon land. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
And, a Detail of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the Late War Between Those People and the 
White Inhabitants (London: John Stockdale, 1796-6), 247-8. 
24
 Edward Long, The History of Jamaica; or, General Survey of the Ancient and Modern State of that 
island: with Reflections on its Situations, Settlements, Inhabitants, Climate, Products, Commerce, Laws, 
and Government, Vols. I-II (London: F. Cass, 1970), 191, 213. 
25
 Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1982), 213-214. 
26
 Jamaica, The Laws of Jamaica: 1760-1792, (London: A. Aikman Printer’s to the King’s Most Excellent 
Majesty, 1811), 221-22. 
27
 Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: The Loss of America and the Remaking of the British Empire (New 
York: Alread A. Knopf, 2011), 258-9. 
28
 Campbell, The Maroons of Jamaica, 146-7. 
29
 Brathwaite, Nanny, Sam Sharpe, and the Struggle for People’s Liberation (Kingston: Published by the 
API for the National Heritage Week Committee, 1977), 248. 
93 
   A further reason for the peaceful handling of disputes over land was that Maroons 
often provided protection to white settlers and the whites wanted to avoid any event 
which would remove this protection. Edward Long remarked that when Moore Town 
moved to new territory in 1768, it was “much better situated” for giving “speedy 
protection” to the estates on each side of the Rio Grande.30 In fact, Long went on to 
claim that some planters went as far as making secret deals with the Maroons, paying 
them a sort of retainer to protect their properties.
31
 This reliance on the Maroons was 
unsurprising given the precarious position of the sugar islands and therefore the 
planters. The sugar islands’ free populations were too small to provide an adequate 
militia, thus leaving them vulnerable to attack.
32
 The planters looked for solutions and 
realised that the Maroons could offer them something which was hard to find elsewhere 
– defence against the large enslaved population. Balcarres, the Governor of Jamaica, 
echoed Long in identifying planters as paying “protection money” to the Maroons to 
safeguard their properties.
33
 This is an example of the continuing closeness between 
some local whites and Maroons but also emphasises one way in which colonial society 
viewed the Maroons as a sources of security. 
   It was not just through protection that the Maroons and white settlers interacted. 
According to Mullin, as visitors, whites witnessed Maroon dances and other 
ceremonies, enjoyed their hospitality, slept with and married some of their women, and 
tried to see Maroons as possessing a culture.
34
 Mullin further claims that white visitors 
were aware that they would be welcome because “A rule with Cudjoe was, ‘always, 
never to provoke whites.’”35 This was not because Cudjoe was fearful of the whites, but 
because he could see the benefits of peaceful co-existence with them. Some whites 
responded to this amicable stance by learning the Maroons’ Kromanti language.36 
   In addition to these social interactions, some Maroons went so far as to name their 
children after prominent planters in the area. Robinson argues that this act could have 
been a client's acknowledgement of the patron or it could have been a mere ploy; an 
attempt to flatter prominent colonists into supporting the Maroons and becoming their 
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advocates.
37
 Campbell shows this practice can be traced back to Africa where a 
common tradition was to choose the name of an authority figure or that of a respected 
individual.
38
 Whether Maroons were doing this to curry favour with local whites, or as a 
genuine sign of respect, the act demonstrates a certain degree of familiarity between the 
two established following the First Maroon War.
39
 
   These friendly interactions prevented mass violence between the two groups 
throughout the eighteenth century. One of the few examples of violence was in 1754 in 
Crawford Town. The account of this event is rather fragmentary but mentions Crawford 
Town being burnt by the “rebellious Negroes,” and one Edward Crawford being 
murdered. The identity of Edward Crawford, whether a Maroon or a white settler, is not 
clear but it does seem that whites were involved in some capacity, because we find 
William Kennedy and Richard Godfrey, both whites, making claims for losses they 
sustained in this affray. The superintendent, too, John Kelly, swore that after the murder 
of Crawford, when the town was burnt, he himself sustained losses to the tune of 
£63.4.6.
40
 This violence was borne out of an internal Maroon dispute and was not 
directed towards white society but it does show how whites could get drawn into violent 
encounters with the Maroons. 
   The rest of the interactions were notable for their lack of violence. Thomas 
Thistlewood, who frequently came across the “wild Negroes” in search of prize money 
on the roads of Westmoreland parish, described an encounter with Cudjoe on Thursday, 
29
th
 May 1750, on the road to St. James. He wrote he “met Colonel Cudjoe, one of his 
wives, one of his sons, a Lieutenant and other attendants.” Cudjoe shook Thistlewood 
by the hand “and begged a dram of us, which we gave him. He brought to my memory 
the picture of Robinson Crusoe.”41 This image of Robinson Crusoe is interesting 
because it implies a certain amount of respect from Thistlewood. According to the 
novelist James Joyce, Crusoe was the true prototype of the British colonist: representing 
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“the manly independence, the unconscious cruelty, the persistence, the slow yet 
efficient intelligence, the sexual apathy, the calculating taciturnity.”42 Furthermore, 
Crusoe is cast in the role of an enlightened European leader over the “savage” Friday. 
The fact that Thistlewood chose to describe Cudjoe as Crusoe-esque reveals that some 
white settlers believed the Maroons to be more civilised than enslaved peoples and that 
they spoke of them with a certain level of awe. 
   In early 1751, Thistlewood met another Maroon leader, Accompong. The Maroon 
wore “a ruffled shirt, blue broad cloth coat, scarlet cuff to his sleeves, gold buttons, & 
he had with [that] white cap, and black hat, white linen breeches puffed at the rims.”43 
Maroon captains in military dress were familiar sights around the island, even into the 
1790s and 1800s. Chiefs “wore a kind of regimentals,” R. C. Dallas noted, “some old 
military coat finely laced . . . with this ... a ruffled shirt, linen waistcoat and trousers, 
and a laced hat.”44 Thus dressed, Wilson states, Maroon captains and their men became 
distinctive figures, roaming across plantations with their rifles in hand, selling their 
game in the markets of Kingston and Spanish Town or sailing to offshore islands to 
search for runaways.
45
  
   On other occasions such as 24
th
 May 1753, Thistlewood met with Cudjoe “just by the 
Styx Bridge and shook him by the hand.”46 Later, Thistlewood wrote of a time at his 
plantation, Egypt, when two of Colonel Cudjoe’s men who, on a furlough for nine days, 
stopped in and drank some punch.
47
 These instances show how Maroons could be a 
feature of colonial society. Interactions were not just limited to hunting slave runaways 
but took place on a social and personal level as well. Maroons were even known to 
spend the night at nearby plantations. Two Maroons stayed the evening at Thomas 
Thistlewood’s plantation, being allowed to “sleep in the cookroom for the night.”48 
Thistlewood even went as far as to dine with some Maroons. He entertained Colonel 
Witter, Mr. Cope and four other white men alongside Cudjoe and Quao.
49
 These 
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examples show that the whites’ view of the Maroons, and those of white society, could 
go against the contemporary racial hierarchy.  
   Other white men contradicted the status quo by having sexual relations with Maroon 
women. Following the outbreak of the Second Maroon War, the colonial government 
offered Maroons the opportunity to relinquish their Maroon identity and live as free 
people in Jamaica. Only ten Maroon women gave up their rights. With them, ten 
mulatto children and four quadroon children relinquished their identity.
50
 Campbell lists 
a further 22 people who gave up their Maroon status in 1796. Of those 22, all except 
seven women were mixed blood. Of those seven, three had liaised with white men and 
had produced mulatto children.
51
 It is not certain whether these women willingly 
entered into these relationships, but the fact they wanted to relinquish their Maroon 
identity, and thus the protection that went with being a Maroon, certainly implies that 
they did.  
   Personal interactions did not just take a sexual form; they also took place in the 
context of employee and employer. Prior to the Second Maroon War, some Maroons 
hired themselves out to planters to clear and plant large tracts of land. This began to 
happen so often that a law was enacted to ensure payment to the Maroons.
52
 Bryan 
Edwards remarks that a Mr. Gowdie hired one of the Trelawny Town Maroons to work 
for him, showing no difference in wages to those that he would have paid to a white 
overseer.
53
 Carey points out a similar circumstance when she says that Maroons offered 
themselves for hire to planters, settling on their back lands as an act of convenience to 
be near their employment but being selective as to what kind of work they undertook.
54
 
The Maroons had a degree of control over where they worked and under what 
conditions – there is no suggestion of compulsion.  
   However, some animosity must have been felt, at least in the case of Mr. Gowdie. 
During the Second Maroon War, one dispatch stated that one of the Maroon chiefs, “in 
his civilised state,” was overseer on the property of Mr. Gowdie, who had always been 
“an affectionate and indulgent master to him.” This particular Maroon came to 
Gowdie’s house, murdered his nephew, murdered Gowdie, and gave as his reason that 
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“all the Maroons had taken an oath to kill every white person.”55 This seems to be the 
same Mr. Gowdie mentioned by Edwards. Given that Gowdie apparently paid his 
Maroon overseer the same wages as a white man, it appears surprising that he was one 
of the few killed in the war. Perhaps this was because the Maroons interacted with 
Gowdie as employer-employee rather than in a social context and the usual problems 
that surround that type of relationship occurred.  
   The most well-known way, as outlined in the previous chapter, in which Maroons 
were employed by whites was through the hunting, and subsequent return, of runaway 
slaves. The details of this were discussed in Chapter One but it is necessary to briefly 
explore how these acts were perceived by whites. There is certainly evidence from the 
white settlers themselves that they relied on the Maroons for this activity. Thistlewood 
wrote in February 1754 that a white man with “wild negroes armed” called to beg 
refreshment because they were hunting “Woodcock’s Negroes.” This in itself is 
interesting because it reveals that white men sometimes went out on the hunt with the 
Maroons – revealing another dimension to the relationship. The white employment of 
Maroons for hunting runaways bordered on using them as a police force. In 1763, 
Cudjoe’s men chased eleven runaways, killed three and took the rest who were tried at 
Savanna-la-Mar. Some of the runaways were hanged and others burnt alive “by a slow 
fire behind the Court House” because they allegedly confessed to the murders of a Mr. 
Wright and Mr. Grizzle at Round Hill, in Hanover.
56
 The advertisement from the Royal 
Gazette mentioned in the previous chapter demonstrates that the whites’ reliance on the 
Maroons for the task continued to May 1795, only three months prior to the outbreak of 
war.
57
 However, the white settlers were not just reliant on the Maroons’ martial 
assistance; on occasion, Maroons often provided them with information on the slaves. 
Thistlewood claimed that, long before one small rebellion, Colonel Cudjoe had “wrote 
to Col. Barclay & the Gentlemen of this parish … to warn them of this that has 
happened.”58  The relationship between some planters and Maroons seems to have gone 
beyond employment to one of providing intelligence on the enslaved population.       
   Despite all of these friendly social relations and peaceful negotiations over land, white 
settlers were still wary of the Maroons. As late as 1791, one planter feared that “It is 
equally in the power of a few Maroons as of the whole body of them, to burn down the 
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cane pieces.”59 After the outbreak of the Second Maroon War, planters understandably 
continued to express concern at the potential actions of the Maroons. One wrote that the 
Maroons’ power of “doing mischief is almost unbounded and I do not see that an army 
of 20,000 men could prevent it.”60 Even after all the years of putting down slave 
rebellions, many planters still worried about the Maroon threat. 
   This awareness of Maroon military effectiveness led many local planters to try and 
placate the Maroons when hostilities did break out in 1795. They were quick to act 
because of a fear that disturbances would spread to the enslaved population. The local 
whites of St. James said that they thought it best to appease the Maroons by promising 
that their causes of complaint would be enquired into by the Legislature.
61
 The white 
settlers had seen the devastation that the Maroons could cause during the First Maroon 
War and, unsurprisingly, those whites closest to the Maroon settlements encouraged 
peaceful resolutions. Richard Hart agrees that the local planters were wary of the 
dissatisfied Maroons and had every reason to desire an amicable settlement, saying they 
did not doubt the ability of the descendants of Cudjoe’s warriors to do their properties 
extensive damage.
62
 In addition to the damage to their properties, they would have 
undoubtedly been worried about the damage that could be done to themselves. 
   These fears did not prevent four local magistrates from travelling to Trelawny Town 
to talk with the Maroons in an attempt to prevent further conflict in the days leading up 
to the Second Maroon War. Various magistrates of St. James proposed to send “four… 
justices to meet four chosen Maroons” to settle all disputes.63 This implies that these 
particular whites were on relatively good terms with the Maroons and trusted them 
enough to go and meet with them even after hostilities had broken out. However, the 
Maroons did not welcome the magistrates in the friendly manner that was expected. 
James Merody, who was assistant to Thomas Craskell, the superintendent of the 
Trelawny Town Maroons, deposed that the local men pleaded with the Maroons to 
surrender themselves early on but the younger Maroons refused and said the militia 
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were fools to think of coming into their woods to fight with them.
64
 It does not seem 
that the Maroons were overly aggressive towards the magistrates but their refusal to do 
as suggested shows the extent to which the Maroons had been aggrieved. However, 
their quarrel seemed to be more related to their treatment by the colonial government 
rather than by individual local whites. In particular, the whittling away of Maroon 
powers by the colonial government seems to have forced the Maroons into trying to re-
claim their power, an area explored in Chapter Three. 
   The apparent friendship between white settlers in nearby parishes and the Maroons 
was called into question by the events that followed the 19
th
 July. The Maroons said that 
on Monday 20th July they would burn Vaughan’s estates, the estate of Fairfield where 
their beloved former superintendent Colonel James lived, and that they desired nothing 
more than to fight the St. James' regiment. This letter is suspect because one of the 
initial reasons for the hostility was the desire to reinstate Colonel James as their 
superintendent; yet, apparently, a few days later they were threatening to burn the estate 
where he lived. As a consequence, five regiments of the Cornwall county militia were 
ordered to hold themselves in readiness.
65
 The urgency implied in the letters suggests 
that the white settlers were aware the Maroons would be willing to turn on the 
plantations closest to them, despite having had seemingly good relations prior to the 
war. In fact, Balcarres wrote in 1795 that “They have threatened the destruction of the 
two plantations nearest them.”66  
   However, other local whites seem not to have taken too much heed of these threats. The 
custos of the parishes sent Tharp, Stewart and Hodges (members of the Assembly) and 
Jarvis Gallimore, a militia colonel, to Trelawny Town on July 20 accompanied by a party 
headed by Colonel Thomas Reid of the St. James militia and Major James. When the four 
magistrates went to meet with the Trelawny Town Maroons, it was suggested a collection 
of money be taken among the deputation to give to the Maroons to ease the tension. 
According to Robinson, everyone gave something except Colonel Gallimore, who 
thought that such a gesture would appear to be nothing more than a reward for violence. 
Gallimore took bullets and gave them instead.
67
 This demonstrates the complexity of the 
relationship between the Maroons and the local whites – not all whites were sympathetic 
                                                          
64
 Examination of John Merody, late assistant to Trelawny Maroon Town before the Commander-in-chief 
at Vaughansfield, 16
th
 August 1795, WO 1/92, NA. 
65
 William Vaughan to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, November 7
th
 1795, WO 1/92, NA. 
66
 Copy of a Letter from the Magistrates of the Parish of St. James to Earl Balcarres, 18
th
 July 1795, WO 
1/92, NA. 
67
 Robinson, The Iron Thorn, 149-50. 
100 
to the Maroon complaints, some wanted to use violence to deal with them. This difference 
in attitude reveals a possible explanation as to why the Maroons attacked some 
plantations and not others. Men such as Gallimore may have been the ones who had their 
plantations attacked whilst plantations such as Stewart’s escaped unharmed. However, it 
is almost impossible to investigate this because there is no evidence that explicitly states 
who had good relations with the Maroons prior to the Second Maroon War. 
   Even after their attempts to talk with the Maroons were rebuffed, the local whites 
continued to advise the Trelawny Town Maroons. They strongly recommended that the 
Maroons comply with the Governor to prevent “those terrible evils.”68 This support 
shown by the local white settlers is repeated throughout the archival evidence. For 
example, James Palmer, the custos of St. James, regarded the decision to send dragoons 
to the area as provocative.
69
 Further, on 25th July, a senior magistrate about to sail with 
the fleet from Negril wrote urging that the Maroons' demands, which he termed “not 
unreasonable,” be satisfied.70 Finally, the gentlemen of the area around the Maroon 
territory assembled, formed themselves into a council of war and heard the story of the 
Maroons. They voted them a “quiet innocent people” and said the colonial troops ought 
to retire.
71
 This backing of the Maroons by local whites was sustained throughout the 
period apparently out of a genuine desire to understand the Maroons’ complaints and 
avoid hostilities. 
   In private, Balcarres acknowledged there was a split in white society regarding the 
Maroons. In fact, he was concerned that men such as John James aimed to lead the 
Maroons in rebellion to reap rewards for himself. He said, “I think the soul and heart of 
the country is with me, excepting the two parishes of Trelawny and St. James who are 
under the absolute sway and dominion of a Major James.” He claimed that James was a 
man of considerable property connected by relationship with all of the men in those 
parishes. Balcarres accused him of being rebellious but “clear sighted enough to 
perceive that the Maroons with himself at their head, and supported by the negroes, 
were to give law to this country.”72 
   After the conclusion of the Second Maroon War, there was continued support for the 
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plight of the Trelawny Town Maroons, despite the violent fighting that took place 
across the colony.  According to Hart, the decision to transport the Trelawny Maroons 
out of the island “in breach of the treaty” appeared to have occasioned “surprise and 
disgust among many white residents.”73  This attitude came from some of the most 
powerful men in Jamaica. John Tharp for example was one of the largest slave-owners 
in Jamaica. At his death in 1805, his personal estate was worth over £362,000 including 
2,990 slaves.
74
 General Walpole, leader of the colonial forces, also mentioned the 
“violent opposition party” in Jamaica which asserted that the colonial government had 
“broken faith with the Maroons,” a view Walpole agreed with.75 There were at least a 
few white settlers who lived near the Maroons who never gave up on their relationship 
with them. 
   Other scholars who have mentioned this local support of the Maroons, albeit briefly, 
speak of the geographic divisions of the whites. Carey Robinson claims that, at first, 
some of the colonists on the northern coast of Jamaica, who had not been infected by 
the new wave of panic, thought that the Trelawnys had been unfairly treated, but in the 
general hysteria which soon gripped the island, all voices eventually became united in 
the belief that the Trelawnys must be brought low.
76
 As I have demonstrated above, 
Robinson’s argument does not seem entirely accurate. Undoubtedly some local whites 
would have removed their support for the Maroons once outright hostility broke out but 
it is clear that they retained several supporters right up until their deportation from the 
island. 
   Bev Carey disputes Robinson’s claim that it was the northern colonists who showed 
initial support to the Maroons. Carey claims that those on the south coast said that they 
found the Maroons harmless and opposed the declaration of martial law, but those on 
the north coast felt threatened.
77
 This contrasts with most of the other archival evidence 
which suggests that it was the planters of St. James and Trelawny (northern parishes) 
who supported the Maroons and opposed action against them. The view that whites in 
the northern parishes, rather than the southern parishes, were more sympathetic to the 
Maroons is supported by a letter written by Balcarres in 1795. He wrote that there is “an 
imperium in imperio, and that is the parishes of St. James and Trelawny, who at first 
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opposed and thwarted every thing that was done.” Balcarres raged that at all times they 
held opinion of their own, not regulated by those of the Legislature, and the other 
parishes.
78
 
   The split in white society over the Maroon issue was not just apparent during the 
Second Maroon War; it was present even before the signing of the peace treaties. The 
minutes of a meeting of the Assembly held on 7 July 1737 reported that Job Williams of 
St. Ann’s had refused refreshments to a party from the barracks at Cave River, in 
Clarendon, declaring that “the rebels never hurted him, and that he would not relieve 
any party sent in pursuit of them.” Clearly, not all white settlers were in favour of 
waging war against the escaped slaves. Williams had apparently worked out, with the 
rebels operating in his neck of the woods, a means of peaceful co-existence.
79
 A year 
earlier, another colonist had remarked “I wish I could say this dangerous and 
troublesome enemy had the good effect of uniting us among ourselves, but particular 
resentments have too great an influence upon some.”80 This situation continued into the 
early 1790s when a letter was written that stated, “My brother’s residence bordered on 
Trelawny Town and his intercourse with the Maroons was always of a friendly nature 
until lately.”81 The use of “until lately” suggests that there was a change in the 
relationship between the Maroons and the author’s brother. Once war broke out, 
relationships and support had to be re-negotiated. 
   The archival evidence provided in this section demonstrates the remarkably close 
relationship between the Maroons and local whites. Whether in a social setting, during 
employment, or on a more personal level, whites and Maroons were in continuous contact 
following the end of the First Maroon War. Wider events, such as the American and Haitian 
Revolutions, did little to change the relatively amicable relationships. Even interactions 
over land, a potentially inflammatory issue, remained peaceful until the Second Maroon 
War. In this way, the ending of the First Maroon War had a significant impact on the 
Maroon position in Jamaican society. However, evidence such as that of Job Williams show 
this accommodating attitude was detected even before the signing of the peace treaties and 
later evidence demonstrates it continued well into the nineteenth century. 
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2.2 Violent Land Disputes and Marriage: Creeks and Borderland Whites 
   The classic image of borderland life in the United States is one of violence and 
animosity. However, it is too simplistic to reduce the relationship to this: Creeks were 
often hospitable to travellers, welcomed so-called “Indian countrymen” into their 
societies, and both Creek men and women married Euro-Americans. On the other hand, 
violence undeniably featured in the interactions in the borderlands, whether as a 
consequence of people and their stock trespassing on Creek lands, kidnap, or theft. 
However, the catalyst of the violence was not previous violence, theft, or kidnap. It was 
the way in which those acts were punished, or not punished, in the eyes of the other 
side. As I will demonstrate, the Euro-American view of punishment differed greatly to 
that of the Creeks and it was this difference which provided the cause for ongoing 
violence. 
   The Creek relationship with white settlers echoed that of the Creek relationship with 
colonists during the British era. I argue that the turning point was not the independence 
of the United States but the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory in 1803. It was this 
moment that marked both the heightening of pressure on the Creeks to give up their 
lands, and when Creeks began to adopt Euro-American practices on a large-scale. These 
had been seeping into Creek society for years but, with the Louisiana Purchase, the 
Creeks found themselves in between two tracts of American territory which the 
Americans were determined to unite. The local whites were determined to spread 
westwards and were willing to use violence to do so.     
   What exacerbated the situation was the differing Euro-American and Creek views of 
land. In 1787, William Panton wrote that the Creeks look on their lands as “their blood 
and their life, which they must fight for rather than part with.”82 Similarly, the 
Hallowing King of the Cowetas said, in the spring of 1789, “Our lands are our life and 
breath; if we part with them, we part with our blood. We must fight for them.”83 The 
problem developed because white settlers never saw Creek fields and streams as Creeks 
did — animated with a thousand nonhuman spirits. Instead, as Joel D. Martin has 
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pointed out, the Americans saw the land as aching for development.
84
 This fundamental 
difference was the cause of many violent encounters in the Creek borderlands. Creeks 
viewed their land as sacred and tied to their society so, even if they did not use it to hunt 
on or live on, the land was still in use in some manner. However, the Americans did not 
understand this, or chose not to understand it, and saw no reason that they could not 
claim the land for their own as, they believed, the Creeks were not utilising it to its 
potential.  
   With this in mind, Hudson argues that, ever since the Congress of Pensacola in 1784, 
the Creeks observed with much discontent the encroachments made upon their lands by 
Americans “in every quarter that we possess.” But they were particularly concerned 
with the actions of the inhabitants of Georgia, who “had encroached greatly to our 
prejudice on our best hunting grounds on the Oconee River and all its waters.”85 These 
were a result of the generous, if unrealistic, land grants in the west promised to Georgia 
Patriots.
86
 This in itself was not a huge complication if the Creeks agreed to the land 
cession. However, the Creeks never agreed to these rewards given to Georgia Patriots 
and, more catastrophically, as Hudson says, these men were not content to wait for the 
necessary legislative acts and appropriations, and began to pour west within a few 
months of the Treaty of Paris.
87
 In 1786, Yntipaya Masla, a principal warrior of the 
Lower Creeks, said to St. Augustine’s Spanish Governor Vizente Manuel de Zéspedes, 
“The Georgians, when they were English, had their frontier separated fifteen days’ 
journey from our towns.” However, since the American Revolution that had “so 
encroached upon and usurped our land that at present they are distant from us only two 
days’ march, not leaving us land enough for our hunting.”88 
   Despite this, some Creeks were, in fact, willing to give up some of their land – land 
which they did not see as spiritual. Creek negotiations with Europeans had included 
discussions over land for centuries. The Creeks often used parts of their land as a 
bargaining tool to gain something that they did not hold in abundance. Remember, for 
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many years before this period, the Creeks had more land than they could use for 
hunting, and not all of it imbued with spirits, so it was more useful for them to give up 
some of it in return for goods they needed. Creeks could be open to negotiations; 
however, they took exception when the whites took more lands than the Creeks were 
prepared to give up. The Creek leader, Alexander McGillivray, wrote in 1788, “I will 
most cheerfully consent to conclude a peace upon this basis (no encroachments).” But 
he opposed such actions when the Americans seized not a few miles of country, but an 
area which extended to several hundred miles.
89
 Creeks were willing to trade their land 
but, understandably, only those lands that would not affect their traditional lifestyles. 
   Kathryn Holland Braund agrees that Creeks were willing to negotiate over certain 
land. She claimed that, if the Creeks believed some lands had lost value due to lack of 
game or conflict with colonists, then they made the best use of the land and traded it 
off.
90
 If this analysis is accurate, then the Creeks may have been using a pre-planned 
strategy when selling off lands following the Revolution. The lands they did sell may 
have become useless in their eyes and they preferred to trade it for cancellation of debts. 
In order to get the best deal possible, the Creeks would have had to emphasise how 
important the lands were to them while actually preferring the cancellation of debt to 
keeping useless lands. Unfortunately for the Creeks, Euro-Americans were not content 
with taking lands on Creek terms but continued to acquire Creek lands after the point 
when the Creeks no longer had enough to survive on. 
   One problem of land disputes was that the borders were seemingly never explained to 
the Creeks. In 1786, the Creeks insisted all settlers be removed and to “ascertain and 
draw a boundary line or rather to explain the old one between us and the English.” The 
result was that the Governor of Georgia asked for even more land and insisted upon a 
boundary line that plainly proved his intention to wrest more than one half of the 
Creeks’ most valuable lands from the nation. The Creeks were increasingly frustrated 
and threatened that “the only alternative that was left us, war with arms in our hands.” 
However, at this point, Creek leaders urged caution to go along with action. They told 
their warriors to “conduct themselves with moderation and to shed no blood on no 
pretense but where self defence made it absolutely necessary.”91 At this early point, the 
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Creeks seemed determined not to resort to violence to solve the land issue. 
   Unfortunately for the Creeks, the Georgian government used certain methods that 
further confused the situation. A cession was made to Georgia by a handful of Creek 
chiefs and the Georgians based their land claims on this. The Georgians proceeded to 
threaten the Creek chiefs with instant death, unless they complied with the land grant.
92
 
Hudson has shown that state-sponsored land-grabbing was accompanied by massive 
land speculation schemes, such as that of the Yazoo Company in the 1790s, which sent 
hordes of surveyors and speculators into Creek territory.
93
 One of the causes of this 
mass migration of Euro-Americans towards Creek territory was the American 
Revolution. However, once again, this has been over-stated because migration was also 
high during colonial times. Saunt shows that, between 1745 and 1775, the white 
population of Georgia increased from 1400 to approximately 18,000.
94
 There is no 
denying that the American Revolution sparked a surge in pressure on the Creek borders, 
but this pressure was present before the Revolution. 
   It was not just the numbers of people amassing on the Creek border but the methods 
those people were willing to use to gain land that caused friction. Some Americans used 
tensions over land as an excuse to launch violent attacks against the Creeks. In 1798, on 
the banks of the Oconee, the Georgians killed a Creek chief and severely wounded two 
others. It was claimed that many of the “principal people” of Georgia were doing all 
they could to foment a quarrel with the Creeks in the hope of provoking a war so that 
they could seize land as far south as Ockmulgie. The headmen of the nation demanded 
satisfaction from the Georgians, but William Panton did not think it was likely they 
would receive it. Crucially, he then stated, “it [satisfaction] will be taken and this is 
exactly what the Georgians want.”95 This supports Reginald Horsman’s argument that 
as the Creeks desperately fought to preserve their lands from white encroachment, their 
“savage” actions were used to condemn them.96 Rather than show the success of the 
Georgian land grabs, this view actually highlights how the Georgians had to resort to 
underhand methods to advance their cause; an unnecessary method if the Georgians had 
been successful in taking Creek lands thus far.  
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   Many Georgians did not just use violence to provoke the Creeks, they also allowed 
their stock to trespass on Creeks lands. This was the case particularly in the decades 
after the Revolution. In 1807, several Creek chiefs complained to Hawkins that “their 
neighbours of Georgia” had allowed their stocks of cattle, hogs and horses to range on 
their land. The chiefs requested that Hawkins contact the Governor of Georgia and 
inform him that if the Americans did not keep their stock on their own side of the border 
then “it would not be in the power” of the chiefs to restrain their young men from 
destroying the stock.
97
 
   The Americans seized upon the excuse of wandering stock to push their boundaries 
even further into Creek territory. Two years before the complaint issued above, 
Tustunnuggee Hutkiss, or William McIntosh, travelled to Washington to negotiate the 
Treaty of Washington with the Americans. Jefferson wanted to push the boundary 
between Georgia and the Creeks to the Fork of the Oconee and Ocmulgee rivers. He 
claimed this was because “neither your cattle nor ours regard a marked line – they 
trespass on both sides & thos produces trespasses by men.”98 It is notable that there is 
no suggestion to draw the boundary back towards the American territory to some 
suitable river there. It is entirely possible that the Americans turned a blind eye to cattle 
roaming over the boundary in order to build a better case to push the boundaries back. 
The Americans at least were in the practice of erecting fences so there was no reason 
they could not do this to prevent their cattle from trespassing on Creek lands.
99
 That 
they did not suggests an ulterior motive. 
   The most likely reason for Creeks to react with such horror to this intrusion of cattle 
on their lands was because it represented the more permanent presence of Euro-
Americans. As will be shown, Creeks could be very hospitable towards travellers but, as 
the years passed, and the presence of people near the border usually pre-empted a loss 
of land, Creeks increasingly turned to violence. Ethridge has claimed that the most 
common form of Creek resistance to encroachment was raiding and harassing American 
settlers, especially those who illegally settled on Creek lands.
100
 George Stiggins 
certainly supported this view. He claimed that the Creeks were induced to believe that 
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committing murders on the recent settlers would teach the white people not to move 
into their country.
101
 Alexander McGillivray agreed and said that if “peaceable 
remonstrances” failed to remove the squatters then his people would not be “quiet 
spectators.”102 More worrying for the Creeks were the people who travelled through 
their territory following the Louisiana Purchase. In the final years of the eighteenth 
century, Creeks were used to the pressure of settlers on their eastern borders. It was not 
until the Louisiana Purchase that the same was felt in the west and the pressure became 
unbearable when combined with the increased strength of the United States. 
   Confrontation over property also increased the inflammatory situation in the 
borderlands. Theft was very rarely without motivation and many of the goods taken 
were out of necessity. For example, on one occasion, four armed Indians painted in “a 
war like manner” raided an American settlement in search of tobacco, corn, salt and 
leather.
103 
Corn and salt were essential to the Creek diet. Leather was a necessity in that 
it could be used for trade or during the seasonal hunt. Of the four items mentioned, only 
tobacco could be described as a luxury: although even this could be used as a trade good 
and the Creeks may have wanted it for that rather than for personal use. This gives an 
insight into the motivations of the alleged robbers. However, regardless of the 
motivation, the white victims felt a crime had been committed against them and sought 
retribution. It is this cause-and-effect sequence of events which was responsible for 
much of the Creek-American antagonism in the borderlands. 
   Robbie Ethridge has argued that the most noteworthy point about theft is that the 
multitude of complaints indicates that the rank and file of Creeks were adopting the 
Euro-American way of thinking about property — borrowing was becoming stealing.104 
Therefore, the act had not changed but the interpretation had. However, more important 
than the act of theft was what was taken and why. For example, horse theft was a 
characteristic of border life. Notably, though, most Creeks did not steal horses for the 
sake of it – some needed them for trade and employment. Braund has even argued that 
the “bravery and daring” required to steal horses from well-armed and hostile whites 
provided a way for young warriors to assert their manhood.
105
 This is where we see an 
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indirect effect of peace treaties signed with the Americans. Negotiating peace removed 
a vital way for men to prove themselves as warriors so they resorted to other methods. 
One was to steal horses, another, as this section later shows, was violence. 
   There were also numerous reports of the Creeks stealing cattle, representing the 
economic needs of the nation. In 1787, Panton wrote that an Alabama chief and some 
Coosadas were the offenders in killing cattle near to town, but they “were detected as 
I’m informed and had the meat taken from them.”106 It is possible that this theft was 
motivated by hunger because the meat, rather than the live animal, was confiscated from 
the Creeks. Deerskins were also often stolen, probably for trade. In 1812, the Upper 
Creeks, on the demand of the federal government, cropped and whipped two Indians for 
breaking open and plundering the factory of the United States of furs to the value of 216 
dollars.
107
 This example hints at the changing power relations between the Creeks and 
the Americans after the Louisiana Purchase. The fact that the Creeks did not punish the 
perpetrators without being forced to suggest they were not going to punish them at all. 
However, once Hawkins told them to do so, they often acted accordingly revealing the 
growing influence of the federal government in Creek country.  
   Many of the complaints about theft came from white settlers, but Creeks could also be 
the victims. For example, in 1799, two white men stole a Creek’s horses and some 
warriors were sent after them. One was recovered by Samuel Berryhill and the Creek 
was offered compensation of 100 dollars for the horse which could not be recovered. 
The man offering the 100 dollars told the Creek to tell his neighbours that a great many 
horses were stolen from the Oconee in Montgomery County, and other parts of the 
frontier, which “ought in justice to be returned as I have returned and paid for yours.”108 
Then, in 1809, a horse was taken from a Creek under pretense of trying it for a swap 
and was subsequently ridden off by a white man.
109
 These examples reveal both that 
Creeks were, on occasion, the victims of theft as well as the level of everyday 
interaction between white settlers and Creeks.   
   It was not just who committed the act that was important – it was how that act was 
viewed by the other side. In the eyes of the Americans, thefts committed by American 
citizens were petty crimes committed by rogue individuals who did not represent the 
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collective will of the United States. Conversely, thefts committed by the Creeks were 
seen as the collective action of the Creek Nation and were met with harsh reaction from 
the Americans. Once again, as with the land issue, it was not the act itself that caused 
the tensions.  
   The taking of items from across the border was not simply limited to objects – people 
were often taken against their will as well. Martin has stated that, as early as the 1780s, 
the Georgians felt there was nothing wrong in holding chiefs hostage and forcing them 
to sign treaties ceding land.
110
 Once again, the differing interpretations of “kidnap” 
caused problems. In 1786, the Americans attempted to ensure the safety of their men by 
seizing and detaining “their good friends the Tame King and Neah Mico” which the 
Americans judged would be a good preventative measure against a war with the Creeks. 
The Americans’ treated this as a security measure but the Creeks were not impressed. 
The Tame King “thundered out a furious talk and frightened the Georgians” and told 
them to leave.
111
 As with theft, it was the different interpretations of an act, rather than 
the act itself which could cause tension. The actual act of taking hostages was a familiar 
one to the Creeks but the indiscriminate method of choosing which Creeks to take 
confused and angered those in the Creek Nation. One complainant, alleged that the 
hostages taken by the Americans were “but of imaginary consequence.” It was said that 
the hostages were taken from Cussitah, a town which the author described as “not only 
without imputation to offence on this occasion, but at all times attached to the white 
people in a singular manner.”112 Taking hostages from an enemy village was not 
condemned in such a way, but to take hostages from a friendly village like Cussitah led 
to confusion, anger and, subsequently, further violence.  
   Unlike many kidnapped Creeks, white people kidnapped and brought to Creek 
country, for whatever reason, could find themselves incorporated into society, much 
like African-American captives were. When Hannah Hale was captured by the Creeks 
and taken to Creek country, she became a rancher and slave owner. After spending 
almost twenty years with her Creek husband, a headman of Thlotogulgau, and raising 
five children, Hale decided to visit her mother in Georgia. Once there, her relatives 
refused to let her return to the Creek nation. Her husband asked Benjamin Hawkins to 
intercede, which he did and Hale eventually returned to Creek country.
113
 This was not 
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an unusual case; many women chose to stay with the Creeks. Ethridge claims this is 
unsurprising considering that Euro-American white women had few prerogatives 
regarding property and divorce in their own society.
114
 The example of Hannah Hale 
certainly seems to support Ethridge’s assertion. Interestingly, G. B. Nash has suggested 
that few Indians took the reverse route of choosing to remain in white society after 
exposure to it.
115
 This shows that, despite the ongoing borderland violence, Creeks 
largely continued to be inclusive towards other races and resisted Euro-American 
attempts to impose a strict racial hierarchy in the south. 
   That said, some white hostages did, in fact, choose to return to white society. Mrs. 
Lillian Williams, an inhabitant of Georgia, was taken prisoner by some Creeks. 
Williams claimed that when she was liberated, she left a small daughter behind, called 
Molly. Williams said that, at the time of her release, the Indians refused to let the child 
go with her because the child was born in their Nation.
116
 This reveals that certain 
Creeks captured whites and brought them to the nation but were willing to release them 
back to white society if they had not been incorporated into a Creek community. 
However, the Creeks often kept any children born in their lands, against the wishes of 
the European parent. Differing views of who was incorporated into society or not 
contributed to acts of retribution in the borderlands. 
   All of these areas outlined above often resulted in violence. The contemporary white 
view of Creeks was that they committed indiscriminate violent acts towards white 
settlers. However, equally prevalent was the violence committed by the Georgians 
against the Creeks. Once again, animosity was exacerbated by different interpretations 
of a similar act. Snyder claims that Creek warriors targeted what they deemed unlawful 
settlements, but settlers retaliated by killing Indians indiscriminately.
117
 The problem 
was that both sides viewed their attacks as justified. Creeks blamed whites for land 
encroachment and whites blamed Creeks for not using their land “properly.”  
   The majority of instances of violence in the borderlands appear to have been launched 
with a specific goal in mind. In 1786, the Americans intended to hold a congress at 
Skalop Creek with about 400 Talapuche men, women, and children. The Americans 
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subsequently ambushed the Talapuche with 3000 armed men and took them all prisoner. 
They released one to go and tell the Talapuche nation that they must submit to the 
following demands: first, to give the Americans the land which they had demanded; 
second, to surrender all the property which the Talapuche had allegedly taken during the 
war with England; third, the hostage-takers demanded satisfaction for “all the murders 
that they [the Talapuche] committed on their citizens last summer.”118 These demands 
represent three of the most common causes of violence between the Creek nation and 
the citizens of Georgia; land, property and retribution. Two of these have already been 
discussed and the third will be discussed later in this section.  
   Not everyone in the borderlands wanted violence, however. Both whites and Creeks 
petitioned Alexander McGillivray in the hope of suppressing border violence. However, 
McGillivray himself often encouraged a certain amount of violence. For instance, he 
instructed Creek hunters to attack if they saw any American settlements appearing in the 
area. McGillivray ended up lamenting that his “orders have been a little exceeded” 
because, on one occasion, the hunters destroyed some boats which held passports from 
Governors.
119
 McGillivray believed that he had given clear enough orders, yet some 
Creeks exceeded them. This fractured relationship mirrors the split between the local 
white settlers and the federal government, which will be discussed in more depth in 
Chapter Three. 
   At the instigation of McGillivray, many Creeks continued to use violence as a weapon 
to discourage white settlement. The 1780s began a period of constant confrontations 
that increased dramatically after the Louisiana Purchase and culminated in removal in 
the 1830s. Creek warriors engaged in nearly continual raids on settlements in retribution 
for encroachments by Americans that grew more and more common.
120
 This continued 
into the nineteenth century. In 1808, Hawkins was furious that Creeks still committed 
violent acts against settlers and he placed the blame firmly at the feet of the Creeks. The 
Creeks had asked him if the Americans were arming their people and he replied “they 
are so” as to defend themselves against “all people who violate their rights.” He said 
that the Creeks killed their cattle, stole their corn, entered their fields and robbed the 
peach orchards.
121
 In Hawkins’ eyes, the Creeks were the aggressors. 
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   Hawkins’ belief was not entirely misplaced. I have already highlighted how 
McGillivray called upon Creek warriors to attack white settlements in the 1780s and 
this continued into the nineteenth century. In 1813, Hawkins wrote to Tustunnuggee 
Thlucco, Oche Hanjo, and every chief of the Upper Creeks, of an incident that had been 
reported to him by General Robertson, the Agent of the Chickasaws. Hawkins explained 
that seven Americans were murdered near the mouth of the Ohio River “showing all the 
savage barbarity that could be invented.” One pregnant woman had been cut open, a 
child taken out and stuck on a stake, and the Chickasaws had been charged with the 
murder. Subsequently, a party of Creeks acknowledged that they had actually 
committed the murder. Two of the principal men of the Creek nation were found to be 
in the party; one named Tustunnuggeeooche of Wewocau and the other Oostanaulah 
Kecoh Tustkey living in Tuskegee. This particular act caused such outrage because it 
was not done by “thoughtless, wild young people, but deliberately, by a party under the 
command of two chiefs.” The outrage was exacerbated even further because it was 
found that the chiefs were those “sent by the Creek nation on a public mission of peace 
and friendship to the Chickasaws.” The Americans demanded that the rest of the Creek 
nation turn out their warriors to apprehend the two chiefs and deliver them to an officer 
of the United States to be punished according to their laws.
122
 The fact that the 
Americans called on the Creeks to deliver the perpetrators to them is a further indication 
of how the American position seems to have been strengthened following the Louisiana 
Purchase. In previous cases of violence, white settlers responded with their own 
violence because their country could do little. However, by this point, the United States 
was in a position to demand Creeks take retribution on behalf of the Americans. 
   As stated above, it was not just acts of violence that caused the heightened tensions in 
the borderlands — it was how both sides attempted to contextualize those acts in light 
of their own views of the world. This clash of beliefs is particularly evident when 
punishment was sought for acts of violence in the borderlands. In 1788, there was a 
murder of “a harmless unoffending man,” named Samuel Greene, by two Creeks who 
came into the settlement and “without the smallest provocation” murdered Greene and 
robbed his house of everything in it. A large force was sent to “chastise the murderers 
agreeable to our laws.” It was feared that the soldiers’ “might fall on innocent 
unoffending Indians” whilst they were full of wrath. The Creeks feared that, unless 
immediate measures were taken by the chiefs of the nation, it would be impossible to 
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prevent the whites from attacking the Creeks. The letter finishes by saying that all the 
Americans desired was that the murderers and robbers be brought to justice.
123
 As this 
demonstrates, the official Georgian policy in the face of alleged murders by Creeks was 
to punish the offenders only, rather than the nation as a whole. However, the letter 
concludes with a warning that if the murderers were not brought to justice then the 
Georgians’ leaders would be unable to prevent other Georgians from exacting revenge. 
The Georgians were willing to punish individuals for individual acts of violence but 
ultimately they would hold the entire community accountable if they could not get the 
satisfaction they desired. This contrasted with the Creek view of punishment which 
exacted satisfaction by killing a person close to the alleged perpetrator, not just any 
person. These differences in practice exacerbated the problems in the borderlands 
because it meant one side felt they were justifiably punishing criminals while the other 
thought the actions were indiscriminate. 
   Daniel H. Usner has examined this clash of cultures with regard to the punishment of 
criminals. He claimed that, whenever a Native American was killed by a white or black 
assailant, an acute conflict between tribal and territorial laws ensued. Although officials 
often expressed concern over the Indians’ “Spirit of Retaliation,” territorial courts rarely 
convicted and punished white men who murdered Indians. They argued that guilt was 
difficult to prove in such crimes, which it undoubtedly was in some cases.
124
 White 
society was seemingly aware of the Creek response to a crime committed against their 
people, yet did little to avoid the subsequent bloodshed.  
   When Creeks were on the receiving end of white violence, many of them, 
unsurprisingly, appealed to Benjamin Hawkins to deal with the problem because he was 
the representative of white society in their nation. Similarly, white people who had 
apparently been the victim of a crime committed by a Creek person were known to 
petition the Creek leader, Alexander McGillivray, to punish the attackers. In 1792, 
General Robertson was wounded by the Creeks “so bad that his life is dispard of” and 
some women were kidnapped. A planter named Hogath pleaded with McGillivray to 
help him in his efforts to locate the women and return them home.
125
 This is particularly 
interesting as it highlights how McGillivray’s influence stretched beyond the limits of 
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Creek country. It also implies that, into the 1790s, whites felt that petitioning a Creek 
leader would be more successful than contacting an American leader to resolve the 
situation.  
   Confusingly, often Creeks and Americans blamed each other when they reacted to 
violence in a similar way. When some Upper Creeks killed a couple of Georgia frontier 
settlers in 1787, the Georgians quickly exacted vengeance, killing some nearby Creek 
hunters. As it turned out, the Georgians had killed Lower Creeks. The Lower Creek 
chiefs responded by saying to the Americans, “you always promised that the innocent 
should not suffer for the guilty.” Pre-empting any reply of ignorance from the 
Americans, the Creeks wrote that the Americans must have known they were friendly 
“or we would not have been among you and hunting.” However, they concluded with a 
point which detracts from their argument. The Lower Creeks stated that they looked 
upon all white people as one and supposed the Americans must do the same to Indians 
which is the reason “you have killed your friends."126 The Creeks were complaining that 
Americans did not differentiate between different Indians, yet admitted that they did 
exactly the same with Americans.  
   Retribution in the borderlands was not always violent, however. Alexander 
McGillivray punished the trader, Timothy Lane, for “his many crimes” by having his 
trade suspended “as an example to others it being the mildest punishment I could 
inflict.” Lane was left with “his necessarys” and departed with all of his horses and 
other effects.
127
 One possible reason for this was that Lane was a trader, rather than a 
white settler who lived illegally on Creek lands. As Kathryn Holland Braund has 
argued, traders were regularly welcomed in the village square and were present at all 
ceremonial occasions in Creek life.
128
 Therefore, instances such as this highlight the 
extent to which whites could be incorporated into Creek society. Their alleged crimes 
were addressed with restraint and some Creeks genuinely tried to ascertain the causes of 
violence and administer punishments accordingly. The fact that they could do so hints at 
the power they held when compared to the frontier whites – the only punishment whites 
were able to dispense was violence until the turn of the nineteenth century and the 
subsequent Louisiana Purchase. 
   The lack of violence in certain circumstances is attributed to the fact that the Creeks 
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and Americans communicated with each other about administering justice. In 1792, a 
young American was killed by some Indians near Kars Bluff on the Oconee River. The 
Creeks assured the Americans that they intended to “make an example” of whomever it 
was that committed the murder. The Creeks pleaded for patience and for the whites to 
give them time to locate the perpetrator, as they had done when they waited twelve 
months to take satisfaction for a man who was killed the previous May.
129
 This letter 
reveals the determination of these Creeks to punish crimes on their terms but it also 
hints at the dialogue between the two sides. Even in potentially inflammatory 
circumstances, such as violent retribution for murder, both sides could communicate 
and try to negotiate a solution in the years shortly after the Revolution. As time passed, 
this was to change.  
   Open communication did not always result in a satisfactory conclusion for either side, 
precisely because of the different interpretations of what constituted punishment. In 
1798, some Creek men killed a white man on the Oconee River. When the friends of the 
man went to inspect the scene, they found a note which read: 
Friends and Brother … we are sorry that we are obliged to take our due 
satisfaction ourselves; you have often promised to give satisfaction in the 
Likke cases, but never have done itt once. Now we have gott itt, our harts 
are strait, and itt is all over. We are now good friends as ever we was and 
can take you by the hand in friendship again.
130
  
The cultural differences here appear to have been the cause of the problem. The Creeks 
were willing to forgive the violent act as long as retribution was sought. The Americans 
refused to do this because it would involve punishing a family member of the accused. 
The result was that nothing was done and the Creeks resorted to “violence,” in the 
Americans’ eyes and “satisfaction,” in the Creek eyes.  A similar outcome was seen in 
1798, when Tussekiah Mico and Yeauholau Mico stated they had fired across the 
Oconee and killed a white man, Nicholas Vines, on his own plantation in Hancock 
County. They left an address to inform the inhabitants that this was for the satisfaction 
for a previous murder.
131
 The wide-ranging impact of different views of punishment 
was still being felt at the close of the eighteenth century.  
   As time passed, certain sections of Creek society increasingly turned towards 
American views of justice and punished Creek perpetrators when pressured to by the 
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Americans. In May 1812, some Creeks allegedly murdered settler William Lott in an 
unprovoked attack near his home. Citing the 1790 Treaty of New York, which required 
the Creeks to punish their own people who had committed crimes against whites, 
Hawkins called on Big Warrior for justice. Big Warrior entrusted this task to William 
McIntosh, head of the Creek national police force. McIntosh and his warriors carried 
out their mission and executed the murderers, one of whom had sought sanctuary in 
Hopoithle Micco’s town.132 There is little evidence to suggest that this change in 
attitude towards punishing the perpetrator, rather than members of the perpetrators 
family, existed before the nineteenth century. Rather than the American Revolution 
unleashing settlers on Creek borders, a more likely explanation was the Louisiana 
Purchase, and the subsequent encirclement of Creek lands, which finally resulted in 
Euro-American ideas of punishment permeating Creek society.  
   This willingness to conform to American ideas of justice in the nineteenth century is 
highlighted in a situation which occurred at St. Mary’s. Two men called Snell and Dun 
were both murdered by the Hitchitis, apparently without any provocation. Following 
these murders, some Creeks wrote “We have warriors, turn them out, do justice and let 
our white friends rejoice that we can act like men.”133 Certain Creeks began to believe 
that, by following the wishes of the whites, they could “act like men,” hinting at how 
the relationship between the whites and Creeks was changing. Acting like a man in 
Creek society would traditionally have involved proving oneself in battle but now it 
seemed to involve showing the Americans that they were able to punish alleged 
offenders in the “right” way.  
   Despite all of these examples of violence in the borderlands, whites who encountered 
Creeks on the frontier could be greeted openly and without threat. When one particular 
group went through Tuckabatchie to the Big Warrior’s territory he received them “very 
kindly” and told them he had provided a house for them in town.134 This different 
reception resulted because the group was only passing through Creek territory. William 
Bartram emphasised the hospitality of the Creeks to strangers in their land saying, “as 
moral men, they certainly stand in no need of European civilization. They are just, 
honest, liberal, and hospitable to strangers.”135 The same could not be said of those who 
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intended to settle.   
  One way to avoid a violent encounter was to be educated in Creek culture. For 
example, in 1792, about twelve miles from the Oconee River one American met two 
Creeks who presented their guns cocked. However, finding the American able to answer 
them in their own language they stopped and talked to him.
136
 The difference when 
compared to other earlier examples is that the white person was able to speak to the 
Creeks in their own language. The Creeks usually responded well to this behaviour and 
white traders were encouraged to learn the language from their Creek wives if they 
married into the Nation. The benefit of speaking a Creek language has been highlighted 
by Theda Perdue. Fluency in a native language not only made a trader’s life more 
enjoyable, but it also enabled him to interact directly with his customer, follow local 
politics, which often had a considerable impact on his livelihood and sometimes his life, 
and act as translator for other foreigners, a role that enhanced his status in the 
community.
137
  
   Learning the language of the Creeks was only one way to ensure peaceful interaction. 
Another was if the outsider had something to offer Creek society. One man spoke of a 
time when he visited the Creeks. He said that when he was a young man they had no 
iron hatchets, pots, nor guns, but that they made use of their own stone utensils. The 
man said that he was the first who brought the white peoples' goods into the town and 
the Creeks welcomed him because of it.
138
 Many Creeks differentiated between those 
outsiders who wanted only their land, usually with little in return, and those who came 
among their community with skills, or goods, to offer. 
   Even into the nineteenth century, outsiders were indispensable members of the 
community and the Creeks were willing to risk violence to protect them. In 1808, a 
game of cards turned violent and Edward Denton was murdered by Kendall Lewis, who 
absconded in order to escape punishment. Lewis took flight to a Creek village. He 
escaped punishment for murder, discarded his ignominious past, and gained influence 
among the Creeks. Within a few years, Lewis became interpreter and adviser to his 
village's chief, Big Warrior. A hundred dollar reward could hardly compensate for his 
translating and metalworking skills. When agents came looking, Hawkins instructed 
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local Christian missionaries to keep him hidden.
139
 The Creeks were able to recognise 
who represented a threat to their culture, and who did not, and incorporated people 
accordingly. 
   As shown by Perdue, the best way for a trader to integrate himself into Creek society 
was to marry a native woman and thereby socially bind himself to the community. 
Richard Bailey married a Creek woman in the 1790s and remained in Creek country for 
40 years. He owned seven slaves as well as 200 head of cattle, 120 horses, and 150 
hogs.
140
 By marrying a Creek woman, Bailey demonstrated to the Creeks that he 
intended to stay in Creek country. Kathryn Braund has argued that virtually every Creek 
trader took an Indian wife and raised a mixed-blood family. The majority of Creeks 
accepted these unions as visible testimony of a trade alliance. There were advantages 
for those traders who took a Creek wife. At the most basic level, marriage to a Creek 
woman linked an outsider to a specific clan, which supported him, protected him, and 
also guaranteed a certain number of customers from the clan network.
141
 Recognising 
and incorporating an outsider into society was not a sign of weakness, but a sign of 
power. It highlighted who had the authority to determine who was allowed a place in 
society. If the Creeks did not want a man in their society, they were able to prevent it 
occurring 
   Having a Creek wife could protect white men from certain treatment. Andrew Frank 
has shown that on several occasions Creeks evicted unmarried traders but married ones 
avoided this fate.
142
 At first glance, this may seem that the Creek woman was being 
used as an entry point into Creek society by American men, but it must be remembered 
that Creek society was matrilineal and women chose to marry the men that they did. 
Many Creek women agreed to be the cultural brokers between American men and the 
rest of Creek society and that choice re-asserted the power they held in society. 
   Marriage with a Creek woman did not always automatically result in full 
incorporation into Creek society, however. In 1796, Mr. Marshall, a trader of twelve 
years with two Creek wives, explained his ignorance of Creek households by saying 
“that during the whole of his residence he had not entered 3 of the Indian houses, that 
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whatever business he had with the men he went to their doors, mentioned it to them.”143 
There were instances when a married trader encountered problems regardless of his 
Creek wife. In 1798, several Creek chiefs agreed to banish six traders and 
packhorsemen who “meddle in public affairs, are constantly circulating reports injurious 
to our peace.” The Creeks gave Richard Bailey, John Shirley, William Lyons, Samuel 
Lyons, Francis Lessly, and Robert Killgore twenty-four days to leave the nation. Bailey 
left behind a Creek wife of 33 years and several Creek children. Charles Weatherford, 
who was married to one of McGillivray’s sisters, a woman of the Wind clan, was also 
banished. However, Weatherford received a reprieve “in consideration of his family on 
the Indian side, and a promise made by Opoie Hutke of Ocheubofau” that in future he 
would attend to his conduct and endeavour to make him reform his conduct. Creeks 
promised Weatherford “if he do' misbehave again, he is then to be removed without any 
favour or affection.”144 This demonstrates that having links to a Creek clan often 
protected a trader more than simply having a Creek wife.     
   Intermarriage between Creeks and whites settlers was not limited to the instances 
where a Creek woman married a Euro-American man. Although there were 
comparatively few intermarried white women, Frank argues that at least two dozen 
European women had Creek husbands. Frank believes that the small number of 
European women in Creek country was due to Creek social structure. Women would 
have had trouble finding a place within female controlled villages. European women 
would not have relatives in the town, access to property, independent status, or social 
obligations unless they married into a Creek clan. They would be nonentities. Therefore, 
most women who married Indians were adopted captives rather than voluntary 
migrants.
145
 In addition to Frank’s point, I would add that Creeks often incorporated 
outsiders into their society when the outsider could benefit the Creek town in some way. 
White women at this time would not have had the same contacts as white men did so 
would not have been able to help the town by trading. Most of the things white women 
could offer were the same that a Creek woman could; as Creek women held the power 
in the villages, it is unlikely they would want to relinquish that power to an outsider. 
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   All of the above demonstrates that the Creek-American relationship was far from one 
of just violence. Good relations could be, and were, formed across the borderland 
region. Traders from both within and outside the nation were welcomed and they often 
settled in the territory with a Creek wife. Overall, however, violence over land and 
property was one of the chief characteristics of the Creek relationship with white 
settlers. Piker has claimed that the violent period began in the late 1760s and early 
1770s when relations “were coming apart at the seams.”146 Violent clashes in the 
borderlands had been building for decades but it was the Louisiana Purchase which 
initiated the sudden escalation of violence. This development allowed whites to 
continue to act in the same way but Creeks now had little scope to retaliate in the way 
they had in the eighteenth century. The westward march of the settlers seemed 
unstoppable.   
2.3 Maroon Security, Creek Lands: The Desires of Borderlands Whites 
   As the above two sections have shown, many of the areas in which the Maroons and 
Creeks interacted with whites were the same. From land disputes to intermarriage, free 
communities across the circum-Caribbean experienced similar situations but the 
outcomes differed. Overall, I argue Maroons enjoyed a far more amicable relationship 
with local whites in Jamaica than the Creeks did with local whites in states such as 
Georgia. It is necessary to explore why that difference occurred and what it reveals 
about the position of free communities in the circum-Caribbean.     
   Land was important to both the Maroons and Creeks and disputes over it impacted 
upon relationships formed with local whites. For the Maroons, land represented their 
identity as a semi-autonomous community in Jamaica. It was the most important thing 
that separated them from other free blacks and they were determined to hold on to it. In 
addition, their land was meant to provide sustenance and economic opportunities to 
avoid an over-reliance on the white population. The Creeks’ land, as Joel Martin 
pointed out, was imbued with thousands of different spirits and, similar to the Maroons, 
was what their identity as a community was based upon.
147
 What differed was the 
manner in which the Maroons and Creeks dealt with white settlers over these land 
disputes. Maroons and Jamaican whites alike petitioned the colonial government and, 
on occasion, some local whites even intervened to settle land disputes. Conversely, 
Creek and Georgian land disputes were characterised by violence on both sides.  
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   The evidence suggests that the central reason for this contrast was the different desires 
of white settlers found in Jamaica and in the south-eastern United States. As Higman 
has shown, Jamaican whites created a plantation society whereas American whites 
established a settler society.
148
 The whites in Jamaica arrived to earn their fortune, 
making enough money to move back to England and place the running of their estates in 
the hands of plantation managers and overseers. Few whites intended to stay in Jamaica 
and raise their families; there were few schools and no universities.
149
 Whites in 
Jamaica were, therefore, not interested in developing the colony, only developing the 
plantation system.
150
 This contrasted to the whites in places such as Georgia. Whites in 
Georgia also arrived to make their fortune but they intended to stay in the United States 
and consolidate their society through establishing schools, transport links, infrastructure 
and, most importantly, land acquisition to aid population growth.
151
  
   This explains the different ways that interactions over land manifested themselves. 
Maroons aided Jamaican whites in achieving their goals whereas, in the view of 
Georgians, the Creeks prevented white American society from expanding to its fullest 
potential. The period under examination here covers the so-called ‘golden years’ of 
Jamaica. Planters were making more money than ever and this was directly related to 
peace with the Maroons. To continue generating money at such high levels, the planters 
required stability over everything else. Jamaica was experiencing a large slave rebellion 
approximately every five years and the planters relied on the Maroons to bring security 
and stability to the island.
152
 As outlined in the previous chapter, the planters had the 
Maroons to thank for killing notorious slave leaders such as Tacky and Three Fingered 
Jack. Relinquishing some land in return for stability of the island and the opportunity to 
increase their wealth was a small price to pay. Furthermore, peace with the Maroons 
had opened up vast, fertile lands for colonists to develop sugar plantations and increase 
their wealth. Even more land was subsequently becoming available for sugar cultivation 
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in places like Tobago and Dominica so there was little need for Jamaican whites to strip 
the Maroons of their land to cultivate their cash crops.
153
 Peace with the Creeks did not 
have the same effect. Those whites remaining in the south-east after the American 
Revolution were largely enemies of the British. They had fought for self-determination 
and to pursue the dream of owning their own property. These men and women wanted 
land, and lots of it. The problem was that large indigenous communities such as the 
Creeks hemmed the white population in towards the coastal regions. This was 
exacerbated as the years passed and the population grew. Once the Louisiana Purchase 
was finalised, white settlers flooded through Creek territory toward the new land in the 
west. The refusal of the Creeks to give up their lands after the Louisiana Purchase was, 
in itself, enough to raise the whites’ ire. 
   The lack of desire for Maroon land was consolidated by the type of land they held. 
Sugar was overwhelmingly the most important crop in Jamaica and sugar plantations 
required a lot of capital to launch and lots of flat land. The Maroons possessed land high 
in the mountainous interior of Jamaica not suited to sugar cultivation. Their land was 
more appropriate for coffee cultivation and there was plenty of available land for any 
whites who wished to pursue that crop.
154
 Conversely, crop exports were far more 
diverse in the United States. White settlers could grow numerous crops depending on 
their capital, although the goal was cotton production. Settlers would begin with small-
scale sustenance farming, then, once they had established themselves, would move up 
through the crops eventually aiming to produce cotton.
155
 This meant that the whites 
hungrily eyed the fertile lands of the Creeks. Simply put, I argue that Creek lands were 
extremely desirable for white Georgians whereas Maroon lands were not suited to the 
favoured crop of white Jamaicans.  
   However, refusal to give up lands was not the only issue. Creeks prevented the 
expansion of the United States in other ways. The Creek territory was too large and too 
far from the larger plantations for them to be effective slave-catchers and, more 
importantly, because of the strained relationships with frontier whites, the Creeks seem 
to have shown little inclination to help them get their slaves back. Slave rebellions did 
not characterise the south-eastern United States to the extent that they did Jamaica so an 
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emphasis was not placed on the Creeks as a security force like it was with the 
Maroons.
156
 As far as most white Georgians were concerned, Creeks contributed 
nothing to the safety of America as a society and actively prevented its expansion.  
   Both the Maroons and Creeks chose how they responded to these white desires. 
Maroons seem to have been, understandably, content with peaceful negotiations. There 
were occasions, such as in the case of Furry’s Town when they had to acquiesce for the 
sake of peace; however, there were other occasions when the white party had to relent, 
such as when the colonial government ruled Moore Town was encroaching on Cosens’ 
land but it recommended nothing be done. This reasonably fair system meant that the 
Maroons continued to sign petitions for investigations rather than launching violent 
attacks against whites suspected of encroaching upon their lands. Moreover, the treaties 
officially granted the Maroon towns certain territories but, in their role as slave-catchers 
or hunters of wild boar, they still had the freedom of the interior to hone their traditional 
skills. There was simply no need to risk all-out war to gain a few more acres. 
Undoubtedly, if whites encroached too much then the Maroons were more than capable 
of resorting to violent methods. The same was not true of the Creeks. The Creeks 
reacted to land encroachments with violence because they were being increasingly 
hemmed in with decreasing opportunities to continue their traditional lifestyles. This 
was particularly so after the United States´ triumph over the Western Confederacy when 
it successfully destroyed the large Native American threat. The seemingly ever-present 
squatters, the unusual (to the Creeks) method of punishing Creeks who attacked white 
settlements and the continual violent confrontations with Georgians led the Creeks to 
choose to use violence themselves.  
   Too much emphasis has been placed on how the whites did not “see” the land in the 
same manner that Creeks did.
157
 It is possible that the whites did not understand that the 
Creeks viewed their own lands spiritually but it is unlikely that it was not important to 
them whether the Creeks were really “using” their lands or not anyway. The whites 
understood that the Creeks needed vast areas of land to hunt deer; so the fact that they 
still encroached upon their lands and pushed for land cessions implies they did not care 
about what the Creeks needed or what their land represented to them. Likewise, the 
whites in Jamaica did not decide not to strip Maroons of their lands because they 
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respected the fact that those lands formed a core part of Maroon identity. The most 
likely reason the whites did not encroach on Maroon lands in large numbers was 
because Maroon land was not particularly useful to them: especially not as valuable as 
an alliance with the Maroons was. 
   These differences in interactions over land seem to reveal several things about free 
communities in the circum-Caribbean. Firstly, free communities with large areas of land 
were more of a target for white society. It is likely that even if the Maroons did not hunt 
runaways then white settlers would have still been uninterested in their lands because of 
the size of their landholdings. In contrast, at the conclusion of the American Revolution, 
white Georgians were determined to push through Creek lands and cared little for what 
happened to the communities that already inhabited them, especially after the Louisiana 
Purchase.
158
 This would likely have been the case even if Creeks had been a more active 
defence force. Secondly, the ability of free communities to hold onto their lands was 
determined by which European, or European-descended, community they were faced 
with. The Maroons encountered colonists who desired a plantation society and 
apparently recognised the Maroon role in contributing to the stability of the island 
whilst the Creeks were confronted with former colonists determined to create a settler 
society based on the principles of their recent revolution against England, one of which 
was the lack of freedom to expand westwards, especially after their defeat of the 
Western Confederacy.
159
 Finally, free communities themselves were not passive in 
these situations. The majority of Maroons chose to complain peacefully about land 
encroachments because, as I will show, they too had something to gain from peace with 
white Jamaicans. Conversely, many Creeks chose to react forcefully to violent 
encounters with Georgians over land because local whites represented little but a major 
threat to Creek traditions. 
   Land was not the only issue that caused disputes in the United States. Other activities 
such as kidnap and theft also contributed to the animosity. Why was this situation not 
replicated with the Maroons? Firstly, there is no evidence of theft between Maroons and 
local whites. It is highly likely that theft occurred on at least some scale but, most 
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probably, it was an issue that was resolved between themselves rather than involving 
the colonial courts. If a theft did occur, it would have been hard to identify whether the 
culprit was a slave, a Maroon or a free black because of rudimentary systems of 
identification. Indiscriminate punishment of Maroons, or at least punishment that did 
not follow the clauses of the treaties, was a particular cause of tension between Maroons 
and white society, as demonstrated by the outbreak of the Second Maroon War, so it is 
unlikely that colonial magistrates would have punished a suspected Maroon without 
being sure of their guilt. Conversely, Georgians held all Creeks responsible for crimes 
committed by one of their people. It seemed to matter little to them who they punished 
as long as they got retribution. This is related to the above points that, as far as the 
frontier whites were concerned, the Creeks offered them little so they did not mind 
provoking them. This was not the case with the Maroons where great care was taken by 
local whites to keep relations amicable. I argue white settlers did not want to risk 
breaking a useful alliance over the theft of items of little value to them.  
   Similarly, kidnap was not a problem in Jamaica, in the same way it was in the south-
eastern United States. Once again, geographic factors appear to have contributed to this. 
Creeks were able to capture whites, and blacks, and carry them deep into their territory 
making it hard for white society to recover them without paying a ransom. The Creek 
nation inhabited millions of acres with dozens of towns and social units making it 
difficult for kidnapped people to be located. Furthermore, there was a market for these 
people: either through ransom, predominantly for white people, or through trade, mainly 
for captured blacks. This situation was not replicated in Jamaica. Maroon territories, 
whilst challenging to access, were never far from white settlements. A captured white, 
in theory, could make their escape and head back towards the coast. In addition, there 
was no need for Maroons to raid plantations and kidnap a white person for money when 
they could simply hunt runaways for financial gain. Kidnapping black people was also 
not an attractive endeavour for the Maroons. Their land was barely large enough to 
support their own populations, never mind providing for captured people, and it would 
have been difficult for Maroons to try and sell any Africans they had captured because 
slave auctions were the domain of whites. It was easier to capture runaway slaves and 
make their money in that way. All of these factors contributed to a lack of violence 
between the Maroons and local whites.   
   The archival evidence suggests that the contrasting levels of violence with white 
society were related to the differing geographies of the regions. Situated at the meeting 
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point of several empires, states and indigenous communities, the Creeks had numerous 
options for alliances, as did the Georgians themselves. As a result, the Creeks were not 
as dependent on the local white Americans as allies. This enabled the Creeks to commit 
violent acts or to respond to violence with violence. Further, with the defeat of the 
Western Confederacy, the Creeks had seen what fate could befall them. It is possible 
they chose to use violence in an attempt to protect their societies from a similar 
outcome. However, both the Maroons and local whites in Jamaica had fewer options. 
The enslaved population was the only other feasible community to ally with. Local 
whites would not have considered this because it would have prevented them from 
increasing their wealth through enslaving people for work. The Maroons also had little 
to gain from an alliance with the slaves that they did not already have. In other words, 
allying with each other served the needs of both the Maroons and the whites.   
   More important was the role of the free communities’ recent history in determining 
the course of events. The Maroons had endured constant warfare from at least 1655, and 
arguably even longer because of their origins as runaways from Spanish settlements. 
Theirs was a society that had never had the opportunity to flourish. They had always 
been free but it was an uncertain freedom: their settlements constantly moved and 
population decline was a recurring problem.
160
 Peace with local whites brought an 
opportunity to end the persistent strain of being a society incessantly at war. It is 
unlikely that the Maroons would be willing to risk that peace by kidnapping a white 
person, launching violent disputes over land or by allowing theft to become endemic. 
That is not to say that the Maroons were not willing to defend their interests if 
threatened but that, from both the Maroon and white side, there seems to have been little 
motivation for violence. This was even so during times of unrest such as in the periods 
of the American and Haitian Revolutions. The local whites seemed loath to act in a 
manner which could provoke the Maroons into seeking violent retribution during these 
times of upheaval. The situation was different for the Creeks. The Creeks’ history was 
plagued by war and fighting but not in the same way that the Maroons’ had been.161 The 
Creek nation constituted a confederation of dozens of tribes and not all of them were at 
war at the same time. At different times, some were neutral, some took part in the 
fighting and some were too far removed to be involved in any way. This meant that 
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Creek communities had the opportunity to grow and consolidate. It also meant that they 
lacked the war-weariness of the Maroons. In fact, young Creeks appear to have viewed 
these violent encounters with whites as an opportunity to prove themselves as 
warriors.
162
 Young Maroons had such opportunities when catching slaves or 
suppressing slave rebellions so there was no need to take part in running battles with 
local whites. The same opportunities were not available for Creeks as they did not want 
to hunt runaways because of their fraught relationship with local whites so their options 
to verify their masculinity were limited. Overall, the Maroons gained something from 
an alliance with the whites whereas the Creeks did not. In the Creek view, the end of the 
American Revolution brought no further guarantees of freedom because they were 
already free; there was no need to court an alliance with the whites to secure an end to 
fighting. 
   Interactions between Creeks and whites could also be peaceful, however. As shown 
earlier, Creeks and whites formed relationships, had children, and traded with each 
other. This was also the case with the Maroons. Mixed marriages were relatively 
common in the southern-eastern United States despite the ongoing border violence; 
however, they were less so in Jamaica.
163
 We can rarely know why a European person 
married an indigenous or African-descended person, whether it was to gain access to 
their lands, because they were simply love matches, or a combination of factors but 
what it does reveal is that the racial hierarchy of free communities could be fluid. As far 
as records reveal, these mixed marriages took place in the territories of free 
communities showing that these societies were more open than European ones. There is 
no evidence to suggest that the offspring of these unions were treated any differently 
than Creek-Creek or Maroon-Maroon marriages. The issues which divided these 
mestizo children from so-called “pure-blood” ones were related to the adoption of 
European practices rather than skin colour.
164
  
   This fluid attitude towards race and outsiders is more pronounced in Creek society 
than in the Maroons’. Almost every trader in Creek country married a Creek woman 
which ensured a certain level of tolerance between both sides. We have no way of being 
certain why the Indian countrymen wanted to live amongst the Creeks. Some may have 
seen an economic opportunity for trade, some may have been forced out of white 
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society, and some may have preferred the Creek lifestyle and desired to marry a Creek 
woman and settle in their lands. What the evidence does reveal is that many Creeks 
accepted these men into their society because of the skills they could bring.  
   There is no evidence to suggest there were any formal intermarriages between local 
whites and Maroons. There were occasions of Maroons and white people having 
children together but it is not clear under what conditions these occurred and whether it 
resulted in marriage. Undoubtedly, a marriage between a white person and a Maroon 
would have been accompanied by huge social stigma in white society so it is 
unsurprising that there is no trace of such marriages.
165
 There was not the same 
economic advantage for a white man to marry a Maroon woman as there was for a 
white man to marry a Creek woman. This, once again, relates to the land issue and the 
fact that the Maroons did not have anything that the whites wanted. If a white trader 
married a Creek woman, it normally ensured access to Creek society and, therefore, 
markets. A white man in Jamaica had far more land available to him and was unlikely to 
want the mountainous, inaccessible land that the Maroons held. The Maroon and white 
relationships are also unlikely to have been formed to ensure favourable trade 
conditions, as was the case with the Creeks, because business on the slave markets was 
not as lucrative as the colonial trade.   
   Once again, the evidence suggests that this issue relates to the different geographies of 
the two examples. If a white man wanted to become a trader in Jamaica, he could, in 
theory, operate from anywhere along the coastal regions. In contrast, if a white man 
wanted to become a trader in the south-eastern United States, and he wanted to trade 
with the Creeks, he needed to live amongst the Creek people. Living in Georgia and 
attempting to trade with the Creeks was extremely difficult, if not dangerous, because of 
the disputed borders. This meant he had to seek a way to live in the Creek territory and 
the easiest way was to marry a Creek woman.   
   These mixed relationships show that free communities tended to be more inclusive 
societies than white communities. They also demonstrate the continuing ability of free 
communities to determine who was an outsider and who was not. Incorporating 
individuals from other societies is the mark of a strong community, not a weak one. 
These free communities permitted mixed relationships precisely because they did not 
feel threatened by European society. It was well within the powers of both of these free 
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communities to exile individuals who they did not agree with. That they did not is 
indicative of their durable influence in the face of European empires. 
   Overall, the Maroons benefited from a more amicable relationship with the local 
whites brought about as a result of the end of the First Maroon War. Conversely, with 
those whites living outside of Creek territory, the end of the American Revolution 
unleashed the land-hungry Georgians to clash with the Creeks over land. The Maroons 
were not weakened by the peace treaties they signed whereas the end of the American 
Revolution brought the first major tests to Creek power. 
   All the issues assessed in this section demonstrate the enduring control of free 
communities over the course of their own history. Violent defence of their lands shows 
the Creeks were unwilling to submit to white domination. Similarly, peaceful defence of 
their territory by the Maroons highlights the continuing ability of the Maroons to protect 
their interests and choose how to react to situations. The Creeks’ decision to kidnap 
American individuals exemplifies their determination to carry out acts of resistance as 
Americans pushed towards their lands. The evidence suggests that the Maroons’ choice 
not to do the same reveals their successful negotiation of peace with local whites. These 
communities were faced with the same challenge of sharing a region with white settlers. 
How they ultimately dealt with that was determined by their own desires, their history, 
the make-up of the white communities and geographic factors. 
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Chapter 3. Maroons, Creeks and the Governments of Jamaica and the 
United States 
   In July 1795, John Merody, assistant to the Trelawny Maroon superintendent, wrote to 
Governor Balcarres informing him of the Trelawny Town uprising. Merody explained 
that “not a moment should be lost in apprizing the country of their danger.” It appeared 
to him that the island was “on the very brink of destruction” and he decided that the 
colonial government must “either strike at the Maroons and cut at the very root of 
rebellion or that this valuable colony was forever gone.”1 Merody’s reaction to the 
Trelawny uprising demonstrates the overwhelming fear that representatives of the 
colonial government often had regarding the Maroons. When present, this fear fed into 
every action taken towards the Maroons and explains the increasing restrictions placed 
upon them as the eighteenth century passed. A rebellion by slaves was to be feared and 
the colonial government strove to contain any mass resistance from the enslaved 
population. However, the perceived horror of a slave rebellion paled in comparison to 
the reaction of the colonial government to a potential Maroon and slave alliance. Slave 
rebellions could be put down by a combination of white militias, companies of enlisted 
slaves and, most importantly, Maroons. If the Maroons rebelled, the colonial 
government’s ability to contain the rebellion was severely limited. The overarching aim 
of the colonial government of Jamaica was to save the colony at all costs. Its policies 
throughout the period under study, much like the federal government’s policies in the 
US, were implemented with this aim in mind. 
   The starting point for exploring both the Maroon and the Creek relationship with their 
respective governments is the end of two significant wars. The end of the American 
Revolution set the scene for the relationship between the federal government and the 
Creek Nation, while the end of the First Maroon War did likewise for the colonial 
government and the Maroons. Both of these heralded huge changes for the white 
governments who interacted with the Maroons and Creeks. Such important wars meant 
a time of recovery was required for both the colonial and federal governments. I argue 
that the need for recovery drove both federal and colonial policy in the respective eras. 
Without this period of recovery and time to consolidate the newly formed alliances, 
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Jamaica as a colony was under threat and the presence of Americans in the south-
eastern United States was at risk. Both the Maroons and Creeks were locked in a 
continuing power struggle with the respective governments and initially they were the 
stronger parties.  
   Once the period of recovery and consolidation ended, the colonial and federal 
governments attempted to manipulate the Maroons and Creeks into changing their 
lifestyles in order to assimilate into Jamaican and American society. This was met with 
resistance from many quarters which was evidence that the Maroons and Creeks were 
not willing to blindly submit to an external power. This resistance to white domination 
could not be tolerated by the white governments. Both the Maroons and Creeks still 
represented a formidable force which could destroy the governments if allied with 
external powers or the huge enslaved population. Therefore, the governments had to 
turn to alternative methods of control. In the United States, the federal government used 
land acquisition as a tool to reduce the power of the Creeks. In Jamaica, following the 
successful conclusion of the Seven Years´ War, the colonial government was in a 
position to enforce more restrictive measures upon the Maroon towns to undermine the 
power of the Maroon leaders. 
   Eventually, the use of indirect methods began to wane. The power of the Maroons and 
Creeks had not been broken and, as Jamaica moved towards the Age of Revolutions and 
the United States towards the War of 1812, they still posed a real threat to the 
governments. The final resort was outright war. The Second Maroon War and the Creek 
War of 1813 erupted as white officials realised they still had not managed to reduce the 
threat of these semi-autonomous communities. Both the Maroons and Creek had seen 
their treaties broken and attempts by the governments to whittle away their powers. 
They were no longer tolerant of an outside force attempting to influence their way of 
life and were willing participants in the fighting.  
3.1 Perceived Threats Yet Faithful Allies: The Colonial Government and the 
Maroons 
   In the late 1730s, after overtures had been made by the British towards the Maroons to 
establish peace, the colonial government was faced with the problem of balancing a 
large, enslaved population with a smaller, free black community with history, culture 
and identity binding them together into a formidable force. An alliance with the 
Maroons provided the colonial government with the opportunity to develop the island 
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but it needed to ensure that that plan did not backfire. The greatest fear was that the 
Maroons would use peace time to consolidate their communities, stock pile weapons 
and foment an island-wide rebellion with the enslaved population. One of the strategies 
that the colonial government decided upon to prevent this alliance was the tried and 
tested divide-and-rule method. They were fearful that, at the very least, the Maroons 
would serve as an inspiration to the enslaved population and, at worst they would join 
forces to overthrow the white government. 
   Much like the scenario to be discussed later that the federal government faced in the 
post-independence US, the colonial government in Jamaica faced the challenge of 
making the economy profitable following a long and costly war. The Maroon threat had 
seemingly been neutralised by the treaties and the colonial government now had to turn 
the newly available land into a lucrative enterprise for the British Empire. In order to do 
this, the colonial government had to continue to subordinate the enslaved population, 
pressure the Maroons to submit to colonial power, and protect themselves from any 
outside influence which could affect the island. The Maroons could assist in all of these 
goals and the colonial government was content to utilise them in this manner while 
trying to weaken them as a community.  
   The colonial government was aware of the threat that the Maroons posed but also 
understood that it could not launch straight into a policy of undermining the Maroons 
and negating their power. It had to deal with the problem cautiously, gaining the 
allegiance of the Maroons while also whittling away at their internal power structures. 
The need for an alternative solution was demonstrated from the 1760s onwards when 
serious slave rebellions, such as Tacky's rebellion, were breaking out and the Maroons 
were not always as swift to help as they once had been. This period coincided with the 
emergence of England as the foremost colonial power in the world and convinced the 
colonial government of its ability to control the Maroons. The necessity of subduing the 
Maroons started to become apparent following the American Revolution with England´s 
increasing determination not to lose any more colonies. The situation was exacerbated 
by the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution – the colonial government decided it had to 
move to reduce the power of the Maroons because several decades trying to weaken 
them had failed and fears of a Maroon and slave collusion were at a maximum. 
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   It is worthwhile to first investigate the colonial government’s motivations for peace 
with the Maroons to try and understand subsequent interactions. In 1739, Governor 
Edward Trelawny of Jamaica informed his superiors in London that the main reason the 
colony was not as highly developed as it might have been was that, prior to the treaties, 
scarcely any good land had existed in safe areas, and a large quantity was located in 
areas controlled by the Maroons. The colonial government had attempted to settle the 
areas by giving soldiers land grants to start plantations but even they had been forced to 
abandon them because of the Maroon hazard. This supports Thompson’s assertion that 
land-grabbing lay at the core of many European overtures for treaties and their lethal 
assaults on the Maroons.
2
 In 1741, Trelawny noted that Titchfield, in Portland, still only 
contained a few huts but possessed a “commodious harbour” and offered excellent 
prospects for trade, suggesting that it had been stunted in its development by the 
Maroon menace.
3
 It was the lack of settlement in places such as Titchfield that forced 
the colonial government to recognise the necessity of continued peace with the Maroons 
to give the under-developed parts of the island a chance to grow. 
   The colonial government’s pressing need to rectify this situation has been effectively 
demonstrated by Trevor Burnard who has shown what impact the treaties with the 
Maroons had on parishes in Jamaica. Burnard calculated in 1730 that an estimated 443 
whites and 7137 enslaved persons lived in the parish of Westmoreland.
4
 However, after 
the treaty with the Leeward Maroons in 1739, land in that area began to be widely 
available to settlers and, by 1768, the holdings there included 62 sugar plantations and 
96 other enterprises, mostly cattle pens and small cotton, pimento and ginger farms. 
Colony-wide, the population and production expanded dynamically between 1730 and 
1788. The white population grew by 237% and the servile population by 145%, while 
sugar production increased from 5450 hogsheads in 1739 to 8000 hogsheads in 1768. 
Westmoreland became a very wealthy parish: the average value of plantations there in 
1768 was 42% higher than the average value in the whole island.
5
 It was not just 
Westmoreland that was developed in the years after the peace treaties. St. James, the 
parish located closest to the Trelawny Maroon territory became “the most thriving 
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district in the island.”6 To the colonial government, land meant control and profit and 
the more land the Maroons held, the more control and profit was out of the 
government’s hands. In addition, the danger of a free community having land to bind 
them together as a community represented a greater threat than individuals alone. Both 
the federal government and the colonial government had to make land acquisition a 
priority in the peace negotiations. 
   It was not just the colonial government’s desire for fertile land that fuelled policy 
towards the Maroons; a further reason for coveting peace was the Maroon influence on 
the enslaved population of Jamaica. Their presence, living as they did in proximity to 
slave society but outside the control of the slave-masters’ jurisdiction, was a vexing 
problem for the slaveocracy. The influence of the Maroons on the slaves of Jamaica has 
been explored earlier in this thesis; suffice to say here that this was one of the initial 
reasons for courting peace with the Maroons. 
   Once the peace treaties had been signed, the colonial government was presented with 
the opportunity to open up the island with increased infrastructure, leading to better 
defence possibilities and easier transportation. Bryan Edwards wrote that the former 
road from Titchfield to Bath through Manchioneal was at least thirty-four miles in 
length. A road from Titchfield through Nanny Town, and over Break-Heart Hill, would 
be shorter by twenty-three miles. However, the road from Bath passed by Moore Town, 
which was one of the larger towns in the Windward communities.
7
 By negotiating with 
the Moore Town Maroons, it was possible to access this area and provide better 
infrastructure to this formerly under-developed, yet fertile, area of Jamaica. In turn, 
these roads “were in consequence found of great use to the new settlers, for carriage of 
their goods.”8 In fact, the Maroons were instructed to cut, clear and maintain other roads 
as well, in the west of the island, from Trelawny Town to Westmoreland, St. James, and 
possibly St. Elizabeth.
9
 This highlights how access to Maroon land, in conjunction with 
Maroon activity in utilising that land, was a key policy of the colonial government. The 
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Maroons are often associated directly with the defence of the island but it is also 
important to note how they could impact indirectly on defence by cutting and 
maintaining roads. 
   Therefore, the primary motivations for peace were security, land gain and to prevent a 
Maroon and slave alliance. However, once the treaties were signed, the colonial 
government’s motivations seemed to change. Zips has claimed that the peace treaties 
were “not worth the paper they were written on” and once peace was in place, the 
colonial government moved to violate them.
10
 This did indeed happen but it is 
imperative to determine exactly when this change in attitude occurred and what the 
motivations were for this change. 
   Other scholars, such as Campbell and Wilson, have discussed this attitude change of 
the colonial government. Campbell has suggested that the change was noticeable from 
the 1780s onwards, whereas Wilson claims it was just after the Seven Years’ War.11 
This section will demonstrate that the turning point was actually the 1790s. The events 
from the 1760s onwards show that relations between the Maroons and the colonial 
government were becoming tenser but that the situation only became irreparable once 
the Haitian Revolution broke out. 
   Both the Maroons and the white population were in a precarious position following 
the peace treaties. That they lived in close proximity to a slave society, where their 
brethren were still in chains, placed the Maroons in a delicate situation. The plantocracy 
was also in a perilous position after the peace treaties. Its fear that the Maroons might 
join the slaves in one great alliance to overthrow the slave system was not unreasonable. 
The fear of a Maroon and slave alliance would soon be realised in neighbouring Saint-
Domingue. However, this fear was soon dissipated when the Maroons stuck faithfully to 
the clauses of treaties which obliged them to hunt and return runaway slaves. In fact, 
fourteen years after the signing of the treaties, Governor Charles Knowles of Jamaica 
said, “I verily believe the Maroons will prove of more service to the country, than they 
ever were of prejudice.”12 Thus, the Maroons initially seemed to align themselves with 
the colonial government.  
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   However, Mullin demonstrates that, treaty or no treaty, Maroon support was never 
taken for granted by the colonial government.
13
 This was because it still considered the 
Maroons dangerous even several years after they had signed the peace treaties. The 
Governor offered three explanations for this: the Maroons’ “manner of life,” their 
strategic location “in the heart of the country” and the “very high idea the slaves 
entertain of them.”14 In addition, it is doubtful that the terms of the treaties were 
acceptable to all of the Maroons. Thompson argues that there were some Maroons who 
were hardliners who would have preferred to fight the whites to the last man for both 
ideological and pragmatic reasons.
15
 Therefore, the colonial government could never be 
certain of unanimous Maroon support. No matter how often the Maroons adhered to the 
treaty, they were always viewed with great suspicion by the colonial government.  
   In the early years after the treaties, the colonial government even went so far as to 
search for an alternative defence force, as “they would likewise form a proper counter 
balance to the Maron [Maroon] negroes; whose insolence, during formidable 
insurrections, has been most insufferable.”16 Historians often emphasise the fact that the 
Maroons frequently came out in support of the colonial government in times of unrest, 
but the evidence in this thesis supports Campbell’s alternate assertion that this was not 
always the case.
17
 It cannot be denied that the Maroons did indeed fulfil their terms of 
the treaty, in some instances to an extent that outstripped expectation, as shall be 
explored later in this chapter; however, this was not unanimous and Maroons often only 
grudgingly came to the aid of the colonial government and the whites of Jamaica.  
   Despite this search for alternative forces, the immediate post-treaty relationship could 
not have started out any better for the colonial government. In March 1740, Cudjoe sent 
one of his principal men to offer assistance upon hearing of the declaration of war 
against Spain. Several of his men even sailed as volunteers on the British ship Louisa.
18
 
It seems that, for Cudjoe at least, adhering to the treaty was desirable. Signing the peace 
treaties with the British cemented his place as leader of the Leeward Maroons. It would 
appear that Cudjoe believed that such actions would avoid further war with the British. 
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The Maroons may have held the upper hand at certain points throughout the eighty-year 
war but the British reinforcements were seemingly endless and every victory was 
followed by more battles. Signing the peace treaties guaranteed freedom for him and his 
descendants.  
   Many other Maroons also seemed to instantly take up their treaty obligations and began 
to hunt and return rebellious slaves; they, “took up all Deserters, and Sent them to Their 
Masters, according to Agreement.”19 In 1746, a rebellion started in Kingston and soon 
spread to other areas. Almost immediately, Colonel Bennett recruited forty mercenaries 
from Crawford Town and they served in the suppression of that rebellion.
20
 Maroons 
received monetary rewards for returning runaway slaves; however, rewards were also 
distributed for killing a rebel slave. For example, a bounty hunter named George Currie 
was rewarded with £100 for killing a rebel slave named Quaco Venter in 1752.
21
 George 
Currie was an officer at Accompong Town and had many times gone out after Quaco 
Venter and his gang. In February 1752, he had captured Beauty, one of Venter’s wives. 
Shortly after, while he was at Lludias Vale, Currie set his party on the trail of Venter, and 
a fortnight after Beauty’s capture, he was shot dead by Currie’s men. The committee of 
the House of Assembly considered the act “a very extraordinary service, as he was a 
dangerous rebel [who] killed many, and was a great terror in the area.”22   
   The most likely motivation for Maroons’ adherence to the treaties was that, in 
addition to the rewards for every slave rebel killed or captured, they were paid a salary 
for every day they were out on the hunt.
23
 The treaties provided for few economic 
opportunities and hunting runaways became an important source of income for the 
Maroons. Therefore, Maroon observance of this particular clause of the treaties was 
probably a result of economic need rather than devotion to the colonial government and 
their mutual agreement. The Maroons may have also preferred stability between them 
and the colonial government to prevent any damage to the position of the Maroons. 
Nevertheless, hunting runaways reassured the colonial government that it had a new 
formidable ally in its quest for dominance. 
   Initially, the colonial government was impressed with the Maroons’ adherence to their 
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treaty obligations and rewarded them with gifts. Edward Long wrote, “They have been 
very serviceable, particularly the Leeward parties, in suppressing several insurrections. 
Their captains are distinguished with a silver chain and medal, inscribed with their 
names, they wear cockades, and are regularly commissioned by the Governor.”24 This 
method of adorning Maroon leaders with symbolic gifts was a tradition also seen with 
the Creeks. To further facilitate amicable relations, when the Governors gave an 
audience to the Maroon chiefs once a year, they would confer some mark of favour on 
Maroon leaders such as “an old laced coat or waistcoat, a hat, sword…or any articles of 
the like nature.” Long states that, “They are pleased with these distinctions; and a 
trifling douceur of this sort bestowed annually, accompanied with expressions of favour, 
wins their hearts, and strengthens their dutiful attachment.”25 Gift-giving was one 
method the governments of Jamaica and the United States utilised in order to achieve a 
mutual goal — pacification of these free communities and attachment to the white 
cause.  
   However, these audiences with the Governor had an ominous tone. Robinson has 
pointed out that the fact that the Maroons were required to wait on the Governor every 
year hints at a darker relationship with the colonial government. No chief who was at 
the beck and call of another figure can retain his authority for long.
26
 By arranging these 
annual meetings the colonial government could claim to be extending the hand of 
friendship to the Maroons while at the same time attempting to undermine the power 
and authority of the Maroon leaders. These meetings may also have served as a sinister 
way to deduce the power of the Maroons – particularly as meetings with the governor 
were often accompanied by a martial display. Despite this, it was the Maroons who 
appeared to push for an audience with the governor, providing evidence of the mutuality 
of desired meetings. Carey has claimed that the issue that annoyed Governor Elletson 
the most was the penchant of the Maroons to call on him in person to discuss any issue 
they cared about.
27
  
   The records do suggest that the Maroons themselves were committed to an amicable 
relationship with the colonial government in the early years. Cudjoe stood before his 
men following the signing of the treaties and “addressed His Excellency aloud, desiring 
                                                          
24
 Long, History of Jamaica, 347. 
25
 Ibid, 347. 
26
 Robinson, The Iron Thorn, 121. 
27
 Bev Carey Maroon Story: The Authentic and Original History of the Maroons in the History of 
Jamaica, 1490-1880 (St Andrew: Agouti Press, 1997, 446. 
140 
the continuance of the great King George’s favour and protection.” Cudjoe continued to 
state that the Governor would administer right and justice to the Maroons, according to 
“the happy treaty and agreement subsisting between them and the white people on the 
island.”28 The reciprocity of the relationship was then highlighted by the Governor who 
stated that the Maroons “might depend on the favour and protection of the great King 
George.” A dinner was ordered for the Maroons and a present of three cows given, after 
which they “were dismissed, and went away perfectly well satisfied.”29 At this point in 
the relationship, it is not hard to believe the Maroons were content. They had been 
guaranteed their freedom and the protection of the colonial government and, so far, had 
only to pledge their allegiance to a Governor and a far-off King. Cudjoe allegedly even 
went so far as to have enforced the use of English to replace the several different 
African languages.
30
 The colonial government believed “property has acquired a degree 
of security which it never heretofore had in this island” and was impressed with the 
effectiveness of the signing of the peace treaties with the Maroons.
 31
    
   The 1750s marked the first time that the colonial government became notably 
involved in Maroon internal affairs. In February 1754, Quao plotted to overthrow the 
government of Captain Ned Crawford at Crawford Town. He staged a coup in which 
Crawford was killed. Quao then closed the town and stopped all communication 
between Crawford Town and other settlements. According to Carey, the Governor of 
Jamaica sent out regular troops accompanied by representative Maroons from all the 
other towns and had Quao killed.
32
 It is not clear whether the Crawford Town Maroons 
petitioned for help from the colonial government; however, there is no record of any 
dissent from them following the government’s intervention. It is not surprising that the 
colonial government were willing to intervene. The terms of the treaty laid out the 
succession of Maroon leaders that was agreed upon by the colonial government and the 
Maroons during negotiations. In the colonial government’s view, killing the chief was 
tantamount to breaking the peace treaty.  
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   Even into the 1760s, the Maroons enjoyed a fairly cordial relationship with the 
Governor. In 1764, when Governor Lyttelton passed through St. James on his Leeward 
tour, eighty-four Trelawny Town Maroons met him at Montego Bay. After the parish’s 
white militia were reviewed, the men of the Maroon group drew up, impatient to show 
their military skill. Long describes how: 
They drew their swords; and, winding their horns again, they began, in wild 
and warlike capers, to advance towards His Excellency, endeavouring to 
throw as much savage fury into their looks as possible. On approaching near 
him, some, with a hurried circling flourish, waved their rusty blades over his 
head, then gently laid them upon it; whilst others clashed their arms together 
in horrid concert. They next brought their muskets, and piled them up in 
heaps at his feet, which some of them desired to kiss, and were permitted.
33
  
Whilst the reliability of parts of Edward Long’s description can be questioned because 
he was a member of the white elite of Jamaica and may have had ulterior motives for 
such a description, the fact is that the Maroons were often entertained by the Jamaican 
Governors and never attacked one of them during a display. The Maroons were known 
for their excellent military ability and it is doubtful they would have been invited to 
participate in such displays had there been any reservations about the safety of the 
Governor. Wilson argues that a display such as this also seemingly pledged their skills 
to the Governor but offered up suggestions as to the consequences of those skills being 
withdrawn.
34
 Seeing the Maroons display such military prowess might serve as a timely 
reminder to the colonial government that the Maroons could be a threat, and this may 
have contributed to the colonial government’s eventual decision to restrict their 
freedom. 
   The Maroons’ usefulness to the colonial government continued into the 1760s and 
could be seen on several occasions, supplying further reason for the colonial 
government to pursue a more accommodating approach. In 1766, a group of 
Coromantees had risen up in Westmoreland and thrown the whole parish into turmoil, 
with several planters and settlers killed. Colonists had caught up and fought with them 
but the Coromantees had withdrawn into the forest. Then, seemingly from nowhere, a 
body of Maroons appeared who had heard of the fight while out hunting hogs. The 
Maroons engaged the Coromantee in battle and by sunset the Maroons had killed or 
captured two-thirds of the Coromantees while the others scattered. Thereafter, the 
Maroons endeavoured to hunt down the majority of the escapees over the following 
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days.
35
  
   However, the 1760s also saw the first signs of a breakdown in the relationship which 
would become irreparable after the Haitian Revolution. Interactions became strained 
and there were frustrations on both sides. This period, following as it did the conclusion 
of the Seven Years´ War and the subsequent consolidation of British strength, marked 
the early height of planter power in Jamaica: one of the reasons the colonial government 
began to turn to a more robust approach towards the Maroons. Undoubtedly, the 
Maroons were still of use to the colonial government but suspicions began to increase. 
Edward Long wrote of an instance in 1761 which he said some believed was a revolt of 
the Maroons who had become so numerous and strong that they now desired “no less 
than the extirpation of all the white men in the island.”36 However, Long claims the very 
reverse was true; because “as far as we have any certain information, [they] have always 
adhered to the treaty, and were the principal instruments employed in suppressing that 
very insurrection.”37 Despite these assurances, there continued to be more than a 
suspicion that the Maroons did not contribute enough to hunting slave rebels and, thus, 
their allegiance was questioned. Robinson claims that, in one skirmish, a body of 
Maroons and a detachment of the 74
th
 regiment stationed at Downs Cove were attacked 
by Tacky’s men. The Maroons disappeared and some whites alleged that they had 
thrown themselves flat on the ground and stayed there until the rebels had been driven 
off.
38
 This tactic would be familiar to any adherents of guerrilla warfare so it may have 
been the Maroons were not “hiding” but simply following their usual tactics. Indeed, the 
colonial government recognised the role that the Maroons of Trelawny Town and 
Accompong played and they were paid £450 “for their services in the capture and 
destruction” of rebels during the great rebellion of 1760.39 Rumours of a lack of effort 
on the Maroon part did not prevent them from continuing to come to the aid of the 
colonial government after Tacky’s rebellion. For example, parties of Windward 
Maroons were still decamped into Kingston and quartered at the theatre on Harbour 
Street for some months in 1779 during the American Revolution.
40
 However, white 
fears had been piqued by speculation about the Maroons’ poor displays during Tacky’s 
rebellion.  
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   Maroons were again implicated in slave rebellions or conspiracies in 1764, 1765, and 
1776.
41
 Even if not under suspicion of direct involvement, whites became less and less 
inclined to call upon the Maroons to suppress slave rebellions, such as an uprising in 
Kingston in 1769.
42
 Perhaps the most worrying incident for the colonial government 
was recounted by James Knight, the colonial agent for Jamaica, who told of an occasion 
when the Windward headman, Cudjoe, threatened the colonial state with widespread 
black resistance when its deputies questioned Maroon loyalties following a scuffle 
between Maroon scouts and a British officer that resulted in two deaths.
43
 Tensions 
were beginning to increase between the Maroons and the colonial government, 
particularly over events such as the above which threatened the very existence of the 
colony. 
   The 1770s, situated in the wider context of the ongoing American Revolution, 
continued this strained trend between the colonial government and the Maroons as one 
detailed example demonstrates. In April 1774, Captain Davy, chief of the Scotts Hall 
Maroons, engaged in a runaway hunt in the Hellshire Hills in St Catherine accompanied 
by white rangers under Colonel Bennett. The group descended to the coast and went to 
search for runaways when they came upon twelve merchant ships lying at anchor. 
Rumour spread among Maroons that there was a plan to ship them away from Jamaica. 
Captain Davy approached some slaves and accused one of them of being a runaway. A 
fight broke out and Davy chopped the man down. Davy ran and a warning shot was sent 
over Davy’s head. As the shot rang out a Charles Town Maroon named Sam Grant leapt 
from a house and fired. A slave stepped out and was hit by the bullet. Sam Grant then 
tried to run away but a young English sea captain attempted to prevent him from doing 
so. Grant told the man to move and that he did not want to hurt him, but the man refused 
so Grant killed him and ran off. He took refuge in Moore Town but the colonial 
government ordered the former superintendent of the Maroons, to capture him. When 
Brereton arrived, Moore Town Maroons “broke into open rebellion.” The Maroons 
claimed they were being ill-used by the British but Brereton eventually managed to 
calm the situation by persuading them to sign a written agreement saying that they 
would deliver Grant to the Governor, which they never did. Brereton returned and 
captured Grant. Grant was tried for murder but acquitted because it was found by the 
court that he had not intended to kill the sailor or the slave. Sam Grant later became a 
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major in the Maroons and chief-commander at Charles Town.
44
 
   Grant´s story is interesting because it reveals some Maroons’ belief that there was a 
plan to transport them from the island. At this point, there is no evidence of any plan to 
transport any Maroons from Jamaica (although this did happen following the Second 
Maroon War). This hints at the distrust developing on both sides. A further interesting 
point is that Sam Grant was actually acquitted despite killing a white man. This implies 
that Maroons were allowed a fair trial which considered motivations and evidence 
before announcing a verdict. Even further, Sam Grant went on to hold a high position in 
a Maroon town showing either that the colonial government truly did not hold him 
accountable for the death of the white man, or that its influence on internal Maroon 
affairs was limited. This relative lack of influence would offer an additional explanation 
as to why the colonial government began implementing more restrictive measures on 
the Maroons.  
   By the 1780s, the opportunities for mercenary employment of Maroon companies 
were becoming increasingly rare, adding to the festering tensions. In 1781, the Scotts 
Hall and Moore Town Maroons complained that they had not been paid their additional 
£200 for killing Three Fingered Jack, the rebel slave who had been at large in the St 
Thomas area for around a year.
45
 This situation is particularly telling because the 
colonial government usually rewarded the Maroons who killed notorious rebellious 
slaves fairly handsomely and the fact that it were accused of not doing so in this 
instance hints at the growing problems in the relationship between the Maroons and the 
colonial government, especially when Three-Fingered Jack’s fearsome reputation is 
taken into account. Despite this apparent snub, Maroons still assembled to assist the 
colonial government in repelling the threatened French invasion under Count D’Estaing 
in 1779 and again in 1780.
46
 
   By the late eighteenth century, then, the colonial government had seemingly moved 
away from offering Maroons high levels of employment and freedom. The loss of the 
American colonies in the 1770s seems to have led to growing suspicions of the Maroons 
and an increase in the determination of the English to subdue any potential threats to 
their Caribbean colonies. This is in contrast to Hart’s claim that the colonial government 
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had “so much confidence” in the Maroons that it was indifferent as to whether or not the 
superintendents appointed to reside in the Maroon towns lived there or elsewhere.
47
 
While it certainly seems that the superintendents increasingly lived elsewhere, I do not 
think that was a result of confidence in the Maroons. The colonial government actually 
introduced more laws directed at the Maroons in an attempt to control them more – 
which would be redundant if the colonial government already had enough confidence in 
them to leave their towns unsupervised. In 1791, the colonial government introduced 
the most restrictive measures yet. One law prevented the Maroons from leaving their 
towns at will and from staying out as long as they pleased. They had permission to leave 
but if they stayed seven days beyond the time allowed they could be seized and sent 
home for trial. Another law allowed Maroons to give up their rights as Maroons and to 
live as free people in any part of the island except in other Maroon towns. They were 
also obliged to join the militia and be available for service when needed.
48
 In addition, 
no party of Maroons participating in a hunt for runaways could be larger than twelve 
including the leader. No party could be sent out without the written permission of the 
superintendent, or remain out longer than twenty days. Maroons could no longer be 
hired by Europeans without a written agreement and any debts which they owed, or 
which were owing to them, had to be settled by two magistrates.
49
 Finally, Maroons 
were required to obtain a licence from a magistrate to sell their surplus goods – thus 
entrenching the authority of the local government over the Maroons, emphasising their 
restriction to settlements, and curtailing their freedom.
50
 Many of these laws seem to 
have been ignored by Maroons – but the important point is that the colonial government 
passed them. Maroons refusing to follow these new rules could only add to the 
increasing suspicions of the colonial government.  
   Some of the laws, particularly those regarding being hired by Europeans, were 
supposedly meant to protect the Maroons because there had been reports of exploitation 
by whites. It is questionable whether this was actually the case or whether it was a ruse 
to whittle away the power of the Maroons. Likewise, preventing slave hunting groups 
from staying out too long would inhibit the chances of slaves and Maroons being able to 
interact in the woods, away from the eyes of the white superintendents. The evidence 
suggests that Robinson was right to claim that the Maroons were increasingly being 
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treated as a conquered race rather than as a people who had voluntarily agreed to make 
peace at the request of their antagonists.
51
 The Maroons did not just sit back and allow 
this to happen. The Trelawny Town Maroons raised issues that displeased them with the 
colonial government. In March 1792, they sent a petition to the Assembly claiming that 
most of their land was comprised of very high, rocky, mountains and the rest was 
exhausted because it had been cultivated continuously since 1739. In addition to this, 
much like in the Creek example, they claimed their land was being trespassed upon. 
This petition was signed by notable Trelawny Town Maroons such as Montague James, 
John Jarrett and Zachary Bayley, and was certified by their superintendent, Major John 
James.
52
 The land was a symbol of Maroon freedom and was what set them apart from 
other free blacks in Jamaica. By allowing whites to begin to trespass upon it, the 
colonial government could be interpreted as symbolically allowing white domination of 
Maroon lands.  
   There were further reasons for Maroon discontent with the colonial government in the 
months before the Trelawny uprising. The Governor declared that the Trelawny Town 
Maroons had been “very troublesome and insolent” with regard to an act of the 
Legislature that had been passed two years previously. The main cause for concern was 
a clause which declared that the evidence of slaves against Maroons should be received 
in “all cases of delinquency.” In the preamble to the law, the colonial government 
claimed that this was necessary because the Maroons’ depredations were “fast 
increasing and were performed only in the view of slaves,” although the government 
does not explicitly outline what those depredations were.
53
 This, as the colonial 
government was aware, would have irritated the Maroons because, since the signing of 
the peace treaties, they had been pitted against the slaves and had been encouraged to 
view the slaves as beneath them. That the colonial government was aware of this and 
still proceeded with implementing this clause is symbolic of the changing attitude 
towards the Maroons. 
   The most obvious indication of the fracture between the colonial government and the 
Maroons of Jamaica was the fact that war broke out in 1795. This time the largest 
Maroon town, Trelawny Town, engaged in hostilities with the colonial government. The 
catalyst for violence was the flogging of two Maroons by slaves. As Hart rightly states, 
“that the magistrates should have sentenced these alleged offenders, instead of sending 
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them back to Trelawny Town to be dealt with there seems extraordinary.”54 However, 
whatever the magistrates’ reasons, whether they inadvertently disregarded the treaty or 
whether they intended to provoke a reaction, the Trelawny Town Maroons did react to 
this breach of the treaty. The issue here is not whether the two Maroons were guilty or 
not, but the fact that official representatives of the Empire knowingly broke the terms of 
the treaty and then tried to make excuses for doing so. This perhaps became the catalyst 
that it did because it represents a time when an official body openly broke the treaty 
terms rather than simply individuals acting alone.  
   This desire to enter into war seems symptomatic of deteriorating relations between the 
Maroons and the colonial government. It is important to note that the festering tensions 
were felt on both sides. The colonial government received reports of a note sent to the 
authorities which stated, “The Maroons wish nothing else from the country but battle; 
and they desire not to see Craskell [the superintendent of Trelawny Town] up here at 
all.”55 The note was allegedly signed by Colonel Montague James and other Maroons. 
Although a problematic source because it is difficult to determine whether the note was 
actually from the Maroons, it does hint at a worsening of relations. The increasingly 
hostile stance of the colonial government towards the Maroons can be seen in a letter 
written by Balcarres, stating, “My policy is – to destroy their [the Maroons’] power of 
concentrating any negro force, whether Maroons or slaves.”56  
   I argue that this change in stance of the colonial government was directly related to 
fear of foreign intervention in the years following the Haitian Revolution. Balcarres 
wrote in 1795 that “much was to be apprehended” from a foreign enemy who was also 
aware of the tensions in Jamaica. In particular, he feared that a foreign enemy might 
“foment and keep up” a rebellion to “place us between two fires.”57 The willingness of 
the colonial government to accommodate the Maroons had expired. As far as the 
government was concerned, the island had been stabilised enough to strengthen white 
society and it was time to reduce the power of the Maroons and avoid another Haiti. 
Therefore, the move from accommodation to warfare was complete. The combination of 
continued Maroon independence, the refusal of the Maroons to relinquish their unique 
identity and live as free blacks, the lurking presence of other imperial forces, the 
constant threat of an alliance between the Maroons and the slaves and, most 
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importantly, this all taking place against the backdrop of the largest slave revolt the 
Americas had seen, meant that the colonial government followed the course of action it 
deemed most effective – unleashing the full force of the British army against the 
Maroons. 
3.2 Trade, Defence and Land: Federal Motivations for a Creek Alliance 
   On September 3, 1783, the Treaty of Paris was signed ending the American 
Revolution. The most well-known article was that which acknowledged the United 
States to be a “free, sovereign and independent nation.”58 The newly created United 
States now faced the problem of building a nation from thirteen former British colonies 
torn apart by war. The challenge of the United States becoming a united country was 
tested by the threat of slaves, hostile indigenous communities, and imperialist nations.  
   Alongside the damage caused to personal relationships, the new United States began 
life as a nation with huge debts incurred from the fighting.
59
 The country owed money 
to other empires, such as the French, that had aided them in their revolution and to its 
citizens who had given money or possessions for the cause. Furthermore, Britain placed 
trade restrictions on the United States so the new country had to seek a new market for 
its exports. In addition to trade, the federal government required security in order to 
unite as a country and to improve its economy. It needed allies to protect it against 
British reprisals and empires, such as Spain, who wanted to expand their territories. The 
Creeks served all these needs. The strategic importance of their land meant that, if allied 
to the United States, they could act as a buffer against European nations. The densely 
populated coastal regions held by the Americans might be able to withstand British or 
Spanish invasion by sea but the sparsely populated frontiers would struggle against an 
overland invasion. Even if these invasions were not forthcoming, powerful indigenous 
communities posed a threat to the vulnerable new country; therefore, the federal 
government had to begin interactions with the Creeks in a cordial manner to prevent 
further devastation. The substantial Creek population was also able to offer the 
                                                          
58
 ‘Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States and his Britannic Majesty,’ 3rd September 1783, 
A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875, 
American Memory, Library of Congress, 1
st
 May 2003, 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=009/llsl009.db&recNum=6 (accessed 15
th
 
May, 2014). 
59
 Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and 
the Making of a New World Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Eliga H. Gould and 
Peter S. Onuf, Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World, (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
149 
opportunity for trade which did not require overseas travel. The British were raiding 
American trading vessels and imposing higher tariffs on American ships. Trading 
overland with communities such as the Creeks actually represented the safer option. 
   All of these reasons explain the federal government’s policy of accommodation 
towards the Creeks in the early years of the republic. The country little choice but to 
appease such a formidable indigenous nation. This was especially so after the Western 
Confederacy´s Shawnee chief, Blue Jacket, defeated the US Major General Arthur St. 
Clair and his army in 1791. The reaction of the federal government was to radically 
alter its fighting forces, which resulted in the defeat of the Western Confederacy by 
General Wayne in 1794. The subsequent government policies of the early republic era 
can be illustrated by the choices faced by Thomas Jefferson. Sean Michael O’Brien 
claims that the Creeks could either be civilised and assimilated, or they could be 
removed and possibly exterminated.
60
 According to Ronald Takaki, either way, it was 
obvious even at this early stage that the Creeks as Creeks in the traditional sense could 
not be tolerated in the republican civilisation the American Revolution had created.
61
 
This chapter demonstrates the accuracy of both of these statements and also explores 
which route was followed and why. 
   Immediately following the American Revolution, the federal government was 
accommodating to the Creeks, seeing them as a necessary ally in a region surrounded by 
enemies. However, as economic factors began to alter so too did the policies towards 
the Creeks. Cotton was the decisive factor. The income derived from the export of 
cotton set in motion the process of accelerated market and industrial development – the 
market revolution. The development of this cotton export sector depended on the 
appropriation of Native American land by white farmers and planters.
62
 The cotton 
boom went hand-in-hand with the move to unite the Louisiana Territory with the eastern 
land-holdings of the United States. This marked the beginning of the change from 
accommodation of the Creeks to appropriation of Creek lands by the federal 
government. However, the Creeks fiercely resisted this cultural onslaught and the 
ultimate result was outright warfare in 1813.  
   In the first years of peace, the federal government chose to approach the Creeks with 
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talks termed in a manner that was more reminiscent of indigenous communication than 
of European. The commissioners representing the U.S. stated: 
Friends and brothers of the Creek nation, we trust that the Great Master of 
Breath who has formed us all brothers whether white men or red men, has 
created this day to be the time for preventing our people and your people 
from taking away that breath which none but he can give or should take 
away.
63
  
The commissioners continued saying that they could not forget entirely the “calamities 
we suffered in the late war” with Great Britain, but that they had “buried all resentment” 
for the part which the Creeks played. They declared that the United States would 
guarantee and defend all the lands of the Creek nation. The commissioners then 
attempted to entice the Creeks by the one method they had available so soon after the 
war – open ports for trade. They offered cheaper imports than those which could be 
obtained elsewhere and said a “secure port for the Creeks in the U.S. will be much more 
convenient than in any other country,” claiming that “both of us will be gainers by 
being friends. The promotion of our mutual interest will promote our mutual friendship. 
This will be found the only method to make a peace happy and lasting.”64 It seems 
probable that this was a cynical method of using “Indian-like language” to secure Creek 
alliance. The representatives of the federal government spoke to the Creeks in a way 
they would not use with other empires – possibly to try and “seduce” them into friendly 
relations and, thus, be more open to negotiations for Creek land. It is interesting to note 
that it was the Americans who altered their style of speech to the Creek way and not the 
other way around. The fact that the Americans used Creek-style language casts them in 
a subordinate role, implying that they recognised that the American Revolution had not 
weakened the Creeks and that the federal government needed to placate them with 
friendly overtures. The desired result of using such language was always the same – a 
Creek alliance which would lead to increased stability for the newly created country. 
   The federal government decided to further advance its aims by moving from flattering 
words to signing treaties with the Creeks. Early treaties made with the British had tried 
to force Native Americans to part with their land, but George Washington’s 
administration insisted that Native Americans must agree to cessions and receive 
compensation rather than face their lands being taken by force. Compensation came in 
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the form of annuities which were an annual payment of goods and/or cash. Chiefs 
received the payments, kept some for themselves for personal and community use, and 
disbursed the rest to their constituents.
65
 Therefore, initially, the federal government 
largely had to rely on negotiations to acquire Creek lands because the United States 
could not be confident of defeating such a strong and united confederation. As will be 
discussed later in this chapter, this policy changed, particularly in the early nineteenth 
century, when the United States had established itself as a force capable of expansion.  
   George Stiggins credited George Washington as the reason for the initial favourable 
interactions between the two sides which resulted in peace treaties. Stiggins claimed that 
from the close of the Revolutionary War to 1794 the general disposition of the Creeks 
was “rancorous and undoubtedly very unfavourable to the United States.” He continued, 
claiming that it was Washington’s “humane request” for the leader Alexander 
McGillivray to visit the seat of government in Philadelphia that improved the relationship. 
He associates this with the fact that the Creeks were given a “kind reception” which was 
flattering for them because they were unused to such treatment by white people.
66
 
According to John Pope, an American soldier who wrote of his experiences in the old 
south-west, Alexander McGillivray was complimented during the visit with a selection of 
elegant gilt bound books and also with a golden epaulet.
67
 Subsequently, the Creeks 
returned to their territory and regaled their fellow Creeks with tales of how they had been 
received with kindness and hospitality by their “great Father Washington” which caused 
them to align themselves with the United States. This event was likely to have had a great 
impact upon the Creeks because it followed the Creek practice of bestowing prestigious 
ceremonies upon visiting chiefs. It is still more feasible that the Creeks, when they did 
align themselves with the United States, were convinced by the negotiations between the 
two sides rather than by flattering words. However, lavish ceremonies allowed those 
negotiations to build on a basis of respectful treatment. 
   Following the apparent success of the meeting in Philadelphia subsequent meetings 
strengthened the interaction between the federal government and the Creeks. Federal 
representatives were often sent to Creek territory to speak with the Creeks and promise 
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favourable conditions. William Johnson, a federal politician, wrote in 1792 that the 
President “out of his great goodness, and friendship for you and your people” had been 
pleased to “concert means for effectually punishing” all who dare attempt to disturb 
Creek peace.”68 Alexander McGillivray highlighted that the federal government reduced 
tensions by being lenient with the Creeks. McGillivray told the Creeks that they had 
nothing to fear from the Americans as he had assurance from General Washington that 
the “killing of a few people, and stealing of horses, even to the number of forty or fifty 
of either, from Georgia, would not cause them to send any force against them.”69 The 
federal government was seemingly determined to prove their friendship to the Creeks, 
although, as I will show, this was simply a gesture. Much like the initial relationship 
between the Maroons and the colonial government, the federal government began its 
interactions with the Creeks in a positive manner to persuade the Creeks to ally 
themselves with the United States. It could not afford an ongoing war with the Creeks 
whilst the Western Confederacy was still active. Turning a blind eye to border 
skirmishes by the Creeks was one of the methods utilised.  
   Despite these friendly overtures, Creeks often expressed caution when it came to 
dealings with the federal government. Alexander McGillivray’s wariness of it, and the 
United States as a whole, can often be seen in his letters to contemporaries, starting as 
early as 1785. He wrote to Governor Zéspedes of Spanish Pensacola, that the United 
States had held forth the “most tempting baits” to his people to meet the commissioners 
of the states in Congress, “but being sensible of their insidious views I have hitherto 
prevented the Indians from complying with their wishes.”70 Sectors of Creeks society 
had become wise to the federal government’s tactic of initial appeasement and knew 
there were underlying motivations for this agreeable attitude. However, it must be 
remembered that McGillivray’s letters can be problematic because, as established by 
historians such as Andrew K. Frank, he played off Spain and the United States to keep 
some power for the Creek nation.
71
 Therefore, McGillivray may well have instructed 
the Creeks not to comply with American wishes, or he may actually have told the 
Spanish he did so to make them believe the Creeks were more in support of the Spanish 
crown. Either way, the letter is evidence of the Creeks not wholly conforming to federal 
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wishes and displaying ulterior ways to exert their continuing strength. 
   The Creeks were wary of the threat the United States was beginning to pose. 
McGillivray noted that the new government was established on a basis which rendered 
it capable of making war on the Creeks “in a fashion that would assure them a complete 
success,” in which case “the terms prescribed [to us] by the Americans would leave us 
very little or nothing.”72 However, during McGillivray’s time, the Creeks had little to 
worry about because the federal government wanted to avoid war with the Creeks if 
possible. In 1789, the Secretary of State wrote that the President was “exceedingly 
desirous” that a war should be avoided if it can be “effected consistently with the 
interest and dignity of the United States,” in particular, because of the expense of blood 
and cost of a war with the Creeks, and of the “embarrassment it would occasion to the 
Government.”73 The federal government could still do without the expense of a full-
scale war with the Creeks, preferring instead to placate them through talks. Henry Knox 
stated, in 1788, that it would cost the government $450,000 to protect the Georgia 
frontier with a 2,800 man army for nine months.
74
 Quite simply, the federal government 
could not afford it. As well as the expense, the federal government could not risk the ire 
of their citizens by having a large standing army during times of peace. Indeed, one 
cause of the American Revolution had been the British standing army, and the federal 
government was keen to avoid making the same mistake. Young has claimed that, as a 
consequence of this, the American army was kept small.
75
  
   This small standing army did not mean the federal government would not defend their 
territory if pressed to. William Panton, a trader who traded with the Creeks as part of 
the Panton, Leslie & Co. partnership, wrote to Alexander McGillivray in 1790, saying 
that if the Creeks struck, the United States must punish them. He reiterated that the 
United States was disposed to be favourable and friendly to the Creeks, but could not 
“sacrifice their national dignity and justice.”76 Doing so would undermine its desired 
power in the region. In 1793, Andrew Pickens, a member of the House of 
Representatives, stressed to the Secretary of War that demonstrating the ability of the 
United States to punish the Creeks was the only measure that would secure “from their 
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cruel depredations the inhabitants of the south-west frontiers.”77 The federal 
government was still fearful of the potential devastation the Creeks could cause to the 
new country, despite the peace treaty which had been signed in 1790. The early years of 
the alliance were a balancing act between placating the Creeks and not wanting to seem 
weak in the region, especially in the face of the threat from other Native American 
confederacies. 
   This balancing act was constantly discussed within the federal government. A 
quotation from Henry Knox, the first United States Secretary of War, shows this when 
he stated that “the Indians, on all occasions, should be treated with entire justice and 
humanity,” showing that the initial federal policies towards the Creeks erred towards the 
considerate side.
 78
 It is not a coincidence that Knox, as Secretary of War, determined 
that the Creeks should be treated amicably. He would have been aware of the power 
they wielded in the region and recognised the delicate line that the Americans had to 
tread. Despite this, the Native Americans were constantly reminded that white people 
were as numerous as the “leaves of the trees.” Sheehan states that ideas such as this 
were always mixed in with reassurances of goodwill and hope intended to impress upon 
the Indians the preponderant power of the white man and the ineffectuality of the Indian 
capacity for war.
79
 I agree that this was the beginning of a long campaign to convince 
the Creeks of their inferiority to the white man and, thus, make control over them easier. 
The policy stayed the same throughout the time period under study – but how it was 
manifested altered. 
   Nevertheless, as early as 1793 the Creeks trusted the federal government to such an 
extent that they petitioned it to send soldiers to settle Creek internal disputes. A 
consortium of Creeks called for an army to destroy the Cowetas, Broken Arrow, a part 
of the Uchees, Usuchees, Big Tallassee and a part of the Chehaws. The petitioning 
Creeks desired this “as, without doing so, there can be no hope of peace.”80 This could 
well have been the reason; however, it must be considered that the motivation may have 
been that one faction of the Creeks had a quarrel with the named towns and merely 
played on this desire for peace in order to entice the federal government to action on its 
behalf. The petitioning Creeks might not have viewed themselves as the subordinate 
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partner asking for federal help but simply saw an opportunity to defeat their internal 
enemies. Nevertheless, the request gave the Americans the perfect excuse to enter into 
Creek internal affairs.   
   Inviting the federal government into internal disputes gave it the foothold in the 
region that it needed to appropriate Creek lands. As the previous chapter outlined, the 
drive for Creek land came primarily from white settlers hoping to expand westwards. 
The federal government desired Creek lands too but, as highlighted above, military 
protection was far more important. However, over time, and as the new country 
strengthened, the government turned towards land acquisition and land grants were a 
feature of the federal relationship with the Creeks. From the peace treaties onwards, the 
Creeks made four major land cessions to the federal government. In the 1796 Treaty of 
Colerain, which confirmed the 1790 Treaty of New York, the Creeks ceded the lands 
roughly between the Ogeechee and Oconee Rivers in Georgia. The 1802 Treaty of Fort 
Wilkinson ceded a portion of land between the Oconee and Ocmulgee Rivers, and in the 
Treaty of 1805, the Creeks sold the remaining section of land between the two rivers, 
making the boundary line between the Creek confederacy and Georgia roughly the 
Ocmulgee River. 
   Some Creeks could not understand this white desire for Creek land because they 
believed there was more than enough for everyone. Prominent Creeks, such as 
Uhollimicco, Cutchatustonico and Oposehajoe, wrote to the federal government and 
asked why the white men wanted to draw lines through the “red people’s” land, asking 
“can’t we all live as we allways lived and by [sic] and sell in peace.” They go on to 
“beg that our great friends will set still and throw away this drawing.”81 This view does 
not take into account the use of the lands that the white people had in mind. Lands in 
Georgia and Alabama were fertile and the Americans wanted to open Creek land for 
cotton cultivation. Such large scale production would push the Creeks off the lands they 
had held for centuries. The problem was that, however large the land cessions were, the 
United States always seemed to push for more. By the early nineteenth century, the 
federal government appeared to feel it was strong enough, and had sufficiently 
convinced the Creeks of the need for alliance, to explicitly pursue a policy of gaining 
Creek lands.  
   Surveying lands was one of the federal government’s initial methods for gaining more 
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holdings. In 1798, the Creeks refused to assent to the running of a line between the 
United States and the territory belonging to Spain. William Panton wrote that some part 
of the nation was considering removing themselves out of the country rather than 
remain to be “cooped up.”82 It is possible the Americans hoped that the Creeks would 
grow tired of being closed in from all sides and voluntarily move to lands west of the 
Mississippi. This is reminiscent of a policy used by the colonial government in Jamaica 
towards the Maroons. From the 1760s onwards, the colonial government restricted the 
freedom of the Maroons to such an extent that they hoped the Maroons would relinquish 
their “right” to be a Maroon and become just like any other free black person in 
Jamaica. Both of these strategies represent indirect ways the governments attempted to 
influence the Maroons and Creeks into giving up their identity and, therefore, their 
property. 
   The federal government wanted Creek land both to turn into profitable plantations and 
to provide better access across the region. This became particularly necessary after 
1803, when the federal government wanted to build a road joining the eastern territory 
of the United States to the newly-acquired Louisiana Territory. In 1805, after years of 
negotiations, a Creek delegation travelled to the American capital and relinquished title 
to two million acres and authorised the American government to build a road through 
the country for a yearly annuity.
83
 In April 1806, Congress appropriated a further 
$6,400 to build a postal road through the Creek Nation that would link Athens, Georgia, 
to Fort Stoddert on the Tombigbee River north of Mobile. When completed, the post 
road would connect Washington and New Orleans over a distance of some 1,100 miles. 
   This issue continued into the second decade of the nineteenth century. In September 
1811, Hawkins attended the general meeting of the Creeks to demand acquiescence over 
expanding the road in light of increasing British belligerency. Hawkins said the white 
people must have roads to market and for travelling where they choose. In particular, 
the people of Tennessee needed to have a road to Mobile.
84
 The resulting road was 
opened in November 1811 and the entire course ran from Milledgeville, Georgia, to 
Fort Stoddert on the Mobile River and on to New Orleans. The road built through Creek 
territory is one of the most pertinent examples to show how the turning point in the 
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Creek relationship with the United States was the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory 
after the Haitian Revolution, rather than the American Revolution itself. The increasing 
landholdings of the United States necessitated better infrastructure and quicker access 
which was only possible by gaining Creek lands and cutting roads through the lands the 
Creek still held. Access through these landholdings had the added benefits of 
undermining Creek sovereignty and gaining insights into their Nation. 
   The federal government turned to other methods of control as well. One of the main 
ways was through changing Creek trading practices. Before the American Revolution, 
British traders had understood the necessity of maintaining decent relations with the 
interior Indians, and in fact, their fortunes and positions had depended on it.
85
 Initially, 
the federal government continued this attitude and desired advantageous trade 
negotiations with the Creeks to help rebuild the shattered economy of the new republic. 
James Seagrove, the Indian agent, alleged that Alexander McGillivray, along with a 
company of British merchants, had enjoyed a monopoly of the commerce of the Creek 
nation, with a right of importing their goods duty free. The Americans considered those 
privileges the principal source of McGillivray’s power over the Creeks and he refused 
to enter a treaty with the federal government unless they could guarantee a continuation 
of those privileges.
86
 This meant that, early on, the federal government was aware of the 
importance of establishing a favourable trade with McGillivray in order to secure his 
alliance. Improved trade conditions were easy to make attractive to the Creeks. In 1789, 
U.S. commissioners estimated that the annual sale of deerskins and other furs was 
£10,000, whereas the goods consumed in the nation were worth approximately £12,000, 
showing the Creeks’ need for external trade.87 
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   The federal government used trade to lure the Creeks to keep the peace. In 1794, 
William Eustis, a congressman from Massachusetts, reminded the Creeks that George 
Washington had provided bread for their starving “squaws and children” and wanted 
nothing in return. Yet, “You have not returned our prisoners, nor restored our property, 
or acted as friends.” He went on to state that, if the Creeks returned the American 
prisoners and property and restrained their bad men from stealing American horses, “all 
will be peace, and General Washington will open a trade to your land, when you may 
have goods for one fourth less than you now give Mr. Panton [owner of the prominent 
trading house in Creek territory] for them, and get more for your skins and furs.”88 
Ethridge argues that the Creeks ultimately found themselves unnecessary to the 
American economy.
89
 However, that did not seem to stop the federal government from 
implementing policies which encouraged trade with the Creeks as a means of control. 
   Starting in 1795, the federal government decided to open trading posts for the Creeks 
to take their produce to, allegedly to guarantee the best prices but more likely as another 
way to control the Creeks. Those stores, or trade factories, provided Indians with fixed 
exchange rates and ample supplies of merchandise and thereby facilitated regulation of 
Native American trade. Although on a day-to-day basis the trade houses allowed 
traditional economic activities to continue, their function of extending credit to 
individual chiefs and traders actually facilitated the displacement of a Native American 
trade economy by a cotton export economy in the South. Most transactions were carried 
out by barter, but certain persons were allowed goods in advance of payment and, as a 
result, chiefs, captains, interpreters, and traders fell into increasing debt to the 
factories.
90
 This is explicit evidence that the trading houses were a federal policy 
intended to reduce the power of the Creeks more directly than simply turning a blind 
eye to Georgian transgressions but stopping short of outright hostility, which came later.  
   Chaudhuri argues that it was Thomas Jefferson who instigated the method of writing 
off debt in return for a cession of lands. He hoped that the factories and trading posts 
would engage in trade in such a way that the Creeks and the other southern Indians 
would be so deeply in debt they would be forced to cede their lands in order to cover 
                                                          
88
 J. Merriweather to the Headmen and Warriors of the Creek Nation, 11
th
 August 1794, Reel 10, ANC, 
LOC 
89
 Ethridge, Creek Country, 13. 
90
 Daniel H. Usner, ‘American Indians on the Cotton Frontier: Changing Economic Relations with 
Citizens and Slaves in the Mississippi Territory,’ The Journal of American History, 72, 2 (Sep., 1985), 
299-300. 
159 
their debts.
91
 The archival evidence supports this claim. In 1803, Jefferson wrote to 
William Henry Harrison that he would be “glad to see the good and influential 
individuals among them run into debt, because we observe that when these debts get 
beyond what the individual can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of 
lands.”92 Forcing the Creeks into debt had become a federal policy and the federal 
government chose to exacerbate the situation by delaying payments agreed with the 
Creeks. The Creeks had only been paid a portion of the 1796, 1797 and 1798 stipends.
93
 
Also, as of 1802, the chiefs who were to receive $100 yearly from the Treaty of New 
York had not received it.
94
 The federal government explained this action by claiming 
they had withheld the stipend as payment for debts incurred at the federal trading posts. 
The Creeks were given the option of ceding their lands in payment of this debts rather 
than paying with their stipend. This was an explicit change in policy. 
  The methods of control that the federal government instigated were subtle and meant 
that the Creeks continued to have a more favourable relationship with government 
agencies than with local settlers. William Panton claimed that seven-eighths of the 
Creek nation were friendly to the United States and would remain so “unless they are 
injured by parties from Georgia going in.”95 The federal government was so determined 
to control the Creeks that it even prevented any state governments from negotiating with 
the community, causing a split in white society.  
   The Creeks themselves recognised the benefits of a friendly relationship with the 
federal government and being “desirous of establishing with them a permanent 
peace,”96 but differing state and federal policies often affected negotiations with the 
Creeks. In 1785, the federal government sent representatives to the Creeks in order to 
negotiate a treaty with them. John Leslie claimed that false reports had been circulated 
through the Creek nation by the state of Georgia which discouraged the majority of 
Creeks from meeting with the federal representatives. Apparently this situation moved 
Alexander McGillivray to “forbid any persons from attending the place where the 
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Americans desire to meet the Indians in treaty.”97 Only two towns met with the federal 
representatives so they said a treaty could not be concluded with so few of them. 
Subsequently, agents of Georgia sought a treaty with the few Creeks present and 
obtained a cession of all of the lands south of the Altamaha and eastward of a line 
southwest from the junction of the Oakmulgee and Oconee rivers, and northwest of the 
Oconee River.
98
 This shows how Georgians could often contradict the policies of the 
federal government in order to achieve a better outcome for their state. This, 
undoubtedly, undermined any trust in the federal government that the Creeks may have 
felt. This was, perhaps, one of the motivations for the federal commissioners to write to 
the Creeks in 1789 requesting that the Creeks were not to hold any treaty with “an 
individual state or with individuals of any state.”99 McGillivray subsequently wrote to 
Arturo O’Neill that the federal government seemed much disposed to agree to “a fair 
and equal peace and as I know it to be the King’s pleasure that we should agree to one I 
am desirous to conclude one.”100 However, McGillivray was not ready to submit to just 
any terms – he reminded the whites of the incident at Mussel Shoals when a party of 
Americans arrived in three large boats, intending to settle the area. The Creeks attacked 
the boats, killing twenty-seven and wounding five. McGillivray warned that this was 
what the Americans could expect if they persisted in their schemes.
101
 These instances 
demonstrate that the Creeks were not the passive partner in the relationship and that the 
federal government had much to fear. They are also additional evidence of the Creek 
refusal to completely submit to federal power. This refusal may well have influenced 
the change from a policy of accommodation to that of war and subsequently removal.  
   This distinction between different Americans did not go unnoticed by the Creeks. In 
fact, Panton declared that McGillivray did not want to deal with the Georgians because, 
he said, they had violated all treaties, but he was willing to treat with Congress.
102
 
Nevertheless, the Creeks were still concerned that, if forced to choose, the federal 
government would support Georgia for the interests of the Union rather than side with 
the Creeks – even if the Georgians were guilty of the violation. McGillivray thought 
that the federal government would not compel the Georgians to restore Creek lands and 
if “we take strong measures to obtain justice, the force of the Union will be employed to 
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reduce us to accept of their own terms of peace.”103 The federal government could not 
afford to be perceived as weak in the eyes of indigenous communities, as well as 
foreign powers. An attack on a Georgian was still an attack on an American and the 
United States had to respond with power.  
   The attitudes of the local white settlers and the federal government towards the Creeks 
did not always stand in opposition to each other. The Creeks stated that they had 
received the “flattering appellations of friends and brothers,” in reply to their complaints 
over land. But, while doing so, the Americans were “stripping [them] of their natural 
rights” by depriving the Creeks of their inheritance which belonged to their ancestors. 
The Creeks continually petitioned the federal government for intervention on the land 
issue but were repeatedly ignored. McGillivray wrote in 1786 that he could not refrain 
from expressing surprise when the Americans declared their “ignorance of the 
discontents of the nation” on account of the encroachments of their people upon their 
hunting grounds.
104
 It is possible the federal government chose to ignore these 
trespassers in order to avoid having to admit to a federal-sanctioned policy of settling on 
Creek lands. Action was not always, or was not able to be, explicit and the federal 
government sometimes resorted to underhanded tactics to gain Creek lands. 
   However, it was the government of Georgia that resorted more frequently to 
underhanded methods. Federal officials themselves believed that Georgia wished to 
gain land from the Creeks and did so using dishonest methods. James Durouseaux wrote 
in 1796 that: 
It is the wish of the Georgians to commence a war with the Indians in hoere 
[here] to incorach [encroach] on more of thaer [their] land, as they could not 
aptain [obtain] a grant for it the laitt [late] treitty [treaty], they would wish to 
taeke [take] it by force of arms.
105
 
Earlier in the spring, the Georgians had murdered a Coweta Indian who, Durouseaux 
claimed, was innocently present at one of the Georgians’ houses. The Cowetas 
demanded satisfaction and eventually went to take it.
106
 This letter suggests that the 
Georgian government deliberately provoked some of the Creeks into violence to justify 
taking Creek lands, against the wishes of the federal government. One reason for the 
distinction between Georgians and representatives of the federal government was that 
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those Americans who lived on the eastern seaboard and thought in Atlantic and 
universal terms were able to separate the practical horrors and violence of border 
warfare from the theoretical problems of Native American relations. They often had a 
sense of perspective which enabled them to recognise the violence and faults of 
American frontiersmen and to observe that the Indians were fighting to protect their 
lands and families.
107
 The evidence I have presented supports Horsman’s view. Rightly 
or wrongly, it was the Georgians who felt the force of Creek violence whether 
retaliatory or otherwise. The federal government was in a safer position and could allow 
other motivations to dictate its actions. 
   One man embodies the federal government’s relationship to the Creek Nation and that 
is Benjamin Hawkins. It is worth briefly reviewing his interactions with Creeks to 
understand the wider context of federal-Creek relations. In their first transaction the 
Creeks were very distrustful of Hawkins and his office. George Stiggins claimed that 
the Creeks held frequent debates among themselves “in contemplation of killing 
him.”108 They considered killing him because some of the Creeks believed that he was 
merely imposed on them by the government as a spy to shackle their liberties, 
highlighting the extent to which the Creeks distrusted Hawkins and, by extension, the 
federal government.  
   Hawkins persevered in his dealings with the Creeks, no doubt encouraged by his 
superiors in the federal government. In public meetings with him, Stiggins claims that 
the Creeks “could not but admire his firm candid and honest deportment.”109 Hawkins 
eventually became close friends with many Creek men, especially the Tuckabatchee 
headman Oche Haujo, known as Alexander Cornells, at whose death Hawkins wrote, 
“We have not his equal among us.”110 There is no doubt that several, if not the majority, 
of the Creeks had an affection for Hawkins as a person, if not for his policies. Stiggins 
elaborates: “They loved him for his virtuous and disinterested greatness of mind, for he 
expressed to them his hopes and wish for their welfare. He took pains to learn their 
language.”111 This bears out the point in Chapter Two that local whites were welcomed 
into Creek society if they married a Creek woman or learnt the indigenous language. 
The fact that Hawkins took the time to learn their language implied his commitment to 
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Creek society and, therefore, eased his acceptance into the community. In fact, he was 
subsequently given the honorary high-ranking title of isti atcagagi or “beloved man,” 
denoting wisdom, accomplishment, and trust.
112
 Hawkins was not the distant observer 
that previous Indian agents had been. The Creeks were able to approach him and discuss 
matters in their own tongue. Hawkins, in many ways, was an advocate of the Creeks 
and did not adhere to the later policies of reduction or removal. However, despite 
Hawkins’ commitment to the Creeks, his interaction with them unquestionably aided 
the federal government in its aim of convincing the Creeks to ally with it against any 
other foreign power. His civilisation plan was clearly an attack on the Creek way of life 
and, therefore, he remains a controversial figure in Creek society. 
   As the years passed, however, the Creeks began to praise Hawkins and his efforts 
within the Creek nation. Hopoie Micco, a Creek chief, wrote to him saying Hawkins 
had long been in their land doing good for them. Hopoie Micco even called him “an old 
chief among us” and stated that they appointed him “our agent, to see justice done in 
our affairs, as well as the white people.”113 This shows the esteem in which Hawkins 
seems to have been held by the Creeks, or at least the esteem in which the Creeks were 
willing Hawkins to believe they held him. It also demonstrates how Hawkins’ role 
could be viewed within Creek society. Hopoie Micco explicitly states, “We appoint you 
our agent” rather than “the United States appoints you our agent.” The Creeks were very 
aware that Hawkins was the federal government’s choice of agent but this implies that 
they believed that the final decision still lay with them. There is probably some truth in 
this belief because the previous Indian agent, James Seagrove, was largely ineffectual 
and had no real impact upon Creek society. This attitude towards the appointment of 
Hawkins suggests that, initially, the federal government had not succeeded in its attempt 
of convincing the Creeks of their inferiority. Hawkins’ efforts seem to have moved the 
Creeks from hostility towards a more genial attitude but the federal government still had 
a long way to go in subordinating the nation. 
   Certain Creeks began to take issue with Hawkins as the years passed. They felt that 
they had no support from him, which by extension meant no support from the federal 
government. Following a severe drought in which they had suffered from hunger and 
lack of clothes. Hawkins explained to William Eustis that if the Creeks really were a 
poor people from “necessity and not from choice” then he would assist them. However, 
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he believed that they could cover the costs of feeding their people from their stipend and 
their lands. Hawkins went on to write that if they had done that then he would have 
applied to the President to help to clothe and feed the Creeks.
114
 This reaction is 
symptomatic of the federal government’s relationship with the Creeks, particularly as 
the years continued. The federal government was willing to aid the Creeks in return for 
their alliance, but government officials often seemed to feel that the Creeks were taking 
advantage of their aid. On first glance, the Americans offering aid to the Creeks would 
place them in the position of power; however, the fact that the Americans felt the need 
to offer the Creeks any aid in the first place suggests the Creeks had something that the 
Americans wanted.  
   This complex relationship with Hawkins aids the understanding of the wider 
interactions with the federal government. As has been shown, the policies of the federal 
government towards the Creeks changed over time. Cotterill claims that the initial goal 
of the government was to extend the influence of the United States among the Creeks, 
to keep them at peace with each other and with the United States, and to civilise them. 
Cotterill then claims that this changed to a policy of removal with the coming of 
Jefferson to the presidency.
115
 Cotterill is correct that the policy changed at this point 
but I argue that it was a result of the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory rather than 
purely Jefferson’s election. The United States might have possessed sufficient material, 
economic, and political strength to overwhelm the Creeks by 1800, as Martin has 
claimed, but it did not have the military advantage of surrounding Creek land until 
1803.
116
 Further, the acquisition of the Louisiana territory eradicated the French 
presence in the region and severely reduced that of the Spanish. Militarily, the United 
States had never been stronger. This enabled it to begin its aggressive policy of placing 
Creeks into debt and offering to write off their debt in exchange for land cessions. This 
was the preferred method to outright war because the British still represented a threat in 
the region and the federal government did not want to push the Creeks into an alliance 
with the British. However, once the United States had gained the Louisiana Territory, 
thus strengthening the Union exponentially, it could change its policy to one of force, 
resulting in the Creek War of 1813. 
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3.3 From Accommodation to War: Free Communities and White Governments 
   This detailed exploration of the various interactions between the Maroons and the 
colonial government, and the Creeks and the federal government, has revealed some 
interesting points. One was that the Maroons and Creeks began the inter-war periods in 
a much stronger position than previous scholarship allows. The reasons for their 
continuing strength were different but the result was the same. On signing the peace 
treaties, the Maroons did not lose any of their military strength, their strategic positions, 
or their knowledge of the island. The Creek Nation also continued to represent a 
formidable military presence in the region and they faced a new republic that was 
wracked with numerous economic, social, and national problems that necessitated an 
initial policy of accommodation.
117
  
   As stressed throughout this chapter, the subsequent years represented a struggle for 
the governments to weaken these communities and thus ensure white society’s control 
of the territory. Signing peace treaties embodied the first step in trying to undermine the 
authority of the free communities. These treaties attempted to ensure a certain amount 
of influence over the Maroons and Creeks. The colonial government of Jamaica 
included a clause which allowed white officers into Maroon territory in order to gain 
knowledge of the areas. In the United States, the federal government installed Indian 
agents and signed treaties with clauses that controlled a certain amount of trade with the 
Creek Nation. Despite the insertion of these clauses, neither government was in a 
position to force the free communities to act upon them. Government representatives 
had to turn to a period of flattery and turning a blind eye to acts deemed unacceptable to 
gain the continued alliance of the communities.  
   This initial stage of accommodation alludes to the vulnerability of both Jamaican and 
American society in the face of the Maroons and Creeks. Neither the colonial 
government of Jamaica nor the federal government of the United States were in a 
position to impose their will on these free communities. Economically, Jamaica and the 
United States needed peace and stability with the free communities. Jamaica was under-
developed in the 1730s, the sugar boom was yet to happen and the coastal settlements 
were at threat of invasion.
118
 I argue that the colonial government needed the Maroons 
more than the Maroons needed the colonial government. Likewise, the federal 
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government faced years of political wrangling to even form a coherent government 
which served the needs of the new republic.
119
 A resounding defeat by the Western 
Confederacy in 1791 highlighted the vulnerabilities of the young country. The last thing 
it needed was war with a formidable enemy like the Creek nation. This implies that free 
communities initially held the upper-hand in the inter-war period. Regardless of race, 
peace treaties did not weaken the free societies. 
   Significantly, the Maroons seem to have been more willing to support the colonial 
government in the years after the peace treaties than the Creeks were to support the 
federal government. This is demonstrated by Cudjoe sending his men to assist the 
colonial government when it was threatened by Spain in the 1740s. The early Maroon 
relationship with the government highlights that the peace treaties were between two 
equal communities agreeing peaceful terms rather than one side submitting to another. It 
also supports the argument in Chapter Two that, because of geographic factors, the 
Maroons and Jamaican whites needed an alliance with each other to achieve their 
desired lifestyles; peace for the Maroons and stability for the colonial government. In 
contrast, the Creeks seemed to be more content to sit back and allow the federal 
government to approach them. At this stage, it appeared to matter little to the Creeks 
whether they traded with American, Spanish or British people as long as the goods were 
there. Several nations could serve Creek needs and the federal government was aware of 
this. At the same time, it realised the necessity of peace with the Creeks for the United 
States to grow; hence, why they were willing to turn a blind eye to Creek horse theft in 
the early stages of the relationship.  
   The willingness of these free communities to initially enter into alliances is 
demonstrated by their attendance at meetings or martial displays with government 
representatives. The Maroons frequently attended meetings with the Governor of 
Jamaica whilst the Creeks were entertained in New York and Philadelphia by George 
Washington. Some scholars have commented upon the dark undertones of such trips but 
travelling to these meetings made more sense than allowing white society into their 
lands.
120
 The Maroons and Creeks had little reason to trust the governments and 
revealing their leaders’ settlements would have been a significant gamble. These are not 
the actions of weakened communities. Neither the Maroons nor the Creeks were forced 
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into attending these meetings but chose to do so to advance alliances, trade networks or 
further treaty negotiations. This implies that neither community felt intimidated by 
white society. At this point, both free communities were interacting as equals with the 
white governments.  
   The initial drive for accommodation on both sides led to both governments placing an 
emphasis on issues other than mass land acquisition. The main distinction between how 
the Maroons and the colonial government interacted over land and how the Creeks and 
the federal government interacted over land was driven by the fact that the colonial 
government did not seem to desire the Maroons’ land in the post-treaty period. This was 
a direct result of the fact that the 1730s peace treaties granted the vast majority of the 
land in Jamaica to the white population; the Maroons were left with a tiny portion 
which, even if it was as fertile as some archival records imply, was so small as to be 
inconsequential to the colonial government. In contrast, the reason for a lack of an 
attempt to gain the majority of Creek lands by the federal government was most likely 
that it had more pressing needs. I argue that trade and stability was more important than 
land acquisition at this point. However, as its economy stabilised, and the Western 
Confederacy was defeated, it became increasingly apparent that the local whites in 
states such as Georgia were determined to gain land through any method possible, the 
federal government appeared to turn towards a policy of land acquisition. This was 
exacerbated by the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory in 1803.
121
 The federal 
government was no longer willing to accommodate the Creeks because the United 
States was at a stage where it needed expansion both for itself and to please the land-
hungry Georgians.
122
 Keeping the Union together at all costs was a factor in this change 
of policy.  
   As the accommodation stage passed, both governments seemed to realise the necessity 
of stripping the free communities of their power. The successful conclusion of the 
Seven Years´ War contributed to the colonial government´s belief that it would be able 
to defeat the Maroons. Tensions, which were already being felt following the American 
Revolution, were increased exponentially during the Haitian Revolution. The 
landholdings of the Maroons bound them together with a unique sense of community 
and they represented a larger threat in light of the Haitian Revolution whilst the Creeks 
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were seen as a physical obstacle to American expansion, particularly after the Louisiana 
Purchase. However, neither the federal nor the colonial government launched into all-
out war without trying other methods of reduction first. The ways in which they did this 
differed, revealing once again, the difference between being a free community on an 
island and a free community in borderlands territory. The relatively small landholdings 
of the Maroons, coupled with the fact that this “frontier” was actually in the interior of 
an island, meant that the colonial government did not turn to a policy of land acquisition 
from the Maroons. Of far more importance to the colonial government was the stability, 
or instability, that the Maroons could bring to the island because of their location in the 
interior. The colonial government recognised that stripping the Maroons of the little 
land they still held would bring instability to the island so it preferred to pursue a policy 
of trying to restrict Maroon freedom to such an extent that they would relinquish their 
rights as Maroons and live in the same manner as the rest of the free black population. 
   The main way the American government tried to reduce the power of the Creeks was 
to manipulate the Creeks into dependency through trade. Worried by the Spanish trade 
agreements, the federal government opened ports to the Creeks and gave them 
favourable trade conditions. In addition, it opened federal factory stores throughout the 
Creek nation with the explicit aim of getting the Creeks into unmanageable debts to 
encourage dependency, and subsequently, land cessions. The Americans also tried to 
influence the Creeks to take up agriculture, although not very successfully. If the Creeks 
grew what the Americans demanded of them, they would be easier to control because 
the Creeks would depend on the Americans to provide foodstuffs in return for cotton 
and other products. As time passed and Britain began to trade with the U.S. again, the 
usefulness of the Creeks as a trade partner changed from direct to indirect. New markets 
for cotton opened up in Britain so the Creeks were no longer needed as major trading 
partners by the American government.
123
 Their usefulness then became related to the 
land they held. Creeks inhabited millions of acres of the most fertile land in the Deep 
South, land that was ideal for growing cotton for the new markets. This is another 
reason for the change in federal government policy from an emphasis on 
accommodation to land appropriation.  
   Conversely, the colonial government in Jamaica was never really interested in trade 
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with the Maroons, reflecting the fact that Jamaica was a plantation society, rather than a 
settler society. The Maroons were specifically banned from growing the main export 
crop of Jamaica, sugar, so their usefulness to the colonial government was never related 
to trade. The trade activities that the Maroons did participate in were local, sustenance-
based ones. The colonial government actively restricted the trade activities of the 
Maroons after the Haitian Revolution broke out to prevent them from becoming even 
more powerful than they already were. Once again, this shows the importance of the 
type of white society a free community encountered. The United States, a settler 
society, needed both internal and external trade whereas Jamaica, an absentee society, 
focused on the export of cash crops like sugar and coffee. The colonial government did 
not seem to be concerned about the Maroons’ economic activities as long as they did 
not infringe on their golden crop – sugar.  
   This interaction surrounding trade reveals that, even at this point, the Creeks were 
becoming dependent on external trade. They were not solely dependent upon the United 
States for trade - that came later in the nineteenth century - but they had been trading for 
so long with European nations that it was impossible to stop.
124
 In contrast, the Maroons 
were less dependent on external trade, although that also changed as the years passed. 
Initially, the Maroons survived economically by hunting runaways and working on 
roads, both activities involving white society. “First time” Maroons were able to revert 
to their traditional lifestyles of hunting wild boar and living off the land but as 
subsequent generations were born, with less opportunity to hone these skills, 
dependence upon the colonial government grew. This shows how the Maroons and 
Creeks were at different stages of development: the Creeks were heavily involved in the 
larger trade networks of the region even before the peace treaties whereas the Maroons 
were less so and more self-reliant. However, both would ultimately meet the same fate. 
   The personal interactions that Maroons and Creeks had with government 
representatives reflected their complex positions within society. The Maroons met with 
the Governor of Jamaica on several occasions. However, these meetings often 
culminated in a display of their martial skills apparently reflecting the subservient 
relationship that the colonial government desired of the Maroons. That is not to say that 
the Maroons viewed the situation in the same manner; the Maroons could have used 
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these displays to show the colonial government their military prowess as an example of 
their continuing strength. On these occasions, Maroon leaders were given gifts such as 
medals or British military jackets. Again, this example suggests that the colonial 
government viewed themselves as the leaders “bestowing” these gifts on their men. 
However, the Maroons may have accepted these gifts as recognition of their work in 
protecting the island from both internal and external threats. These examples, as well as 
others outlined in the Maroon section of this chapter, demonstrate the continuous power 
struggle between the Maroons and the colonial government. The colonial government 
seemed determined to break the spirit of the Maroons and cast them as subservient 
participants whereas the Maroons continued to demonstrate their strength and their 
commitment to their unique position in society. When the colonial government began to 
intervene in the internal affairs of the Maroons, it was at the Maroons’ invitation and 
does not appear to have been forced upon them. 
   The personal interactions between the Creeks and representatives of the federal 
government were just as multi-dimensional as those between the Maroons and the 
colonial government. This is exemplified in the relationship between Benjamin 
Hawkins and the Creeks. Unlike the colonial government’s involvement in Maroon 
affairs, Hawkins did not arrive in Creek country at the explicit invitation of the Creeks. 
However, they did permit him to enter their territory and live amongst them, albeit with 
a certain amount of suspicion. The initial suspicions of the Creeks were confirmed by 
the civilisation plan; Hawkins, and the government he represented, intended to change 
Creek society beyond recognition. This sequence of events effectively reflected the 
changing relationship between the Creeks and the federal government. Following the 
end of the American Revolution, an uneasy peace led to suspicions on both sides. 
However, trade brought stability and benefits to both the Creeks and the federal 
government so a period of tolerance followed. This seemed to lead to both sides over-
estimating their strength; the federal government believed they could implement such a 
controversial plan and the Creeks believed they could reject it. This was one of the 
major factors which led to the ultimate breakdown of the relationship and the Creek 
War of 1813. 
   The complexity of the situation is demonstrated by the fact that both communities 
were faced with white societies that were experiencing splits over how to deal with 
them. In Jamaica, the colonial government had long advocated a reduction of Maroon 
power and actively worked to achieve that, particularly once their power was 
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consolidated with the end of the Seven Years´ War: whereas the majority of local white 
settlers constantly supported the Maroon cause, even in times of war like the Second 
Maroon War. In the United States, the white settlers pushed for removal of the Creeks 
while the federal government held a more accommodation-driven stance, at least in the 
early part of this period. Both the United States and Jamaica, understandably, wanted to 
avoid any splits in white society.   
   It is interesting to note, therefore, how the Jamaican and Americans governments 
differed in dealing with these splits regarding the Maroons and Creeks. In Jamaica, the 
later policies towards the Maroons seemed to be more in line with the colonial 
government’s belief in how to deal with the Maroons. That is, that increasing 
restrictions were placed on the Maroon communities, despite the overwhelming support 
of the local whites for the Maroons. The reason for doing so was most likely as a result 
of the loss of the American colonies in the 1770s, a situation which made the English 
ever more determined to hold on to its Caribbean colonies.  In contrast, in the south-
eastern US, the federal government’s policies appeared to eventually move towards the 
attitude of the local whites in states such as Georgia: in other words, mass appropriation 
of Creek lands. This implies who was driving the policy decisions in Jamaica and the 
United States with regard to free communities. I argue that in Jamaica, the colonial 
government held more power than local whites, whereas in Georgia the local whites, or 
at least their state government, had more power than the federal government. This is 
important to note when assessing how these governments decided the most suitable 
methods to stabilise their societies.   
   These differing stances of the two governments could also explain the differing 
attitudes of the local white populations regarding the Maroons and Creeks, as outlined 
in Chapter Two. Local whites in Jamaica seem to have had less influence on the 
colonial government than the local whites of Georgia did on the federal government. 
This, in turn, may have led to the Jamaican whites feeling less protected by their 
government and more vulnerable to attacks. The Jamaican whites observed first-hand 
the protection that the Maroons brought to the island following the peace treaties and 
this contributed to a more amicable relationship between them and the Maroons, 
especially during the Age of Revolutions. On the other hand, the local whites in Georgia 
and Alabama had fought, and won, a revolution to have their voices heard.
125
 It was the 
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whole basis of the new republic and they knew they had an influence on the federal 
government. They also knew that the federal government was in its infancy and men 
owed more allegiance to their state than to their country. The federal government would 
always ally with their citizens over the Creeks, even if their citizens were to blame for 
any outbreak of war.  
   To conclude, it is important to note how the borderlands context of the Creeks, in 
comparison to the bordered location of the Maroons, affected the interactions of the 
Maroons and Creeks with the respective governments. The federal government could 
not afford to be too overt with its attempts to take Creek lands. Any actions which 
alerted the Creeks to the true desire of the federal government would have pushed them 
towards an alliance with other nations such as Spain and Britain. In contrast, the 
colonial government of Jamaica could afford to be more direct in its attempts to restrict 
Maroon freedom because the threat from other nations was not as pronounced, or 
feasible, as in the south-eastern US. Indeed, from the 1760s onwards, its position as the 
most dominant colonial power in the world consolidated the belief that it could defeat 
the Maroons. 
   The geography of these two locations also had an impact on the ability of the 
governments’ capabilities to be involved with the internal affairs of the communities. 
The colonial government was able to ban the Maroons from growing certain crops 
because of their proximity to white settlements which led to an increasingly fraught 
relationship between the government and the Maroons. The federal government was not 
able to be as involved in Creek internal affairs because of the size of the Creek territory 
and its proximity to other powers, as outlined above. The vulnerability of being an 
encircled free community worked both ways. It meant that the colonial government 
could impose restrictions because of a lack of potential alternative allies for the 
Maroons, but it also meant that any subsequent rebellions occurred in the midst of white 
society and, therefore, meant the Maroons continued to have power. The Creeks had 
more potential allies but the Americans could reinforce their border with the Creeks and 
would have more chance of quelling any attacks.  
   What do these parallel relationships reveal about the role of free communities in the 
circum-Caribbean? First, that peace with free communities was instrumental in allowing 
European societies to expand, without the initial stage of accommodation on both sides 
both Jamaica and the United States would have struggled to consolidate their power and 
173 
would have been under threat from the French and Spanish empires. Second, it suggests 
that peace treaties did not weaken free communities and did not significantly strengthen 
white governments. Economic factors brought about by the treaties led to both 
communities losing some of their influence but none of those were apparent in the early 
years of the treaties and, just as important, were the geographic factors mentioned 
above. The fact that both free communities invited white society to intervene in their 
internal disputes actually hints towards their enduring strength as a community and 
suggests that neither the Maroons nor the Creeks felt intimidated by the European 
presence. Third, the geographic location of a free community appears to have 
determined the trajectory of their interaction with white governments. The Maroons 
were seemingly more committed to amicable relations with the colonial government 
than the Creeks were with the federal government because of their presence on an 
island. Finally, external events had a significant impact on both free communities and 
their relationships to their governments. The Maroons frequently showed their 
commitment to the colonial government. However, they continued to refuse to 
relinquish their unique identity and this resulted in an external factor, the Haitian 
Revolution, making their position untenable, particularly in light of England´s 
confirmed colonial supremacy following the Seven Years´ War, resulting in the Second 
Maroon War. The Creeks did not prove their commitment to the United States during 
the inter-war period and refused to adopt the civilisation plan to a sufficient extent. 
This, coupled with the Louisiana Purchase following the Haitian Revolution, led to the 
Creek position becoming unsustainable and ultimately led to the outbreak of the Creek 
War of 1813. 
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Chapter 4. Maroons and Creeks in the Wider Circum-Caribbean 
   In 1730, the British Board of Trade and the colonial government of Jamaica became 
alarmed by rumours of collusion between the Maroons and the Spanish. A Maroon, 
captured by the British in one of their raids on the Maroon settlements, declared that 
one of his captains had visited Cuba and promised to assist the Spaniards if they 
invaded Jamaica.
1
 A similar situation arose in the south-eastern United States. In 
November 1785, a consortium of representatives of the American federal government 
despaired that the Creeks intended to ally with foreign nations. The Indian Agent, 
Benjamin Hawkins, wrote that the Creek leader, Alexander McGillivray, was forming a 
dangerous confederacy between several Indian nations, the Spaniards, and British 
agents.
2
 Both of these incidents how Maroon and Creek interactions may have reached 
beyond the borders of Jamaica and the United States. There is little direct evidence that 
the Maroons formed alliances, or even engaged in dialogue, with nations other than 
Britain. However, there is ample proof to suggest that they may have done so. In 
contrast, there is definitive evidence that the Creeks were participating in alliances with 
other nations. The sources here demonstrate that these communities were not consigned 
to the borderlands of Jamaica and the United States but were participants in the circum-
Caribbean both before and after the treaties, at least in the minds of the white societies. 
The most notable difference was that the Maroons’ interactions were only notional 
whereas the Creeks’ followed a definite policy of weighing up which country could 
offer them the most and then aligning themselves with that nation. 
   This chapter constitutes the final area of comparison between the Maroons and 
Creeks: their interactions with other nations in the circum-Caribbean. In other words, it 
considers exchanges with foreign people such as the French, Spanish and Americans for 
the Maroons, and the British, French and Spanish for the Creeks. It argues that Maroon 
and Creek histories were inextricably tied to the circum-Caribbean. I show how 
interactions with the outside world changed little until the Haitian Revolution, at which 
point both the Maroons and the Creeks saw their worlds altered irreversibly. 
   The beginning of the Haitian Revolution left the colonial government of Jamaica with 
no option, in its mind, but to nullify the influence of the free, semi-autonomous 
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Maroons. For the Creeks, the end of the Haitian Revolution removed the French, and 
arguably the Spanish, as viable alternatives for alliance and meant that they were only 
left with a choice between the British and the Americans. The ultimate outcome for both 
the Maroons and Creeks was land loss: either directly by immediate removal for the 
Trelawny Town Maroons after the Second Maroon War or indirectly with the removal 
process being set in motion for the Creeks when the Haitian Revolution triggered the 
sale of the Louisiana Territory from France to the United States. Either way, the Haitian 
Revolution had significant implications for these communities and their interactions 
with other nations. 
   The period under study was one of frequently changing alliances and constant 
hostility. At the beginning, 1739 to 1763 was a period of almost continuous warfare in 
the circum-Caribbean, especially between Spain, France and Britain. In 1739, Spain and 
Britain were embroiled in the War of Jenkin’s Ear, chiefly caused by illegal trading 
among the two nations. There were rumours that France would join on the side of Spain, 
which it eventually did in 1744. The war finally ended in 1748 with the Treaty of Aix-
la-Chapelle.
3
 Following this was the Seven Years’ War which took place between 1756 
and 1763 driven by Britain’s antagonism towards the French and Spanish Bourbons, 
resulting largely from overlapping interests in its colonial and trade empires. This 
period of warfare led into the Age of Revolutions, the first one relevant to this thesis 
being the American Revolution in 1776. Finally, the French, and subsequently Haitian, 
Revolutions broke out in the latter stages of the eighteenth century and involved all 
three of the Spanish, French and British empires. It was the Haitian Revolution that 
proved to have the most impact upon the Maroons and Creeks. 
4.1 Real Allies to Imagined Revolutions: The Maroons, Spanish and French 
   The Maroon interaction with the world outside of Jamaica has received much less 
scholarly attention than has that of the Creeks. Much of the established work describes 
the early Spanish involvement with the Maroons and the later influence of the Haitian 
Revolution on the Trelawny Town uprising. However, these issues are only mentioned 
fleetingly and the work does not ascertain the extent to which the Maroons were aware 
of, and interacted with, the world outside Jamaica. Earlier works tended to focus on 
telling the overall narrative of the Maroon story and what this meant for the rest of the 
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island only.
4
 There is a significant gap in the literature of historical analysis of the 
Maroons’ interactions with non-British people. This section aims to fill that gap.  
   Jamaica’s trade in sugar and rum helped to make the island the wealthiest colony in 
the late eighteenth century British Empire. On the eve of the American Revolution, 
when per capita wealth for a white person in England averaged about 42 pounds, and 
about 60 pounds for whites in the thirteen colonies, white Jamaicans enjoyed a per 
capita net worth of 2,201 pounds.
5
 Undoubtedly, this made Jamaica an attractive 
prospect to all European powers in the region. Further, it meant that Jamaica was at the 
forefront of the British mind when it came to protecting its colonial interests. This 
meant blocking the Maroons from allying with external enemies. It was one thing 
stopping the Maroons from joining forces with the slaves but quite another to prevent 
them from joining with the Spanish or French. Alvin O. Thompson has stated that the 
Jamaican colonists were convinced that the Spanish were plotting with the Maroons to 
recapture the island after the peace treaties.
6
 However, no scholar has yet assessed the 
extent to which this fear influenced the colonial government and its actions towards the 
Maroons. Further, no scholar has explored the extent to which the Maroons actually did 
interact with other nations and whether this changed throughout the inter-war period. 
This section shows that the Maroons were a fully integrated part of the region they lived 
in and always had been. Their actions may not have always been intended as the actions 
of Caribbean citizens but they were often interpreted that way. It also highlights how the 
Maroons continued similar relationships with external nations from before the First 
Maroon War until the Haitian Revolution. This cataclysmic event, rather than the 
Second Maroon War alone, changed how the Maroons were viewed, the risk they 
posed, and how their interactions with non-British people were interpreted.  
   The first foreign interaction that the Maroons experienced was with the Spanish 
before the British take-over of the island in 1655. In fact, the Maroons had actually 
joined with the Spanish to fight against the British invasion of Jamaica. When the 
Spaniards retreated before the British army under the command of Venables, they had 
with them about 1500 blacks and mulattoes, many of whom were slaves. Some 
remained with their masters, while others dispersed, thirty or forty in a gang, to different 
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parts of the mountains. From there, they made frequent excursions, to “harass the 
English soldiers,” who had been represented to them, “as bloodthirsty heretics that gave 
no quarter.”7 This demonstrates that an allegiance with a European power was not a new 
feature of Maroon life. The alliance may not have been the formal arrangement that was 
seen later with the British but, nevertheless, it shows the early origins of a Maroon-
European alliance.  
   There is evidence to suggest that Maroons continued to interact with the Spanish, even 
after the Spanish withdrawal from the island. In 1720 the then Governor of Jamaica, Sir 
Nicholas Lawes, was haunted by the fear that his internal and external enemies were 
working in concert. By September 1720, according to an affidavit by John Tello, a 
trader, the “rebels” had approached the Spaniards. Tello said that a letter had been sent 
from the Maroons to the Governor of Caracas asking him to let the King of Spain know, 
“that if he would be pleased to grant them their freedom and let them enjoy the same 
liberties as the rest of his subjects, they would without much trouble put the island into 
his possession.”8 A similar instance was recorded in the 1730s. In May 1730, there was 
a trading voyage at Santa Maria in Cuba. A man, Quarrel, happened to have said that in 
seven years’ time Jamaica would have no more reason to trade with the Spanish 
merchants because Jamaica would breed her own cattle. The merchants replied that, in 
less than half that time the island would be theirs, and when Quarrel asked them to 
explain, since there was peace between Britain and Spain at the time, the reply was that 
the “rebellious negroes” of Jamaica had sent a letter to the Governor of Caracas asking 
for the assistance of Spain to take Jamaica. This was reiterated by an eminent Spanish 
merchant who told Quarrel that the story was in the mouth of everyone at Port-au-
Prince. 
9
 
   There is no direct evidence that these episodes occurred. The only references are 
second-hand and, therefore, we cannot say beyond doubt that there was contact. 
However, if they did occur, then the interactions reveal several things. Firstly, they 
suggest that the Maroons were in contact with people from outside Jamaica. Other 
scholars have described the slave networks that criss-crossed the region at this time but 
have failed to show how the Maroons were tuned into this network as well as the 
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trading routes of the Caribbean.
10
 Secondly, they intimate that the Maroons were still in 
contact with at least some Spanish people, decades after the official evacuation of the 
island. French St-Domingue was closer than Caracas so if the Maroons were simply 
casting around for an ally to fight the British, it would have made more sense to make 
contact with the French. The fact that the Spanish were favoured suggests the Maroons’ 
motivations were based on their shared history of fighting alongside the Spanish. 
Thirdly, it appears that, from an earlier stage than usually recognised, the Maroons were 
willing to join with a European power in order to have their freedom guaranteed. The 
date usually given for this decision to ally with a European nation is the late 1730s 
when the peace treaties with the British were signed. The letters above suggest that 
those actions were not a break with custom but a continuation of policy. There is, of 
course, the possibility that the Spanish in both circumstances were making these claims 
to stir up trouble in Jamaica. However, this seems unlikely because two separate 
incidents recount a remarkably similar event. Instances such as this are evidence that the 
Maroons practiced a policy of informal European alliance long before their treaties with 
the British.  
   The Maroons were suspected of collaboration with the Spanish right up until the 
signing of the peace treaties. In the late 1730s, Carey argues, planters believed the 
Spaniards planned to attack Jamaica alongside the Maroons because a Spanish sloop 
was moored in Port Royal, although it turned out to only be there for repairs. This 
shows that planters were convinced that if Spain attacked the island then the Maroons 
would join them.
11
 As it turned out, white Jamaicans had little to fear; as soon as the 
Maroons signed the peace treaties with the colonial government they took to their new 
role with gusto. For instance, the example mentioned in Chapter Three, when Cudjoe 
sent several of his men against the Spaniards and they sailed as volunteers on the British 
ship Louisa.
12
 It seems that Cudjoe and his men were pragmatic; they had tried to form 
an allegiance with their former allies, the Spanish, but, when rebuffed, they sought 
peace with the British and moved to immediately prove their commitment. 
   This feeling of duty did not seem to change in the inter-war period; the Maroons had 
signed their treaties and, by and large, fulfilled their obligations. However, this did not 
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prevent the colonists from suspecting the Maroons of outside collusion. In April 1774, 
when the North American patriots began military exercises in preparation for the war 
against Britain, the white colonists believed the Maroons to be in open rebellion. 
Apparently, the Maroons had assembled and “taken to arms” on the north of the island. 
Admiral Sir George Rodney, the commander of the Jamaican naval station and a naval 
hero, sent two warships to Port Antonio arguing that the “late disturbances” prove the 
Maroons still had a strong inclination to be “troublesome.” It was not until October that 
Rodney felt sufficiently confident to recall the Maidstone from Port Antonio back to 
Kingston.
13
 This typified the Maroon relationship with the colonial government. None 
of the concerns seem to have been based on fact but were more a result of 
unsubstantiated white fears.  
   When war did break out in the American colonies in 1776, a slave rebellion also broke out 
in Jamaica in the parish of Hanover where most of the planters were recent settlers and 
where there were “more sugar works than some [parishes] of three times the extent.”14 The 
Leeward Maroons were suspected of involvement in the rebellion. A report in a British 
newspaper claimed that American emissaries encouraged the slaves, giving them 
ammunition and guns. Silas Deane, an American diplomat, had indeed advocated American 
support for an uprising of the Caribs in St Vincent and a slave revolt in Jamaica.
15
 However, 
there is little archival evidence to suggest that the Maroons were involved in the Hanover 
uprising. Most likely, this was a sign of things to come. The Maroons were to be plagued by 
rumours of alliances with non-British forces until the Second Maroon War. Before the 
Haitian Revolution, the whites seemed to tolerate the rumours; the same was not true after 
the Haitian Revolution. Despite continued suspicion of their actions in the late 1770s, the 
Maroons consistently came to the aid of the colonial government in times of external threat, 
for example, as shown by Campbell, in 1779-80 when the colony was threatened by the 
French.
16
 The Maroons, at least, seem to have had little desire to end their alliance with the 
British in favour of France, the United States or Spain. The earlier reaction of white 
Jamaicans to news of the American Revolution foreshadowed what happened several years 
later with the Haitian Revolution.  
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   Colonists’ fears escalated once again in the 1790s and led them to believe that the 
Spanish had, once again, gained the trust of the Maroons. Adam Williamson wrote in 
1791 that the “alarm” in the country seemed to spread daily because some of the local 
whites found “the greater to imagine” that the Spaniards had brought in arms and 
gunpowder to sell to the Maroons and to entice them to revolt.
17
 This threat led the 
colonial government to command the Maroons to round up all the Spanish vagrants they 
found in the parish of St. James and to take them to Montego Bay.
18
 Despite this, 
rumours persisted and the British were certain that the Windward Maroons were 
receiving help from the Spaniards in Cuba, and expected a Spanish attack.
19
 These 
examples highlight the impact of the Haitian Revolution on the whites of Jamaica. 
When the Maroons had been accused of external collusion before, it was simply 
commented upon; now, the Maroons were expected to round up the foreign people to 
rid the island of the threat and also, presumably, to prove their loyalty to the colonial 
government. That the Maroons complied was a continuation of their behaviour from 
earlier decades into the 1790s. 
   The same could not be said for the colonists. Their behaviour following the outbreak 
of the Haitian Revolution and, subsequently, the Second Maroon War demonstrates how 
tolerating a free community plagued by rumours of foreign interaction was no longer 
acceptable. When the Second Maroon War broke out, the colonial government 
immediately turned to considering the external help that the Trelawny Town Maroons 
might seek so Governor Balcarres saw to it that the island was “cleared of the swarms 
of French banditti.”20 It is unsurprising that a government would consider who its 
enemy might ally with but it is rather telling that its immediate reaction was to believe it 
was the French. This suggests the extent to which the Haitian Revolution created the 
change in the treatment of the Maroons because prior allegations were of an alliance 
with the Spanish. 
   One member of the colonial government who was convinced that the French were 
involved was Lord Balcarres. Scholars have wrongly attributed his attitude to paranoia 
when, as I show, his fears were substantiated. Richard Hart has commented on this so-
called paranoia towards external forces. He wrote, “Balcarres the aristocrat had an 
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obsessive fear of the revolutionary ideas then current in Europe.”21 Carey Robinson has 
also claimed that Balcarres believed that the trouble with the Maroons was premeditated 
and instigated by French revolutionaries. 
22
 Clearly, we can never know for sure 
whether Balcarres truly believed that the French were involved in rousing the Maroons 
but the evidence in this chapter overwhelmingly suggests that he had at least some 
grounds for believing so. Undoubtedly, a certain amount of this fear was disbelief that a 
non-white community could inflict so much damage on the British without external 
support. However, in light of the political context of the time, it is not improbable that 
the French could be involved.  
   The archival evidence shows that Balcarres’ fears were not totally unfounded. In 
1795, the Maroons were said to have told the St. James magistrates that they were a free 
people, and would “join the French if they come.”23 This evidence suggests that the 
Maroons were aware of the situation in St. Domingue and that they were willing to use 
it to their advantage. This is the first example of the Maroons being unwilling to tolerate 
the suspicions over their commitment to the British. Whenever accused before, the 
Maroons turned out to defend the island; following the Haitian Revolution, and the 
increased wariness towards them, the Maroons were unwilling to ignore the situation. It 
is unlikely that these words attributed to the Maroons were made up. The man who 
repeated them was James Stewart, one of the advocates of peace with the Maroons in 
the early days of the 1795 hostilities. Stewart would have been unlikely to stir up 
trouble between the Maroons and the colonial government because of his plantation’s 
proximity to the Maroon territory and his prior efforts to maintain peace. 
   Other St. James magistrates also referred to the potential French involvement when 
recounting their actions in the early days of the Second Maroon War. John Tharp was 
concerned that the French were aware of Maroon hostilities because British longboats 
were captured daily by French privateers. He believed that this presented a “fine 
opportunity for the brigands to have excited their favourite plan of universal destruction 
to British property.” They decided it to be “highly proper to temporise with them [the 
Maroons] particularly as their claims were not unreasonable.”24 Tharp, much like 
Stewart, had a lot to lose from a Maroon war. They were both men who spoke out in 
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favour of the Maroons; an unlikely occurrence if the Maroons truly intended to join 
with the French to usurp the British control of the island. As Chapter Two showed, men 
such as these were in close contact with the Maroons so it is likely they would be 
relatively well-informed on events.  
   Immediately after the incident which sparked the hostilities, there was nothing more 
than rumour, and some subsequent Maroon threats, to imply that the French were 
involved in the hostilities. In July 1795, Balcarres referred to emissaries from the 
French being found in Maroon country. He stated that he had traced them and found 
that they had been released from the prison ships and were then “of most dangerous 
description.”25 The Maroons then further inflamed the situation by saying that the 
“French fight the backras on the water; and that now they were fighting on land, backra 
would have enough to.”26 Comments such as this certainly help to explain the 
heightening tensions at the time as the Maroons continued to show their awareness of 
the political situation of the region and their determination to exploit it to their 
advantage. 
   Balcarres seems to have initially remained unconvinced of French involvement. In 
August 1795, he wrote to inform the Duke of Portland of the insurrection among the 
Maroons in Trelawny Town, saying they had been “for some days in a state of 
rebellion.” Balcarres continued that if it was “merely a dispute” with the whites in the 
neighbourhood then measures he had taken against them would “restore quiet.” But if 
the French were at “the bottom” it “becomes infinitely more alarming.”27 It seems 
apparent that Balcarres had no firm evidence to suggest that the French were involved. 
By this point, he had not even established the true cause of the event. 
   Balcarres increasingly suspected the French after information passed to him from a 
Frenchman in Jamaica. He claimed that a man called Monsieur Fanchet communicated 
to him that the French intended to put Jamaica with the other British colonies in the 
same situation as St Domingue.
28
 Balcarres also discussed the trial of a Frenchman in 
which it was stated that the French believed that only some of the Maroons were ready 
for a revolt but the French were sure of the intentions of those Maroons because they 
were in correspondence with a French minister, Fanchet. The examinant of the trial was 
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told by Fanchet that if they were as sure of the whole of the Maroons as they were of 
that part, it would only take two or three thousand men to bring about a revolt.
29
  
   In further letters to Britain, Balcarres elaborated on his fears. In September 1795, he 
wrote that the best hope he had of their “continuing quiet” was the evidence he had 
received saying that the French had only “gained a part of the Maroons.”30 Despite the 
above evidence of Fanchet, it seems that by September Balcarres was still not certain of 
the extent of French involvement. As a result of Maroon comments threatening to join 
with the French he, unsurprisingly, suspected the possibility but he did not seem to have 
been wracked with paranoia as suggested elsewhere. 
   By October 1795, Balcarres finally seemed to have decided that the French were 
involved in the uprising. He wrote in that month that he was sending off “multitudes of 
French people. Every soul, that is capable of bearing arms, all over the island, must be 
shipped off.”31 It is unclear what finally convinced Balcarres that all French people had 
to be removed from the island but it seems that a combination of the continued 
hostilities in Saint Domingue and Maroon remarks regarding the French heightened his 
fears.  
   The impact of the Haitian Revolution is further demonstrated by the type of French 
people that Balcarres had removed. He wrote to the Duke of Portland in 1795 that he 
had “pushed out” of the island over “one thousand of the greatest scoundrels in the 
universe, most of them Frenchmen of colour, and a multitude of French negroes.”32 This 
evidence demonstrates Balcarres’ fear that a repeat of the Haitian Revolution was going 
to occur in Jamaica. Balcarres may have been wary that white Frenchmen were in 
Jamaica to stir up trouble with the Maroons in order to distract the white Jamaicans 
from events occurring in Saint-Domingue but the fact that he was also wary of the 
“coloured” Frenchmen reveals even more. The white colonists already believed that the 
Spanish and Americans had attempted to rouse the Maroons against the white 
Jamaicans. This was a threat but not one taken too seriously. These rumours had never 
resulted in the white Jamaicans removing all non-white people from the Spanish and 
American colonies from the island. The fact that they did so when the situation was 
repeated with the French suggests they were suspicious of the French black population, 
                                                          
29
 The Further Examination of Jean Fort Morensane, 20
th
 August 1795 CO 137/95, NA. 
30
 Balcarres to the Duke of Portland, 29
th
 September 1795, WO 1/92, NA. 
31
 Balcarres to the Duke of Portland, 4
th
 October 1795, WO 1/92, NA. 
32
 Balcarres to the Duke of Portland, 24
th
 October 1795, WO 1/92, NA. 
184 
a direct result of the Haitian Revolution. 
   Perhaps one of the deciding factors for Balcarres was the accusation that the French 
were not alone in supporting the Maroons. He stated that “from America we have 
reports that insurrection and civil commotion were to happen here, long before any such 
thing was suspected in Jamaica.”33 The colonial government seemed to believe that the 
French were all over the island and when any Frenchmen went from Jamaica to 
America, they “repair immediately to the French consul, or minister, and there make a 
declaration of all that has passed in Jamaica, which is transmitted to France.”34 To 
believe that the Maroons, the French and the Americans were acting in collusion would 
have struck British hearts with immeasurable fear.  
   There was even a suggestion that the Americans knew of rebellions before they broke 
out and that there were “mercantile letters from that country pressing for the payment of 
debts because it was there conceived that Jamaica was not likely to remain in a quiet 
state.”35 This would have distressed members of the colonial government immensely 
because it was only a decade after the British had lost thirteen colonies to the Americans 
– they did not want to lose their most valuable colony to them as well. There had 
already been a scare during the American Revolution that the Maroons would cause 
some disturbance.    
   It was during this period that the colonial government re-visited their fears of a 
Maroon-Spanish alliance. Adam Williamson, who had been sent to command the 
expeditionary force in St Domingue following the revolution there, told Balcarres “that 
the Spaniards know very well what is going on in Jamaica.”36 This may have played on 
British minds when they heard the account of a planter called Smith who spoke of a tall 
man among the rebel Maroons. Smith said the man was a Spanish mulatto and 
suggested the possibility of a liaison between inhabitants of Cuba and the Maroons, 
alleging that in the case of an earlier rebel victory the Spaniards in Cuba knew about it 
before Spanish Town.
37
 Of course, it is virtually impossible to prove the existence of 
this man but the fears associated with his existence reveal the extent to which the 
Maroons were intertwined in the circum-Caribbean, in the eyes of the colonists, and the 
suspicions the colonial government had as a result of that, particularly following the 
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outbreak of the Haitian Revolution. 
   Concrete evidence of the impact of the Haitian Revolution on how potential alliances 
between Maroons and external peoples could be viewed is provided by the archival 
records. General Walpole, a man who turned down a ceremonial sword because of the 
subsequent treatment of the Maroons, stated that he was concerned that the Windward 
Maroons “being equally depraved with the Trelawny Maroons, is more to be dreaded 
from the ease with which it could be supported from St Domingo.”38 It was not just 
ideological inspiration that white colonists feared but physical support too. Likewise, 
when the colonial government felt that things were going its way in St Domingue, it 
seemed to fear the Maroons less: “From our great success against the Trelawny 
Maroons, and also from the favourable appearance of revolt in our favour in St 
Domingo, we can have no dread of those Windward Maroons.”39 Balcarres constantly 
linked the fate of St Domingue to the development of the Second Maroon War. He 
believed that “if St Domingue falls, [that] this island may also go. To detain the troops 
is, therefore, impossible, and I must temporize with these Windward Maroons the best 
way I can.”40 The Maroons were inextricably tied up with events in Haiti, as a result of 
white suspicions. 
   After the end of the Second Maroon War, Balcarres faced some harsh criticism for his 
actions. In order to absolve himself of any blame he claimed that he was not responsible 
for the causes of the hostilities. He explicitly stated that the war had its origin in French 
principles and “not its origin in the killing of a pig.”41 Balcarres was right in the latter 
claim. However, it is clear from the evidence shown above that, while always 
suspicious, he was not convinced of French involvement until several months into the 
campaign and even then had little concrete evidence of their participation.   
   Once the war ended, Balcarres needed to defend his stance towards the Trelawny 
Maroons and was determined to prove French involvement by providing evidence from 
a man named Robert Gillespie – reflecting more of an attempt to protect his position 
rather than the actual situation. Gillespie recalled Sonthonax’s apparent conversation 
from three years before in which they had discussed the comparative state of Jamaica 
and St Domingue. Sonthonax agreed that Jamaica had the advantage of tranquillity and 
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an “indisturbed state” but he “hoped and gloried” in the idea that “his children of the 
Blue Mountains” would throw off the “shameful yoke” under which they lived and 
establish “the tree of liberty” on the same basis as their brethren of St Domingue. 
Gillespie claimed that Sonthonax also hinted that there were emissaries working 
towards that desired event.
42
 If true, this evidence suggests that Balcarres’ fears of 
French involvement were totally justified. However, it is rather telling that in the 
plethora of earlier letters he sent to the Duke of Portland regarding the Maroon uprising, 
he never mentioned this evidence. It seems unlikely that such a definitive account of 
French involvement would not be mentioned by Balcarres when trying to garner support 
for his harsh suppression of the Trelawny Maroons.  
   The evidence throughout this section highlights the possibility of the Maroons’ 
awareness of, and involvement with, the outside world before and during the Second 
Maroon War. Their reaction to the end of hostilities enhances the claim that they were 
informed participants in the circum-Caribbean. In 1796, a group of Maroons wrote to 
the colonial government to say that if they were settled on lands in any other parts of 
Britain’s dominions they might again “obtain an opportunity of proving the sincerity of 
their repentance and how anxious they are to prove themselves faithful subjects.”43 The 
wording here suggests that they were taking responsibility for the hostilities; however, 
the interesting point is that they were aware of other regions of the Empire and that they 
wanted to continue to be a part of that Empire. This was reiterated in several letters. In 
1796 Balcarres reported to the British government that these “people are really willing 
to do anything. They are aware of their outcast state and should no country receive 
them, they are perfectly willing to serve his Majesty as soldiers anywhere.”44 This was 
followed by a letter signed by the Maroons themselves in which they said they would: 
Be pleased to settle us in any country under his Majesty’s government and if 
that cannot be affected we humbly offer ourselves to serve his Majesty as 
soldiers in any of his governments to defend and protect the same as 
dutyfull and subjects provided our old men and women, our wives and 
children who are numerous. To receive such protection and support from 
government as enable them to live comfortably.
45
  
This is strong evidence to show that the Maroons were far more involved in the “outside 
world” than previous scholars have given credit. Further, it supports the argument that 
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there was little change in the Maroons’ attitude towards the outside world from the 
peace treaties onwards. It was the Haitian Revolution which changed the world they 
lived in and, therefore, the alliances they could form.  
   All of the evidence above suggests that the Maroons were fully aware of wider events 
in the circum-Caribbean. Initially, the Maroons fought the British alone but when it 
became apparent that there was a stalemate, they may have sought an alliance with the 
Spanish. When this did not work out, and yet more fighting occurred, both the British 
and the Maroons moved to negotiate peace. At the time of the treaties, the evidence 
implies that the Maroons were not concerned who they allied with, as long as they allied 
with a power that guaranteed their freedom. However, little suggests that the Maroons 
were interested in exchanging an alliance with the British for one with another 
European nation once the peace treaties were signed. 
   As the years passed, the Maroons stuck to their treaty obligations. The fragmentary 
references in the records suggest the possibility of individual foreigners interacting with 
the Maroons but the overall evidence implies that there were no sustained alliances with 
foreign nations after the peace treaties. The Maroons were plagued with rumours of 
foreign intervention but continued to turn out in support of the British whenever threats 
to the island were perceived despite suspicions surrounding their actions. In earlier 
years, it is extremely unlikely that the situation would have escalated to the extent that it 
did. But in the context of the Haitian Revolution, and rumours of Maroons seeking 
French assistance, the colonial government, and Balcarres in particular, became fixated 
on French involvement and moved to destroy the Trelawny Town Maroons.  
4.2 Vying for an Alliance: The British and Spanish Approach the Creek Nation 
   The Creeks’ interaction with the “outside world” has, for several reasons, received 
more attention than that of the Maroons. Firstly, the Creek scholarship is more 
developed than the equivalent Maroon scholarship. Secondly, there is an abundance of 
Creek material in the archives that refer to these “foreign” nations. Finally, the 
boundaries of indigenous territory in the United States have long been recognised as the 
meeting point of several empires and it logically follows that the Creeks would have 
interacted with these nations and their empires. Scholars such as Robbie Franklyn 
Ethridge have noted that the Creek country was far from isolated, with constant traffic 
188 
of people through the land.
46
 However, my work differs by highlighting how the Creeks 
were connected to the region’s power politics to the extent that external events such as 
the Haitian Revolution radically altered their history. No other scholar explicitly 
highlights the impact of that revolution on the Creek nation. In particular, this section 
explores the different types of interactions the Creeks had with people from the British 
and Spanish empires, and how these continued in a similar manner in the inter-war 
periods, only changing dramatically with the end of the Haitian Revolution. 
   I will first assess Creek interaction with the outside world from the American 
Revolution onwards, with particular focus on Spain and Britain. The French presence in 
the south-east was effectively ended in 1763 so this relationship is not investigated, 
particularly because Braund has claimed that the Franco-Creek alliance had served 
mainly to irritate the British.
47
 In terms of the British, Braund has shown that, early on 
in the relationship, the British were regulars at Creek square grounds, smoking the 
camulet, drinking the black drink, and patiently enduring the formality of Creek town 
meetings.
48
 This helped to pave the way for the majority of the Creeks to take the 
British side during the American Revolution, in addition to the persuasion of influential 
British men who had lived among them prior to the Revolution.  
   Writing a generation after the war, George Stiggins claimed that the Creeks were 
buoyed up through “pure friendship” to the British because of their kind and friendly 
treatment, but did not know the cause of the disagreement between the British and the 
thirteen colonies.
49
 This, however, is not entirely accurate. The Creeks were aware of 
American reasons for complaint against the British; they had interacted on many 
different levels with colonial and post-colonial society and knew the causes of 
discontent. Claiming that the Creeks knew nothing of the causes of the Revolution both 
reduced them to the contemporary stereotype of ignorant savages and absolved them of 
any responsibility for forming an alliance with the losing side. The fact that Stiggins, of 
Creek descent himself, found it necessary to make this claim hints at the extent to which 
the Creeks transferred their allegiance from the British and sought an alliance with the 
Americans in the decades after the Revolution. By Stiggins’ time, the Haitian 
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Revolution had ended and the need to ally with the Americans became even more 
pressing. Stiggins’ re-writing of history helped this goal. 
   The Creeks’ pro-British leaning was encouraged by the fact that, at the outbreak of the 
American Revolution, the British had sent agents and commissaries to live with or 
periodically visit the Creeks – David Taitt and Lachlan McGillivray for the Upper 
Creeks, Timothy Barnard and William McIntosh for the Lower Creeks. In general, the 
“pure” Creeks supported the British. 50 The Americans and Spanish most often found 
their followers among non-Creeks – including the Hitchitis, Yuchis, Alabamas and 
Tuckabatchees. Followers of the Tame King (Hoboithle Mico) and the Fat King 
(Cussita Mico or Eneah Mico), although in the minority, looked to the Georgians for 
support. The Alabamas and Yuchis turned to the Spanish.
51
 These differing preferences 
demonstrate how complex the Creek world could be and how different nations could 
interact concurrently with the Creek nation; where possible, these differences will be 
investigated in the context of the Creeks’ changing relations with the outside world. 
   Following the end of the American Revolution, the British and Americans signed the 
Treaty of Paris without so much as a mention of the tribes and the British 
controversially gave away many of the Creek lands. Colin G. Calloway states that the 
Indians were “thunderstruck” when they heard this, especially as they had fought 
mainly on the side of the British.
52
 There is no doubt that the Creeks were indeed 
stunned by these actions. However, despite this astonishment, the Creeks continued to 
prefer an alliance with the British until the cataclysmic event of the Haitian Revolution. 
   The immediate continuation of preference towards the British was because, after the 
signing of the Treaty of Paris, Congress believed that in aiding the British the Indians 
had lost any right to lands within American territory and ignored colonial precedent by 
failing to acknowledge any Native American right of soil.
53
 The Americans treated the 
Creeks like a conquered people and, therefore, the majority of Creeks continued to court 
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relationships with the British. Evidence of this continued friendship is shown by the fact 
that, following the American Revolution, many Creeks lamented the withdrawal of their 
“beloved white men,” although he claims that it was the British commissaries and 
agents who had lavished them with presents whose withdrawal the Creeks actually 
bemoaned because the Americans decided not to follow a similar policy.
 54
 However, 
Martin has claimed that British gift-giving had already declined sharply, after the 
French departed the region in 1763.
55
 Therefore, is it likely that the Creeks rued the loss 
of these gift-giving British men if the act had already declined? Was it simply economic 
factors which caused them to “bemoan” their withdrawal?   
   Economic motivations for a continued alliance with the British were certainly present 
following the American Revolution. William Eustis, a Congressman, wrote that it was 
evident that, as long as the Indians traded with Panton’s trading house “or some other 
English trader,” the English would have all the influence with the Indian nations.56 This 
certainly suggests that it was the economic benefits of the relationship with the British 
that made most Creeks attempt to continue their alliance. Eustis went on to claim that 
such a situation would cause the Americans a great deal of damage. He suggested that 
this could only be prevented by a “concession of free and open commerce in this city 
for all the nations.”57 However, despite American endeavours to attract the Creek trade 
to the United States, the Creeks continued to show a preference for the British. Saunt 
argues that the British influence on Creek trade was clear and some Creeks even 
travelled to British colonies, such as the Bahamas, to secure a source of trade.
58
 The 
Americans continued to show concern about this trade relationship between the Creeks 
and the British. Jefferson wrote to Washington in 1790 complaining that Alexander 
McGillivray, with a company of British merchants, enjoyed a monopoly of Creek 
commerce. He lamented that the British had a right to import Creek goods duty free and 
that, as a result, the Creeks were unwilling to enter into a treaty with the Americans.
59
 
This clearly shows that the motivations for continued Creek and British interaction in 
the post-Revolution years were largely economic. The Americans, too, recognised how 
important the issue of trade was and realised the impact upon security.  
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   A further reason for the continued relationship between the British and the Creeks was 
the action of one man: Alexander McGillivray. Throughout the 1780s, many of his 
contemporaries, including Arturo O’Neill, the Governor of Spanish Pensacola, 
considered McGillivray as constantly opposed to the “ambitious pretentions” of the 
Americans and considered him always “greatly inclined toward the British.”60 
According to O’Neill, McGillivray boasted that he was going to carry on commercial 
intercourse with the British, and that he would grant them a port of entry on the coast.
61
 
O’Neill was concerned that, if some incident occurred with England, it would “be best 
to watch him.”62 McGillivray, along with other Creeks, seemed determined to continue 
their relationship with the British and, as a result, continue to trade with them. These 
quotations suggest how personal relationships could influence wider Creek and British 
interactions. Alexander McGillivray had links to the British through his Scottish father, 
Lachlan McGillivray, and continually preferred to trade with them. Frequent mentions 
throughout the archival evidence attest to this preference for the British. O’Neill often 
referred to McGillivray in favourable terms, for example as “my much esteemed friend 
McGillivray” but he also described him as “so British at heart.”63 McGillivray’s 
preference was clearly for the British. 
   It was not just the desirable trade offered to the Creeks by the British that reinforced 
Creek motivations for continuing the relationship and added to American fears: it was 
also the military support that the British could offer. The British still had ties with 
indigenous communities across the United States and British agents were quite capable 
of uniting these nations and providing them with military support. This was a particular 
concern of the Americans and Spanish. In 1790, O’Neill wrote that he continued “to 
fear” that McGillivray intended to reconcile the indigenous inhabitants of the Ohio, 
Cherokee, Cumberland, and Mississippi rivers with the British and their vassals on the 
Lakes.
64
 It was well within the capabilities of the British to support such a plan and it 
was this potential for military assistance which the Creeks also seem to have found 
desirable about continuing relations with the British. 
   O’Brien has gone so as far to claim that individual British traders operating out of the 
Apalachicola area were secretly encouraging Native Americans to make trouble for the 
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Americans and that British officials knew about it yet did nothing to suppress it.
65
 This 
is more than likely; however, it was not just traders who convinced the Creeks that the 
British could support them militarily. William Augustus Bowles, the former British 
soldier who was determined to form a Native American state with himself as King, told 
the Creeks that the British were sending supplies to support the nation in a war with the 
United States, “exciting a clamour” among the Creeks. 66 McGillivray did not want to 
be usurped by Bowles so passed information about him to the Americans, the British 
and the Spanish for his capture. Nevertheless, it is clear that Bowles was influential in 
continuing Creek support for the British. 
   Prior to the upheaval of the Haitian Revolution, the Americans had much to fear from 
this British military assistance to the Creeks. In 1789, several American commissioners 
wrote to the Creek nation reminding them of their offer of friendship. They wrote that, 
although the United States could not “entirely forget” the calamities of the American 
Revolution, the Americans had “buried all resentment” for the Creeks’ part in “that 
bloody scene.” They offered the Creeks military protection and favourable trade 
terms.
67
 The Americans had concluded that those two issues were imperative to 
securing the alliance of the Creeks because they were such a feature of the Creek and 
British relationship. William Panton’s presence meant that the British were still seen as 
the best trading partners by the Creeks. Military assistance was constantly promised and 
British agents often visited the area as a reminder to the Creeks that they were still 
present in the region. But, as stated above, it was the presence of Alexander 
McGillivray which seemed to contribute most to the favourable relationship between 
the British and the Creeks after the American Revolution. 
   However, this relationship did not continue indefinitely. External events affected 
interactions between the British and the Creeks. By the second decade of the nineteenth 
century, the geo-politics of the region had changed so dramatically that the British, 
despite still holding a special position in the Creek nation, no longer commanded the 
same influence. For reasons which will be discussed in detail in the comparative section 
of this chapter, the Americans now held prime position in the fight for Creek alliance.  
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   When war broke out between Britain and the United States in 1812, old discussions 
re-surfaced about which side indigenous communities would take. The chiefs of the 
Lower Creeks told federal officials that they were “unanimously determined to preserve 
the friendship of the United States.” They continued that, even if the British offered 
arms to them, they would endeavour to constrain their young men from accepting them, 
or if they did accept them, from using them against their “friends the United States.” 
The chiefs concluded by saying that they depended for safety “not on arms and 
ammunition but on the friendship of the President; that they are surrounded and have no 
back country to fly to.”68 The final quotation succinctly demonstrates why the Creeks 
now turned towards the Americans in increasing numbers. The Louisiana Purchase of 
1803 which followed the end of the Haitian Revolution had enclosed the Creeks and 
they were now surrounded by American territory, with land hungry settlers eager to 
push through Creek lands to the American territory in the west.
69
 Previously, in times of 
hostility, the Creeks could flee through friendly indigenous communities to relative 
safety towards the Mississippi. The Louisiana Purchase had closed this option. They 
were caught between two vast areas of the United States. 
   The above letter from the Lower Creek chiefs to the federal government is also 
interesting because it highlights how affinities to certain nations could often be split 
down generational lines. The evidence suggests that young Creeks were more in favour 
of the British and that older Creeks preferred the Americans. This supports O’Brien’s 
claim that young warriors felt a sense of rage and helplessness at the destruction of their 
national pride and identity.
70
 This was most likely because of the borderlands violence 
discussed in Chapter Two. As the civilisation policy limited young Creeks’ 
opportunities to prove themselves as warriors, they turned to fighting with the 
encroaching Georgians. Therefore, the young Creeks considered the United States the 
enemy and the British as suppliers of arms and support to fight the enemy. As the 
nineteenth century progressed, and opportunities to prove themselves as warriors 
diminished, the younger generations seemed to increasingly turn towards the British in 
the face of American expansionism. 
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   The British were aware of the turning tide in the region and fought to keep hold of 
their alliance with the Creeks. In 1814, a man who claimed he was a British officer, and 
another man called Tom Perriman, visited one of the Creek kings and “urged him to war 
and to go out with the warriors.”71 This was in keeping with the British policy of stirring 
up the Creeks for their own gain. However, this time the Americans responded with 
their own statement to the Creeks saying that the British talk was “perfectly in character 
with their usual mode of deceiving and using Indians for their own wild projects of 
ambition.” Hawkins asked the Creeks what the British King did for “his red children” 
when the American armies, under Washington, drove the British from this country. He 
answered his own question by stating that the King did not name the Creeks in the 
treaty of peace, and gave away “all the lands of his red children” this side of the 
Mississippi. Hawkins then asked what Washington did for the Creeks saying he made 
the Treaty of New York “with you which saved your country” and implemented the 
plan of civilization. Hawkins reinforced his point by saying that when the British want 
war, they are “your fathers, and give you arms and ammunition for blood.” In times of 
peace, “you are not worth their notice.”72 The Americans were in a stronger position by 
this stage, having eliminated threats such as the Western Confederacy, and could send 
out such powerfully worded statements to the Creeks. In the late eighteenth century, the 
Americans tended towards soft negotiation with the Creeks in order to keep them from 
the British. But by this stage, they were sending letters highlighting how the Creeks 
should be grateful for American support, especially as they claimed the British did not 
support them in the same manner.  
   Records from the years following the outbreak of the War of 1812 are littered with 
examples of the British trying to hold on to Creek support. In 1812, Hawkins wrote to 
William Eustis that there were four British vessels at St. Augustine with “a little of 
everything to help the poor red people,” and the British intended to give it to the 
Creeks.
73
 Joel Martin claimed that instances like this “surprised and peeved” Thomas 
Jefferson that even in 1812 many Creeks were continuing to side with the British rather 
than the Americans, who were aggressively acquiring Creek lands by 1812.
74
 However, 
while the majority of Creeks still preferred the British to the Americans, it was 
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becoming increasingly difficult to resist the Americans. If the British provided military 
assistance, the Creeks would side with them but an increasing number of Creeks 
believed that their future lay with the Americans. When Creek refusal to follow 
American wishes outraged Andrew Jackson, in 1812, he said “the Creeks must be 
punished, and the American frontier protected” because he had no doubt they were 
“urged on by British agents and tools.” Jackson wrote that the sooner the Creeks “can 
be attacked, the less will be their resistance, and the fewer will be the nations or tribes 
that we will have to war with.”75 The Americans were now in a position to eradicate the 
Creeks and used their continued relations with the British as a justification for doing so. 
   The continued presence of the British in Creek territory accelerated the American 
decision to take Creek lands. Andrew Jackson wrote of the Creeks’ “alarming and 
hostile attitude” and was particularly concerned because he had no doubt that the twelve 
whites among the Creeks must be “agents of a foreign nation, exciting the Creeks to 
hostilities against the United States.” This particularly concerned the Americans 
because it reminded them of the “raised scalping knife and tomahawk” used “against 
our defenceless women and children” in the American Revolution.76 The Americans 
may have tolerated the Creek presence in the region for a longer period if the Creeks did 
not seem so insistent on staying allied with the British. 
   The British were not the only regional threat to American supremacy in the years after 
the American Revolution: the Spanish empire also represented a danger. In fact, 
scholars such as Gould and Martin have stated that the most important force that made 
the south-east experience different from other regions in eastern North America was the 
early, powerful, and persistent presence of the Spanish.
77
 Unlike the British, the Spanish 
empire still had holdings in places such as the Floridas which bordered Creek territory, 
and offered an alternative to the alliance offered by the Americans. Most worrying from 
the American point of view was that the Creeks were very much aware of that fact. 
Alexander McGillivray wrote in 1790 that Spain was “the only ally and natural 
protector of the redskins of the south.” He argued this because Spain granted the Creeks 
a trade “equal to all their needs” and free from any tariff. Further, McGillivray claimed 
that Spain had not asked for, and “will never ask” for the cession of an inch of ground. 
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Similar to the alliance with the British, relations with the Spanish seem to have been 
based on economic factors. Caughey claims that the Creeks had always favoured trade 
with the British but, after the American Revolution, England had abandoned her 
“erstwhile enemies” without making any provision for the trade that was so essential to 
them, therefore they had to turn to the Spanish.
78
 While the evidence earlier in this 
section shows that this is not entirely accurate, the Spanish did move to secure the 
formal trade of the Creeks.   
   The move for trade agreements by the Spanish was welcomed by the Creeks. When 
the Creeks had to search for an alternative source of support in the years following the 
Revolution, Alexander McGillivray decided to make enquiries to see if Spanish trade 
and support could be secured. Caughey claims that he preferred the Spanish over the 
Americans because McGillivray’s father, Lachlan, had been persecuted by the 
Americans.
79
 Once again, we see the influence trade and personal relations could have 
on securing the allegiance of the Creeks. These personal preferences often led the 
Creeks to seek security from the Spanish crown. Alexander McGillivray solicited the 
Spanish king’s “gracious protection,” explaining that Britain had been compelled to 
withdraw its security from the Creeks. McGillivray concluded by stating, “We certainly 
as a free nation have a right to choose our protector.”80 At this point, the Spanish 
seemed preferable to the former enemies of the majority of the Creeks – the Americans. 
There is the possibility that McGillivray was simply playing the Spanish off against the 
Americans, as he was known to do. For example, when he threatened the Spanish, 
saying “If the Spanish Governor doesn’t answer our expectations I shall be very sorry 
that I shall be obliged to take the American offers.”81 However, the evidence shows that 
the Creeks did consistently prefer an alliance with either the British or the Spanish so it 
seems more likely that that particular statement was political manoeuvring by 
McGillivray. 
   In fact, there was a mutual desire for a relationship between the Creeks and the 
Spanish, as shown when Zéspedes referred to the “particular merit and the services” of 
Alexander McGillivray when he attached Spain to the Creeks. He wrote of the 
“wellknown good disposition, zeal, and affection,” with which McGillivray has 
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“endeavoured to preserve the friendship of his nation toward Spain.”82 In recognition of 
McGillivray’s services, in 1784, Spain began paying him $600 per year - the same 
amount a Creek hunter might have grossed in 25 years.
83
 The Spanish were determined 
to keep McGillivray, and the rest of the Creek nation, on good terms with them. In 
1788, Miró wrote to Espeleta that whatever happened between the Americans and 
Spaniards, McGillivray would “maintain a position of constancy” at the side of Spain.84 
Despite this, the Spanish continued to be concerned that McGillivray and the Creeks 
would turn to the Americans. McGillivray wrote in 1788 that Miró was convinced that 
the Creeks were going to offer their trade and influence to Georgia. McGillivray 
ridiculed this idea, saying Miró had noticed his “rooted aversion” to those people and it 
was “absurd in him to image it.”85 The fact was Spain needed the Creek nation as allies 
and provided benefits for the Creeks to do so. At a time when the Spanish population of 
East and West Florida was no more than two thousand, the Creek and Seminole 
population numbered around forty thousand people, representing an effective buffer 
against the United States.
86
 
   Caughey argues that McGillivray and the Creeks disliked the Americans because they, 
especially the Georgians, were land hungry, whereas the Spanish priority was to protect the 
land they already owned in North America by strengthening the Native Americans as buffer 
provinces against the United States.
87
 This is indeed a fair assertion – earlier chapters of this 
thesis have demonstrated the land hunger of local settlers in Georgia. Of course, the Spanish 
were not averse to gaining land but they much preferred consolidating their existing 
holdings rather than aggressively pursuing more. The Spanish did officially assure the 
Creeks that they would not take their lands. In a treaty between the Creeks and Spain, the 
Spanish agreed not to extract from the Indian nations any lands to form settlements to the 
“injury of the properties of those who enjoy them now.”88 This was signed by Estevan 
Miró, Arturo O’Neill, Martin Navarro and Alexander McGillivray. Given this statement, it 
is hardly surprising that the Creeks would pursue an alliance with the Spanish, especially as 
the years progressed and Georgian land hunger grew. 
   However, some archival evidence does dispute Caughey’s claim that the Creeks 
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favoured the Spanish. For example, an excerpt in a magazine stated that, if the Creeks 
encountered American men in their territory, they would be detained as prisoners, but 
Spaniards would be “treated as the negroes until they are restored, and are obliged to 
work in the field.”89 This implies American prisoners were treated more humanely than 
their Spanish counterparts and contradicts the idea that the Creeks unanimously 
supported the Spanish over their American counterparts. Treatment of prisoners may 
have been determined by which Creek tribe captured them; as stated earlier, tribes such 
as the Alabamas and Yuchis showed a preference to the Spanish – presumably because 
of their proximity to Spanish settlements.   
   In a situation reminiscent of that with the British, the Americans realised that they 
needed to do something to respond to the Creek alliance with the Spanish. They decided 
that favourable trade for the Creeks was again the issue to focus upon. Shortly after the 
Revolution, in 1788, the Americans opened their ports for the import and export of 
Native American goods free of any duty, fee or reward - either on imports or exports. 
Zéspedes wrote that if the same thing was not done by Spain, the “whole trade and 
influence of these nations will revert back to the Georgians.”90 The Creeks agreed to 
trade with the Americans and McGillivray was accused by the Spanish of admitting 
unqualified American sovereignty and to have arranged a definite commercial treaty 
with the United States.
91
 
   However, McGillivray’s actions did not involve outright support for the Americans. 
Rather, he was using them as leverage with the Spanish as he had with the Spanish 
earlier. In 1784, he had been officially negotiating with the Americans over a “large part 
of the Indian’s hunting lands” that they intended to settle upon. He warned them that the 
Creeks were in alliance with, and under the protection of, Spain “who will of course 
interpose his support on behalf of the Indians and their lands.”92 McGillivray was fully 
aware of his bargaining chip in such negotiations – his ties with Spain - and, once again, 
used this as a veiled threat to the Americans. In subsequent negotiations, with the 
Americans in mind, the Spaniards began to court McGillivray and the Creeks by 
offering greater advantages to them, and by granting larger emoluments to McGillivray. 
In April, Miró announced McGillivray’s salary was to be increased from $600 to $2000 
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a year. Nevertheless, the Americans responded in kind and later in the summer a 
lieutenant arrived from New York with $2900 in gold, the balance of the first annual 
instalment the United States promised to McGillivray, the interpreters, six principal 
chiefs, and the nation.  
   Alexander McGillivray’s experiences with the Spanish and the Americans are a prime 
example of how the Creeks tried to negotiate their way in a fast-changing world. Theda 
Perdue claims that the political skills needed by native leaders changed dramatically at 
the end of the eighteenth century. She writes that there was “play-off diplomacy” but 
that only Spain and the United States were left to play off against each other. American 
expansion was of particular concern to both the Creeks and Spanish, both the legally 
sanctioned extension of the frontier through the purchase of Indian land and the illegal 
encroachments on tribal domains by white hunters, traders, and settlers.
93
 Whilst there is 
no doubt that American expansionism signalled the growth of a new power in the 
region, it did not prevent the Creeks from recognising the importance of negotiating 
with both the Spanish and British as well. O’Brien maintains that the situation became 
more precarious in 1800 when Spain transferred the vast Louisiana territory to the 
French who posed a far stronger military threat by this point.
94
 However, it was the 
subsequent transfer of the territory to the United States which really threatened the 
Creek Nation. 
   The evidence has shown that the Creeks preferred an alliance with the British rather 
than with the Americans, particularly in the McGillivray years. Perhaps this was 
because the British had lost their landholdings and did not pose as much of a threat as 
the United States. Their second preference was for Spain — a country that still held its 
American empire but showed little inclination for expansion at this time. McGillivray 
was a shrewd man, though, and never cut all his ties with the Americans, despite 
seeming sceptical that the United States would endure as a nation. Caughey claims that 
McGillivray had little confidence in the republican form of government and favoured 
the “tested monarchical type” – Britain or Spain.95 The archival evidence certainly 
supports this assertion.  In 1784, McGillivray wrote to Miró that the protection of a 
“great Monarchy is to be preferred to that of a distracted Republic.”96 The importance of 
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a monarch was stressed again in 1796. One Creek delegation wrote “we know that the 
Spanish have a king, but that America has none.”97 All this evidence shows that many 
Creeks held a distinct preference for the monarchical empires of Britain and Spain.       
   A more nuanced reason for the seemingly contradictory actions of the Creeks is 
provided by Alexander McGillivray who wrote that as a free nation the Creeks had a 
right to choose and enter into “alliance and friendship” with any power that would be 
“most agreeable to us.”98 It is inevitable that at different times, under different 
circumstances, the preferred nation would change. The archival evidence suggests that 
this was consistently Britain, with Spain also favoured, but that external events caused 
the Creeks to realise the direction in which the region was heading so chose to 
accommodate the Americans as well. Trade and personal relations were not the only 
reasons the Creeks allied with the Spanish. The Spanish, like the British, consistently 
supplied the Creeks with arms and ammunition.
99
  
   As time passed, and the Creeks were aware that alliances with European powers were 
failing, the Creeks increasingly saw the benefits of keeping out of battles between 
Europeans. One Creek wrote that the chiefs of different towns were to meet to “agree 
with each other,” not to take up arms against either the British or Americans, but to “let 
the two brothers fight their own battles. We will be friends with each, when they come 
among us to trade.” 100 This demonstrates, perhaps more than any other quotation, that 
the Creeks’ main preference was for the nation that could provide them with the best 
trade and, thus, the best way to sustain their lifestyle. It seems that they preferred the 
British or Spanish because they were familiar with those nations and understood their 
form of government far more than the republican style of the newly formed United 
States. Further, the British and the Spanish had not stripped the Creeks of their land to 
the extent that the Americans did – not necessarily out of respect for Creek rights but 
because their focus lay elsewhere. If the Americans had pursued a different policy with 
the Creeks, there may have been more scope for support for them from the Creeks. 
Ultimately, neither the Spanish nor the British could capitalise on the Creeks’ 
preference for a monarchical regime and the Americans were left to take the vast 
majority of the Creek lands following the war of 1813.  
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4.3 Courting a Foreign Alliance: The Maroons and Creeks Compared 
   The above two sections show how both the Maroons and Creeks could participate in 
the world outside the immediate regions in which they lived. Previous scholarship on 
the Creeks has outlined how Creeks forged relationships with people of several 
countries other than the United States; therefore, the Creek section in this thesis has 
focused on how these interactions developed and changed throughout the period under 
study. The evidence shows that similar interactions continued from the end of the 
American Revolution until the early nineteenth century. The American Revolution 
introduced another dimension to the region, the creation of the United States, but, 
overall, the Creeks continued to trade and meet with the British and Spanish while 
trying to negotiate with the Americans. Ultimately, circumstances led to significant 
changes in Creek history but these were a result of external situations rather than an 
inherent Creek desire to replace a British alliance with an American one. I have shown 
that the main catalyst for change was the Haitian Revolution. This was because, in one 
stroke, it weakened several European nations present in the region and, indirectly, 
strengthened the United States.    
   In contrast, the previous scholarship on the Maroons has been largely silent on the 
subject of Maroon interactions outside the setting of colonial Jamaica. In order to 
overcome this silence, the Maroon section above outlined the many foreign people with 
whom the Maroons allegedly interacted and the contexts in which those interactions 
took place. I demonstrated that the Maroons may have continued to interact with 
external communities in a similar way as before the First Maroon War. Ever since their 
creation as a community the Maroons had allied with Europeans and this did not change 
following the end of the war. The main thing that changed was the European nation 
with which they allied; that is, they were initially allied with the Spanish but 
subsequently transferred their allegiance to the British. Rumours of potential non-
British supporting Maroons were present before 1791 but there was no sustained 
suspicion of their interactions with external empires until after the Haitian Revolution. 
Suspicion of the Maroons, unsurprisingly, exploded exponentially when the Second 
Maroon War broke out. Earlier rumours could be tolerated because the Maroons 
consistently turned out in support of the British against their foreign enemies. However, 
the Haitian Revolution made the white population of Jamaica think differently. Free 
blacks in Saint-Domingue had often supported the white population yet all-out war 
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eventually raged between all sectors of Haitian society.
101
 In contrast to the effect on the 
Creeks, when the first years of the Haitian Revolution had little impact, the initial years 
of the war were enough to impact upon the Maroons. The sheer scale of death and 
destruction suffered by the white population during the Haitian Revolution was enough 
to increase the colonial government’s belief that the Maroons’ power had to be reduced. 
   The above two sections, then, have shown that both the Maroons and the Creeks 
changed little when it came to interacting with foreign nations until the Haitian 
Revolution. However, prior to the Haitian Revolution, there were differences in these 
communities’ interactions with the outside world. For example, from the archival 
records, the Maroons rarely had any concrete interaction with foreigners but tended to 
be the subject of white fear about potential collaborations with whichever country  
Britain was at war with at the time; for example, the rumours in the 1770s of Maroon 
involvement with the Americans. In contrast, the Creeks continued to physically meet 
with various European nations, sign treaties with them, and trade with them. It is now 
necessary to compare how and why differences such as these occurred.  
   The first theme to analyse is the Maroons’ and Creeks’ interactions with the Spanish 
empire. As the earlier sections showed, both the Maroons and Creeks had prolonged 
exchanges with the Spanish empire during the period under study, a continuation of 
their practices from before the inter-war periods. The Creeks’ relationship with the 
Spanish was more amicable than their relationship with the United States. The main 
features of the Creek-Spanish relationship were trade and protection of land. The Creeks 
had always traded with Spain but there was more importance attached to this particular 
trade following the American Revolution because they offered an alternative to the 
unfavourable Americans.
102
 The Creeks had always shown a preference, 
understandably, for favouring those nations who would respect their boundaries. 
Further, the Spanish still held territory in the Floridas and along the coast, meaning they 
could provide the Creeks with access to ports for their trade. 
   In contrast, the Maroons do not seem to have placed much emphasis on an alliance 
with the Spanish in the inter-war period. Indeed, their rumoured interactions in 1790s 
may have been nothing more than the fears of white colonists. Their initial relationship 
with the Spanish, before the First Maroon War, had been based on military protection 
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and little else. Once that military protection was withdrawn, and not re-offered in the 
early eighteenth century when the Maroons requested it prior to the peace treaties, then 
the Maroons did little to continue relations with the Spanish. Here, we begin to see the 
differences between the Maroons and the Creeks and the external help that they sought. 
The Creeks seemed to require military assistance and trade options in order to exist as a 
community whereas the Maroons apparently required military assistance but survived 
on subsistence-based agriculture rather than trade. The Spanish could not provide the 
same effective alliance as the British could, so the Maroons committed to their alliance 
with the British. In contrast, several nations had the potential to offer the Creeks what 
they desired. That the Americans chose not to do so pushed them into the arms of 
nations such as the Spanish.   
   The Haitian Revolution affected both the Maroon and Creek relationship with the 
Spanish, albeit in different ways. The Maroons once again found themselves under 
suspicion of potential collaboration with little real evidence of actual interaction and the 
Creeks suddenly found their position untenable. The transfer of the Louisiana Territory 
following the Haitian Revolution to the United States represented both a strengthening 
of the United States and a weakening of Spain. The Spanish could no longer offer them 
trade terms on the same level as the Americans could. Furthermore, the Spanish could 
no longer protect the Creek territories in the face of such American expansionism. The 
Creeks were forced to seek an alliance with the Americans to preserve as much land as 
possible. 
   The Creek relationship with the Spanish disintegrated until the Creek War of 1813 
because of the impact of the Haitian Revolution. The same could not be said for the 
Maroons. The main effect of the Haitian Revolution was on the suspicions of white 
Jamaicans regarding the Maroons. Rumours abounded that the Spanish had been sighted 
in Maroon territory and the Maroons were made to round up all Spanish vagrants and 
remove them from the island. In contrast to the Creeks, the Maroons did not seem to 
change their behaviour — they followed their orders and continued to ally with the 
British. It was the colonial government that changed its behaviour towards the Maroons. 
   What explains this difference between the Maroons and Creeks? Both had ties to the 
Spanish yet only the Creeks chose to maintain those ties. The answer lies partly in the 
regions in which the Maroons and Creeks lived. The Maroons shared Jamaica with the 
British and an alliance with the Spanish jeopardised this relationship because a Spaniard 
204 
on the island was a threat to the British. Furthermore, the Maroons’ treaties specified 
that they defend the island against external threats. There was no similar obligation for 
the Creeks. The Creeks lived in borderland territory so it was hard for anyone to police 
their land. A Spaniard in the region had just as much right to be there as an American. 
The Maroons had little choice but to end their relations with the Spanish in order to 
honour their treaty. In contrast, the United States was too weak immediately after the 
American Revolution to prevent the Creeks from continuing their alliance with the 
Spanish.  
   Overall, the difference between the Maroon relationship with the Spanish and the 
Creek relationship with them was what the Spanish could offer. Trade with the Maroons 
was virtually impossible for the Spanish but was enshrined in treaty with the Creeks. 
Military protection would have been difficult to provide for the Maroons but was quite 
feasible for the Creeks. The only thing the Spanish could offer both communities was 
relationships based on personal experiences. The Spanish had offered assistance to the 
Creeks throughout their history and this was reflected in their many treaties with the 
Creeks.
103
 The Spanish had fought alongside the Maroons and the Maroons may have 
remembered that, hence their letters to Spanish governors early in the eighteenth 
century. However, ultimately, this was not enough to secure the alliance of the 
Maroons. The initial interest in allying with the Spanish, and the subsequent move away 
from them, reveals the waning influence of the Spanish empire in the region. By the 
nineteenth century, the Spanish no longer represented a threat to the United States or to 
Jamaica so the Maroons’ and Creeks’ search for military assistance increasingly turned 
to the British and Americans, respectively.  
   These variations show the different concerns facing free communities living in a 
borderland region rather than an enclosed area of an island. No community that had 
interests in what is present-day Georgia and Alabama was strong enough to protect 
itself against all potential enemies. Security came in the form of numerous alliances and 
trying to keep all parties placated. The Creeks courted an alliance with the Spanish, and 
vice versa, because both could provide trade and military protection to one another. 
Therefore, the Maroon and Creek interactions with the Spanish demonstrate the extent 
of choice that free communities continued to enjoy even after signing peace treaties 
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with white governments. The Maroons chose to commit to the British whilst the Creeks 
chose to keep their options open in the context of their occupation of borderlands 
territory.  
   Both the Maroons and Creeks were also suspected of interactions with a secondary 
nation in the inter-war periods – the Maroons with the French and the Creeks with the 
British. These two nations are compared because each represented the biggest threat to 
the societies with which the Maroons and Creeks had the most interactions. The British 
in Jamaica were most threatened by the Spanish in the early eighteenth century, a fact 
which manifested itself in the early fears of Maroon collusion with the Spanish. 
However, as the eighteenth century wore on, it was the French who became the main 
concern of the British. This was primarily because France was a strong force in the 
Caribbean, and, subsequently, because of the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution. In 
contrast, the British represented the biggest threat to the United States because of the 
Creek preference for that nation and their military might, so the Americans were 
increasingly wary of British interactions with the Creeks.  
   The main difference between the Maroon relationship with the French and the Creek 
relationship with the British was that there is little evidence to suggest the Maroon 
relationship was anything but the product of white Jamaican fears. In contrast, the 
British had very real ties to the Creeks, going back decades and built on former 
alliances, trade, and personal relationships. The Americans were justifiably wary of the 
British because Britain had the military might to threaten the newly formed republic and 
continued to interact with the Creeks. The French had the military might to support the 
Maroons but at no point were the Maroons interested in that type of support. The only 
mentions of Maroon interactions with French people were either rumour or the Maroons 
using potential alliance with the French as a threat. 
   The differences come down to the fact that the French, much like the Spanish, could 
not offer anything more than the Maroons already had whereas the British could offer 
the Creeks a more suitable alliance than that with the Americans. The Maroons had the 
autonomy they wanted and, until the Haitian Revolution, there were few restrictions 
placed on them that they had not agreed to in the treaty. Further, when planter power 
was at its height in Jamaica, following the defeat of the French in the Seven Years´ 
War, it made sense for the Maroons to ally with such a formidable country rather than 
the weakened France. In contrast, the Americans were intent on expanding their 
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territory at the expense of the Creeks. The British were not interested in doing the same 
and, during colonial times, left the Creeks much to their own lifestyles as long as trade 
continue. The 1763 Proclamation, which limited expansion to a line along the 
Appalachian Mountains, also encouraged Native Americans to pursue an alliance with 
the British.
104
  
   The geographic locations of these two communities affected their relationships with 
foreign nations. The Maroons, being surrounded on all sides by the British and having 
received the freedom they coveted, seemed to have had little desire or opportunity to 
form any sustained alliances with foreign nations. Once this alliance had flourished, the 
Trelawny Maroons even requested that they be settled in some other part of the British 
Empire if they could not stay in Jamaica. In contrast, the Creeks benefited from being 
situated on borderland territory. Creeks could choose to trade with British firms in 
Spanish territory, like William Panton’s, and export through ports on the Gulf Coast, or 
with American firms and do their business through Atlantic ports such as Savannah. 
The Creeks had more interactions with different nations purely because of their 
location. Several nations could fulfil Creek desires but the personal links to Britain, 
through men such as Lachlan McGillivray, ensured the Creeks’ preference for a British 
alliance. 
   What impact did the Haitian Revolution have on these particular relationships? For 
the Maroons, the impact of their supposed interactions with the French was immense. 
The Revolution was the major reason that they were plagued by rumours of French 
collusion. The British were terrified that the French would instigate an uprising of the 
Maroons in Jamaica in order to distract the British from their actions in Saint-
Domingue. Their fears were based on several comments by the Maroons and the 
feasibility of the French provoking something for their own gain. For the Creek 
relationship with the British, the impact was more indirect. The end of the Haitian 
Revolution sparked the sale of the Louisiana Territory and the end of the French empire 
in the region. That left the British as the only true opposition to American power. The 
Americans were now gaining enough strength to threaten the rest of the British colonies 
in North America. The British tried to prevent this from happening by attempting to 
form stronger allegiances with the Creeks and to stir them up against the Americans. 
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This had a certain amount of success but some Creeks were moving towards the 
Americans in increasing numbers. This split between pro-British Creeks and pro-
American Creeks was one of the primary reasons for the outbreak of the Creek War of 
1813.
105
  
   More indirect, but just as important, was the psychological impact of the Haitian 
Revolution on the Creeks. Much like the Maroons, the Haitian Revolution increased 
tensions across the region regardless of whether there was any firm evidence of 
collusion between a group and fighters in Haiti. The Americans saw what could happen 
in an area with many competing powers during a revolution. The island of Hispaniola 
consisted of the Spanish in the east of the island, the French in the west, and the British 
lurking ready to take advantage if the opportunity arose. Added into this European 
power struggle was the split between grand blancs and petit blancs, the Haitian Maroons 
and the vast enslaved population. It was a situation very similar to that in the United 
States. The tensions between whites in states such as Georgia and whites in the federal 
government replicated the relationship between the grand blancs and the petit blancs in 
many ways. The Haitian Maroons were a semi-autonomous society in the midst of the 
borderlands territory – much like the Creeks. There were also several competing 
European nations who had to conduct their activities in the presence of a large, enslaved 
population. This meant that the United States actually had more in common with Haiti 
than Jamaica did, meaning the Haitian Revolution served as a dangerous warning to the 
United States. 
   The situation in Jamaica is representative of the benefits that can be gained from being 
a free community on an island colonised by only one European power. With the 
reduction of French power in the region and the removal of the largest Maroon town, 
the colonial government felt the threat had been dealt with satisfactorily and allowed the 
other Maroon towns to remain. If those Maroons had lived in a borderlands context, it is 
likely that the colonial government would have advocated their removal from the island 
as well. Living on the borderlands provided opportunities for alliances but it also 
suffered the risk of one country acquiring all of the lands bordering a certain 
community, as the United States did, and hemming that community in until removal or 
extermination were the only remaining options. In contrast, in Jamaica, the removal of 
the largest town of a community set an example to the rest making further removals 
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unnecessary.  
   Overall, the comparative section of this chapter has shown how the presence of 
Maroons and Creeks had an impact on those beyond the limits of Jamaica and the 
United States. Previous scholarship has addressed this to a certain extent with the 
Creeks but not with the Maroons. One of the most interesting similarities revealed by 
the comparison is that an alliance with the British was the preferred choice of both the 
Maroons and the Creeks in the inter-war periods. The British had given Creek lands 
away in the Treaty of Paris and had increasingly restricted the freedom of the Maroons 
and fought against them in the Second Maroon War, yet the Maroons and Creeks still 
wanted to be part of their empire. However, in other ways it is unsurprising that both 
communities showed a preference for a British alliance. The British had granted the 
Maroons their freedom in the peace treaties and, at least initially, had little influence on 
their internal dynamics so there was no need to seek an alternative alliance. In the 
United States, the alternative to the British for the Creeks was an alliance with the 
increasingly weak Spanish nation in North America or the Americans who continued to 
move towards a policy of mass land acquisition. Directly or indirectly the Americans 
wanted to change the Creek way of life whereas the British did not. Despite this, the 
Creeks were not forced into this choice by the decisions of other nations. It was unclear 
after the American Revolution whether the federal government would attempt to expand 
their lands into Creek territory, or even if it would be able to, yet the Creeks still 
showed a preference for an alliance with the British.  
   A further reason for the preference for the British was the geography of both 
communities. The Maroons, with their territory in the heart of Jamaican society, were 
the biggest threat to the stability of the island so, as a result, were treated cautiously, and 
sometimes even amicably, by the British. In contrast, the Creeks did represent a threat 
to the stability of the United States but, with their position in contested borderlands, 
they were one of many nations which could threaten the newly formed United States. 
This meant that the British had to appease the Maroons more than the Americans had to 
appease the Creeks. An alliance with the Creeks was always preferable to being at war 
with them but the federal government had several other threats facing them and 
potential alliances with other indigenous communities rendered a union with the Creeks 
non-essential. The British presence in the south-eastern United States, representing a 
threat to the United States, meant the Creeks could follow the policy of “my enemy’s 
enemy is my friend.” In addition to this, the Creeks had fought alongside the British in 
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the American Revolution so there was substance to concerns about a potential alliance. 
However, the main reason for the Maroons and Creeks preferring an alliance with the 
British boiled down to land. The British did not want the Maroon land because their 
allegiance was more valued than their lands. Likewise, the British prized trade over land 
in North America so did not attempt to push the Creeks from their lands like the 
Americans did. This meant that both communities continued to favour the British over 
all other options.  
   This section has explicitly demonstrated that free communities were intertwined in the 
fate of the circum-Caribbean. Furthermore, it has shown that it was often the European 
nations who courted an alliance with free communities to bolster their positions in the 
region. The alliances of these communities in the circum-Caribbean were dictated by 
what they offered other nations. The Maroons provided stability and a fighting force 
equalled by no other; their role was not defined by the colour of their skin but by their 
effect on Jamaica. The Creeks represented a trade option for many nations and, most 
importantly to the Americans, they held vast quantities of fertile land. Their role was 
determined by their position in the region and, secondly, their landholdings. Both 
communities determined their own preferences for alliance with other nations but, 
ultimately, it was an external event, the Haitian Revolution that had the most influence 
on the trajectory of their history.
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Conclusion 
   For both the Maroons and Creeks, their decision to make peace with the British and 
Americans proved to be catastrophic. Their allegiance allowed Jamaica and the United 
States to grow economically, to unite divided societies, and to advance the system of 
slavery. This enabled Jamaica and the United States, respectively, to transform from 
under-developed territories to formidable powers in the region. The subsequent refusal 
of the Maroons and Creeks to bow to the demands of the whites, especially in light of 
external events such as the Haitian Revolution, led to both governments moving to 
destroy the power of free communities such as theirs.  
   In Jamaica, an eight-month conflict broke out in 1795 between the Trelawny Town 
Maroons and the colonial government. The war was sparked by the flogging of two 
Maroons by a black slave for stealing two hogs but the origins were more associated 
with the increasing restrictions placed on Maroon freedom and the Maroons’ growing 
resentment of those laws. Rumours tore through white society that the Maroons were 
arming themselves in retaliation and when six Maroon leaders went to the British to 
present their grievances, they were taken prisoner which triggered the Second Maroon 
War. The war itself initially seemed destined to end in a stalemate. The British troops 
outnumbered the Maroons ten to one but the Maroons relied on their knowledge of the 
topography of Jamaica and their martial skills, honed by decades of hunting slave 
runaways, to resist the British. The turning point was the introduction of one hundred 
bloodhounds and their handlers from Cuba, forcing the Maroons to surrender and sue 
for peace.  
   However, it was the aftermath of the war which shocked the Maroons and those 
planters who continued to support them. A treaty was put forward by the colonial 
government which required the Maroons to beg for forgiveness on their knees, return all 
runaway slaves, and be relocated elsewhere in Jamaica. The most devious part of the 
proposal was that the colonial government only gave the Maroons three days to turn 
themselves in, an impossible feat given the Maroons’ location. The colonial government 
then used their lack of surrender as a pretext for deporting the Trelawny Maroons. The 
Trelawnys were invited to a friendship feast with representatives of the government 
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where the Maroons were thrown into chains, boarded on ships and sent from the island.
1
 
Thus, the Trelawny Town Maroons, the largest and most influential of the Maroon 
towns, ceased to exist in Jamaica. 
   In the United States, a more complicated military encounter took place between the 
Creeks and the federal government. War had broken out between Britain and the United 
States in 1812 and it was against this backdrop that an internal Creek conflict grew into 
the Creek War of 1813. Initially, the fighting was between the Redsticks, those Creeks 
committed to a traditional lifestyle, and Creeks loyal to the United States who had taken 
to Hawkins’ civilisation plan. However, when an American militia group attacked a 
band of Redsticks returning from Pensacola with arms and ammunition, it resulted in 
all-out war between the Redsticks and the United States. The fighting raged on with 
more and more militia groups becoming involved until the Battle of Horseshoe Bend in 
which Andrew Jackson broke the military might of the Creeks with his superior number 
of men and weapons.
2
  
   The outcomes of the war stunned the Creeks. The majority of the Redsticks had fled 
to Spanish Pensacola where they continued their fight against the United States on the 
side of the British in the War of 1812. The rest of the nation was forced to sign the 
Treaty of Fort Jackson, which compelled the Creeks to cede 21,086,793 acres – half of 
present-day Alabama and parts of Georgia – to the United States.3 The treaty made no 
distinction between the Creek allies of the United States, belonging to largely Lower 
Creek towns, and the Redsticks who had fought against the federal government. The 
effects of this were devastating and set in motion the events leading to the removal of 
all Creeks from the south-east during the Trail of Tears.  
   Thus, both the Maroons and the Creeks ultimately suffered a similar fate. However, 
this was not a fate determined solely by the white governments but was more as a result 
of key decisions made by the Maroons and Creeks throughout the time period under 
study. The most damaging decision for both communities was choosing to make peace 
with their respective governments. For the Maroons, peace brought freedom, both from 
slavery and from decades of fighting. For the Creeks, it established reciprocal trade 
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agreements and annuities bestowed on the Nation. However, the darker side of peace 
was that these communities were turned into slave-hunters and were gradually drawn 
deeper into slave society. Both the Maroons and Creeks had formed complex 
relationships with slaves before the treaties but this new context into which those 
relationships were thrust changed the course of their history. It mattered little that 
throughout their shared history with the enslaved population there had always been 
animosity, and also times of alliance, because their participation in hunting runaways 
was a propaganda victory for white society. The result was that Maroons and Creeks 
could now be portrayed as the supporters of slavery and, on a more practical level, 
actively involved in suppressing slave rebellions and hunting runaways. 
   Hunting runaways brought stability to the regions, meaning that the white 
communities of Jamaica and the south-eastern United States could flourish, especially 
after the Seven Years´ War and the defeat of the Western Confederacy. These actions 
were enough to form a bond of mutual respect between the Maroons and Jamaican 
white settlers but, in the United States, the relationship between white settlers and 
Creeks was largely characterised by borderlands warfare because the Creeks refused to 
relinquish their lands, or their way of life, which hindered the alliance. Both Jamaica 
and the United States had an abundance of uncultivated land; the difference was that the 
Creeks held desirable land whereas the Maroons did not.  
   The attitudes of the local whites towards the Maroons and Creeks led to a split in both 
white societies. In Jamaica, many local whites advocated lenient treatment of the 
Maroons whereas the colonial government aimed to restrict their freedom and, thus, 
force them to relinquish their Maroon status. In contrast, the federal government was 
often more accommodating towards the Creeks than the local whites were. The federal 
government could not afford, either economically or politically, to strip the Creeks of 
their lands. The end of the Western Confederacy changed this and enabled the United 
States to establish their military might. As time passed, the federal government could 
not ignore the growing clamour in the South and moved to keep the Union together at 
all costs and, hence, changed their policy towards land acquisition. 
    Above all else the governments desired stability to mend their fractured societies. The 
Maroons and Creeks chose to contribute to this stability, predominantly through hunting 
runaways but also through the suppression of internal and external threats (by the 
Maroons) and through trade (for the Creeks). Most notably, both the Maroons and 
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Creeks chose not to go to war with white society during the early years of the inter-war 
periods. As time passed, the stability that both communities provided ensured that white 
society could progress and consolidate their strengths. External events, such as the end 
of the Seven Years´ War and the defeat of the Western Confederacy, convinced the 
governments of their superiority over the free communities. It was at this point that the 
origins of the Second Maroon War and the Creek War of 1813 began to emerge. Once 
the governments were strong enough to implement their policies, the only choice left for 
the Maroons and Creeks to defend their way of life was war and both communities 
chose this path rather than submit.  
   The event which finally resulted in the governments moving to reduce the influence of 
the Maroons and Creeks was ultimately an external one – the Haitian Revolution. As 
Chapter Four showed, both communities had links with several nations and it was these 
very associations which made their presence as free communities untenable. If the 
Maroons had agreed to relinquish their unique identity and live as free blacks in urban 
areas, or the Creeks had accepted the terms of the civilisation plan and dispersed to live 
as farmers, then these contacts with other countries may not have concerned the white 
governments. However, because the Maroons and Creeks chose to continue practising 
their traditional lifestyles, as fully formed communities, both governments became wary 
of their existence. As individuals, the Maroons and Creeks did not threaten white 
society, but, as semi-autonomous nations, the presence of both communities threatened 
the very existence of whites in the region.  
   The paths that the Maroons and Creeks followed were strikingly similar in the inter-
war period. The Creeks signed peace treaties whose clauses reflected those signed 
earlier by the Maroons. Both made informed decisions on their interactions with slaves, 
whites, governments, and foreign nations. The parallel trajectories of the Maroons and 
Creeks were not determined by whether they were African or Native American, black or 
indigenous, but by their status as free, semi-autonomous communities with corporate 
identities.  
   As shown throughout this thesis, there were also several notable differences between 
the Maroons and Creeks. For example: Maroons often enjoyed more amicable 
interactions with local whites, whereas Creeks tended to have a more favourable 
relationship with the federal government, and the Maroons’ contacts outside Jamaica 
were only suspected by the colonial government rather than being clearly evident as in 
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the Creek case. However, the greatest difference was the type of borderlands that the 
communities live in. The Maroons were a free community on an island surrounded only 
by the British whereas the Creeks were situated at the meeting point of several strong 
empires and indigenous nations. It was these issues that became the determining factors 
in their fates.  
   In Jamaica, the local whites and Maroons were thrust together in the face of the 
perceived threat of the enslaved population and chose to ally because they served one 
another’s needs. However, the colonial government continued to be wary of the 
Maroons because of their location in the very midst of the island. This led to the 
increasingly hostile stance towards the Maroons from the 1760s onwards when their 
suspected interactions with slaves and foreigners came under ever increasing scrutiny. It 
was in this period that the Seven Years´ War concluded and England emerged as the 
world´s foremost colonial power, enabling it to challenge the position of the Maroons. 
In the United States, both the Creeks and the local whites had several options for 
alternative alliances, so there was little incentive to resolve the ongoing borderland 
violence. The federal government also showed little inclination towards quelling the 
fighting because it did not want the Creek nation as an ally after the defeat of the 
Western Confederacy and the Union had strengthened enough to focus on westward 
expansion. By the time of the Louisiana Purchase, the Creeks had become an obstacle to 
the growth of the United States. 
   The emphasis on investigating the type of borderlands that developed in different 
countries and regions has an impact on the wider historiography of free communities in 
the Americas. Previous work has expertly demonstrated the role of society in 
determining the treatment of an external group but has not explicitly highlighted the link 
between the geography of a region and the subsequent actions of that society.
4
 This is 
an approach which can be beneficially utilised for any type of community. The 
historiography on other colonies which had a Maroon presence changes in light of my 
research. For example, historical investigation into the Surinamese Maroons can be 
broadened by the understanding that those Maroons lived within a region surrounded by 
several different empires.
5
 Further, the Dutch and British governments were almost 
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continuously at war and the colony changed hands several times. Using the conclusions 
in this thesis, the presence of two European empires implies that the Surinamese 
Maroons held significant power because they had more opportunity to play empires off 
against each other, as the Creeks did in the United States. Likewise, the historiography 
of Haitian Maroons could be enriched by considering their location on an island, like 
Jamaica, rather than a borderlands context.
6
 However, the island of Hispaniola was 
colonised by two European empires — the French and Spanish — so the Haitian 
Maroons were actually also in a similar position to the Creeks. The Haitian Maroons 
represent yet another type of borderlands context that free communities could find 
themselves in. 
   The impact of this research also extends to the historiography of other Native 
American communities. The experiences of Native American communities, such as the 
Iroquois and the Abenaki, who lived on the border with British Canada, would have 
differed as result of their location. Northern communities were known to ally with the 
British in Canada on several occasions in their history but had little opportunity to 
negotiate with the Spanish so, while still in a borderlands setting, their geo-political 
negotiations would not have been an exact replica of those of the Creeks’.7 More in-
depth consideration of the empires which free communities such as these interacted 
would lead to more revealing comparisons; for example, the similarities between the 
Haitian Maroons and the Iroquois despite their different racial backgrounds. 
   In conclusion, this thesis has shown the significance of considering the impact 
geography and geo-political contexts had on free communities. Would the Maroons’ 
story have been altered if they had been situated in Georgia and Alabama, at the 
meeting point of several empires and indigenous nations? Likewise, would we have 
seen a change in the trajectory of Creek history if they too had lived high in the 
mountains of Jamaica? The answer is unequivocally “yes.” This thesis has added to the 
existing scholarship on free communities in the circum-Caribbean but the approach 
utilised can be broadened to show that future studies must include a detailed 
understanding of the impact of the region and borderlands that these communities lived 
in on their social, political and economic interactions with the world around them.  
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